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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent decades the Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been widely regarded 
as an innovative way to construct transport infrastructures and to improve the 
quality of service. As the number of PPP cases has increased, many countries 
have tried to standardise PPP models to minimise the costs of trial and error. 
South Korea, where 426 PPP projects have been undertaken since 1994, usually 
preferred the BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) model for transport. In the BTO 
model, the private sector recoups its investment by charging end users directly 
and hence should bear the traffic demand risk. However, the Korean 
Government shared the demand risk through a minimum revenue guarantee to 
induce private sector involvement, and this led to many criticisms of the BTO 
model. Tariffs in the BTO case were much higher than those of public 
operators, but the Government still had to pay large amounts of guaranteed 
revenue. Thus, BTL (Build-Transfer-Lease), where the demand risk is on the 
public sector, has become an alternative model. The BTL is the “service sold to 
the public sector” model which is similar to the DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-
Operate) in the UK. This thesis examines which of the BTO and the BTL PPP 
models is optimal to save governmental expenditure for transport 
infrastructures such as road and rail. Appropriate traffic demand risk sharing, 
which a particularly controversial issue in South Korea, is explored. These 
research objectives are examined through five case studies: the Incheon 
Airport Expressway and the Oksan-Ochang Expressway cases for road PPP; the 
Incheon Airport Railway, the Daegok-Sosa Railway and the Seoul Metro 9 cases 
for rail PPP. Through a detailed literature review and five case studies, the 
thesis shows that the optimal PPP model, which is measured by the VFM (Value 
for Money) assessment, needs to satisfy the interests of public sector, private 
sector, and end users. Based on these assessments and including these three 
viewpoints, it is concluded that the optimal PPP model for road can be the BTL 
where the public sector can save expenditure or reduce the level of tariff. 
Traffic demand risk for roads is relatively low, so the public sector does not 
have to transfer it to the private sector with high profit rate. In the case of rail, 
the limited revenue and high cost make a project difficult to be financially free 
standing by the BTO model. However, the BTO can be a better option in urban 
rail if traffic demand risk is shared appropriately.       
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CHAPTER 1   
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
In recent decades the Public Private Partnership (herein after PPP) has been 
widely regarded as an innovative way to cope with rapidly increasing public 
demands on social infrastructures. Transport, which needs huge investment for 
construction in a short period, is one of the most invigorated sectors for the 
PPP (UN ESCAP, 2006). Moreover, the public services under the PPP scheme are 
expected to achieve higher quality of service by transferring risks and 
responsibility to the sector which is more effective to control them (HM 
Treasury, 2008). 
 
For this reason, more than 100 countries in the world have used the PPP for 
public services (PPIAF, 2011). In South Korea, the PPP has been used since 
1994 when the PPP Act was legislated, though several public projects had been 
individually constructed by the private sector before 1994.   
 
Though the aims of the PPP are similar, the forms of PPP vary from country to 
country according to their social and economic circumstances. As the number 
of PPP cases has increased, many countries have tried to standardise PPP 
models to minimise the costs of trial and error. The PFI (Private Finance 
Initiative) of the UK seems one of the most famous PPP schemes in the world, 
and some countries and researchers use that term as a synonym with the PPP 
(Chiu and Bosher, 2005, Drapak, 2009). South Korea also has a unique PPP 
scheme which is named the PPI (Private Participation in Infrastructure). With 
regard to the PPP models, which model to choose depends on the 
circumstances of each country and the characteristic of a project.  
In the PPI scheme of South Korea, where 426 PPP projects have been 
undertaken since 1994, the BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) and the BTL (Build-Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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Transfer-Lease) models were mainly used for transport infrastructure projects 
(see Chapter 3). The BTO is a PPP model where the private sector builds a 
facility, transfers its ownership to the public sector and operates it for a 
specific period with the permission from the public sector.  In the BTO model, 
the private sector recoups its investment by charging end users directly with 
the traffic demand risk. However, the Korean government shared the demand 
risk through a Minimum Revenue Guarantee (herein after MRG) to induce the 
private sector involvement, and this led to much criticism of the BTO model. 
The Incheon Airport Railway, which was the first BTO project for rail in South 
Korea, was sold to the public operator only after one year of operation because 
of low traffic demand. The Yongin Light Railway is in court because of a 
discrepancy in demand risk sharing. The Busan-Gimhae Light Railway and the 
Uijeongbu Light Railway are anticipated to be in trouble with the same reason 
(Vivant, 2011). The recent global financial crisis affected the PPP market 
negatively and it was worse for the BTO model where the demand risk is on the 
private sector (see Chapter 2). 
 
Thus, the BTL (Build-Transfer-Lease), where the demand risk is on the public 
sector, is now suggested as an alternative model of the BTO for transport in 
South Korea. The BTL is a PPP model that the private sector builds a facility and 
transfers the ownership to the public sector. However the public sector gives 
the right to use it to the private sector for a specific period and the private 
sector leases it to the public sector again. In the BTL model, the private sector 
recoups its investment by the fee from the public sector for leasing.  It is 
usually used for the public service with little income from the end user, so it 
was introduced to facilities like school without enough revenue for the private 
sector to make a profit (KDI, 2009b). The BTL model has not been used for 
road PPP, but the NABO (National Assembly Budget Office) of Korea suggested 
using the BTL model for road instead of the BTO model (Lee, 2005). 
 
This thesis examines which PPP model out of the BTO and the BTL is optimal to 
save the governmental expenditure and to provide higher quality of service to 
the end users for road and rail in South Korea. For this examination, a method 
is newly suggested to compare the BTO and the BTL model. It also suggests 
the optimal traffic demand risk sharing, which is a key issue for the BTO model 
with MRG in South Korea. Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The purpose of this research is to find out an optimal PPP model between the 
BTO and BTL for road and rail in South Korea. Here, the meaning of ‘optimal’ 
can vary according to a view point. The PPP model saving the life cycle cost of 
the public sector, which reflects on the interest of tax payers, can be optimal 
to the public sector such as a government. On the other hand, the model 
giving higher return with lower risk can be optimal to the private sector. The 
model providing higher quality of service with lower tariff can be optimal to the 
end users of the service. 
 
For a successful PPP, these three points of views from the public sector, the 
private sector, and the end users need to be satisfied. Among these, the view 
from the end user is mostly covered by the public sector, because the end 
users cannot directly attend the negotiation table for a PPP contract which is 
concluded between the private and public sectors. With regard to the view of 
the private sector, the involvement of the private sector is decided in the PPP 
market and various conditions of each company are difficult to be theoretically 
considered in the thesis. Also, since such public service using the PPP scheme 
has been provided by the public sector, the public sector usually has the 
initiative in the PPP market. Thus, the public sector needs to offer an attractive 
PPP model which is acceptable to the private sector by employing methods 
such as appropriate risk sharing. 
 
This research aims to provide a guide for the public sector to choose an 
optimal model between the BTO and the BTL in road and rail in South Korea. 
An optimal PPP model needs to save the life cycle cost and to provide higher 
quality of service with lower tariff. This model should meet the interest of the 
private sector and offer an appropriate risk sharing to raise the feasibility of a 
PPP project itself. Especially, traffic demand risk is the key issue for the 
transport PPP in South Korea, so it needs to be considered mainly in terms of 
risk sharing. For this purpose, four research objectives are set out as follows: 
 
  To identify the features of the PPP models in transport in South Korea  
The appraisal on the BTO model is provided and the characteristics of the 
BTL, as an alternative PPP model, are discussed through the literature Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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review. In South Korea, these two PPP models were regarded proper for 
different areas: the BTO for transport with incomes from the end users; and 
the BTL for the service without enough income such as a school and sewage 
facility. In this context, this research objective examines the possibility to 
use the BTL instead of the BTO for transport and which model is better for 
road and rail;  
 
  To develop a detailed methodology to compare the BTO and the BTL  
Comparing the BTO and the BTL models for a transport project has not 
been tried before, so a new methodology will be developed. Quantitative 
and qualitative approaches will be developed to explore ways to compare 
the life cycle cost (LCC) and the quality of service of different procurement 
models; 
 
  To examine the optimal PPP model for road and rail in South Korea 
Through the quantitative and qualitative comparison between the BTL and 
the BTO models in both road and rail cases in South Korea, better PPP 
model is explored to save governmental expenditure and to provide better 
quality of service; and 
 
  To determine the appropriate demand risk sharing in road and rail  
The public sector in South Korea still prefers the BTO model for saving the 
LCC spent from the public sector (government expenditure) on transport, 
so the discussion is needed as to whether the BTO model can be optimised 
through an appropriate traffic demand risk sharing instead of using the BTL 
model which is more risky to the public sector. This will require a 
probabilistic approach to determine risk. In addition, a method to 
determine the optimal Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) will be 
developed for the BTO model. 
 
The thesis will make significant contributions to knowledge by making 
detailed comparisons of BTO and BTL PPPs for the road and rail sectors for 
the first time.  A new approach in which qualitative methods are used to 
supplement quantitative methods will assess the impact of service quality. 
This methodology will also be used to develop new guidelines for revenue 
risk sharing in BTO contracts. Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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1.3 Previous Studies 
 
The private involvement in the public service area could broadly be shown 
throughout the history of the World. However, the PPP has boomed since the 
1990s when the PFI was first introduced to the UK and many developing 
countries have tried to use the PPP for an early procurement of the 
infrastructures (Chen, 2010, Estache, 1999). As many countries introduced the 
PPP to cope with the increasing fiscal burdens and to improve the quality of 
public service, many researches about the PPP have been undertaken to suit 
the circumstances of each country.  
 
Though the details of the PPP are different according to the characteristics of a 
project, the PPP basically needs to be designed to allocate obligations or risks 
to the sectors which are best able to manage them (ADB, 2008). Through the 
appropriate risk management or obligation allocation, the public sector aims to 
minimise costs while improving the quality of public service. In short, the 
purpose of the PPP can be understood to maximise the value for money 
through optimal risk or obligation allocation.  
 
Thus, many issues of the PPP research have been mainly about risk allocation, 
value for money, and financial costs. Corner (2005) pointed out the real 
success of PFI projects depended on the degree to which risk was genuinely 
transferred from the public to the private sector and optimally shared through 
the qualitative and quantitative indicators. Clifton and Duffield (2006) explored 
the improved governance of the PFI/PPP in Australia through the contract 
structure between the private and public sectors, and risk management. Galilea 
and Medda (2010) studied the influence of the political and economic contexts 
such as a country’s experience, corruption and democratic accountability on 
the success of the transport PPP. In specific, they argued that the inexperience 
and corruption in developing countries affected the success of the PPP 
negatively, so the multilateral lenders like the World Bank should support these 
countries to set up a regulatory frame work for the PPP. Debande (2001) 
analysed the PFI cases in transport infrastructures from the UK experience, and 
argued that though the transfer of risks made it possible to reduce the 
construction cost, transaction costs were relatively high. He also suggested 
that the optimal PPP take into account two phases of the transport projects: the Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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design-construction and operation of the infrastructure. To evaluate the PPP 
projects, it looks necessary to test the VFM (Value for Money). Forshaw (1999) 
explored the UK’s traditional public procurement and PFI through the VFM 
concept. Heald (2003) suggested the necessity of a framework for the best 
VFM under the UK accounting regulation. He argued that though the VFM 
analysis should be considered with total risk, the accounting treatment 
decision was mainly judged by the sharing of risk, so the best VFM should 
cover the risk such as construction risk where the private sector had a 
responsibility beyond the accounting treatment.  
 
As the PPP cases increase, many governments are making a standard form for 
the PPP to minimize the cost of trial and error such as the transaction cost and 
time for negotiation. Such standard form of the PPP is called a PPP model, and 
it is designed to suit the characteristics of a project or to fit the social and 
economical circumstances of each country through the optimal risk allocation. 
The PPP model is based on a regulatory or legislative framework of each 
country, and it is best able to reflect the situation of PPP market of that country. 
Thus, the research on the PPP models seems the most practical way to allocate 
risks and to maximise the value for money.   
 
However, research on the PPP model has not been broadly invigorated in the 
World because of the flexibility of the PPP context and the ambiguity in terms 
and conditions across countries and across sectors (Galilea and Medda, 2010, 
Delmon, 2010). Thus, studies on the PPP models mainly focus on general 
features of the PPP model and comparative studies at a country level or at the 
various sector levels such as transport and water services.  
 
Palmer (2000) analysed the contract issues and financing between the DBFO 
model and the DBO model. He argued that the DBO model was different from 
the DBFO model in that the government was responsible for financing, so the 
DBO model would be more cost effective and quicker than the DBFO model. 
Vickerman (2003) analysed the characteristics of different types of PPP in the 
UK. The full privatisation, the PFI scheme, and the PPP scheme were explored 
through some UK transport cases such as the Channel Tunnel, Railtrack, PFI 
road, etc. He also argued that the private sector involvement required projects 
to be discrete and clearly defined PPP. Chiu and Bosher (2005) explored the Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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risk sharing mechanism by looking at the various types of PPP arrangements 
for water and wastewater services. In the transport sector, researches on the 
PPP model are much related with the payment mechanism. The BOT (Build-
Operate-Transfer) model, which is one of the most prevalent PPP models in the 
road sector, uses actual toll collected from the end user. The DBFO model, 
which is common in road in the UK, uses shadow toll or availability payment. 
Thus, several studies focus on a comparison between real toll and shadow toll 
(Aziz, 2007, Faivre d’arcier, 2003, House of Commons Transport Committee, 
2005, Bain and Wilkins, 2003a).  
 
In South Korea, the BTL model was newly introduced in 2005 and used to some 
railway projects from 2006. In the case of the rail BTL projects, the first project 
is still under construction. Thus, there are few studies on the BTL model for 
transport and most research on the BTL model was about general features and 
the sectors such as the school, military accommodation, and environment 
facilities (Park, 2011b, Ahn et al., 2011, Koo, 2011, Cho et al., 2009).  
 
With regard to the comparison of the BTL and the BTO models of Korea, Shin 
(2006) tried to compare both PPP models for the Incheon Airport Railway from 
the perspective of financial cost. However, he ignored the qualitative factors 
and various risks in the financial analysis. Since this study did not consider 
various characteristics of the BTL model, it might not seem to sufficiently 
examine the use of the BTL model for transport as an alternative to the BTO 
model. Kwak et al. (2009) suggested the risk-integrated feasibility analysis 
model of the BTL and the BTO project for the military residence building. They 
tried to use both models for a single military project by dividing it into two 
parts which are suitable for the BTL and BTO respectively.  
 
Though several studies examined the characteristics of each PPP model, an 
optimal PPP model for transport has not been studied enough. Especially, since 
the BTL model has not been used for road in South Korea yet, there is still 
doubt on the BTL model for rail. Thus, this thesis aims to suggest new 
methodology to compare the BTO and the BTL models not only for saving 
government expenditure and improving the quality of service, but also for 
identifying the optimal PPP model for transport infrastructures specified in 
road and rail. Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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1.4 Research Scope 
 
Since there are many PPP models worldwide and they sometimes can be 
tailored to the circumstances of each country, it might be difficult to compare 
all the possible PPP models. However, many countries make an effort to 
standardise the PPP model to reduce the cost and time for negotiation when 
making a contract with the private sector. These efforts make it possible to 
compare the characteristics of each standardised PPP model. This study 
focuses on the BTO and BTL model in South Korea as a practical research for 
solving the current problems with the BTO model in South Korea. 
 
This research deals with the PPP for transport infrastructures, especially road 
and rail. These two transport modes are the most prevalent users of PPP 
schemes not only in South Korea but also all over the World including the UK 
(see Chapter 2). Seaport and airport also represent important portions in the 
PPP fields, but this study primarily focuses on road and rail. 
 
The stakeholders of PPP are the public sector, the private sector and the end 
user. These three sectors hold different views on the PPP. In other words, the 
government has the main interest in budget savings and providing public 
service on time. The private sector always wants to make a profit. On the other 
hand, the end users do not care who provides transport infrastructure. What 
they are only interested in is the quality of service and fee if there is one. 
However, in most cases the government makes a decision to use the PPP after 
taking various views into account because the government has to be in final 
charge of providing the public service. Thus, many parts of this study are 
mainly focused on the government view while several characteristics of the PPP 
from different perspectives will be added to the qualitative analysis.  
 
The PPP is very sensitive to the social and economic circumstances of each 
country. Not only financial status but also credibility of country or people’s 
behaviour to the public service are important for the success of the PPP. 
Though the regional scope of this research is mostly limited to South Korea, 
the UK cases will be also studied to understand the newly introduced BTL 
model in Korea, which is basically using the concept of “service sold to the 
public sector” model in the PFI of the UK. Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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1.5 Research Procedure  
 
The research procedure for the optimal PPP model in South Korea consists of 
five steps with eleven chapters which cover the four research objectives.  
 
The first step addresses the research background, research objectives, 
previous studies, research scope, and this research procedure as an 
introduction of the research (Chapter 1). 
 
The second step reviews the general concept and models of the PPP. Definition, 
history, and the status of the PPP in the World including the UK, are mainly 
reviewed. The PPP models in the world are also introduced and classified. The 
trends in the PPP in transport are explored and the appraisal of PPP projects is 
reviewed. The regulation and models of the PPP in South Korea are also 
reviewed and the PPP projects for transport in South Korea are explored 
(Chapter 2 and 3). 
 
The third step studies the methodology to determine the optimal PPP for road 
and rail in South Korea. In this step, the meaning of the “optimal PPP model” is 
clarified and available methodologies to find an optimal model are reviewed. 
The concept of the VFM (Value for Money) assessment, which is the most 
prevalent method to find whether the PPP is better than the direct public 
investment, will be studied. In addition, the case study as a research tool is 
reviewed and five cases are selected for further study (Chapter 4).  
 
The fourth step is to determine the optimal PPP model that gives the highest 
VFM for different transport modes. This step takes five different cases in Korea 
which have already been implemented or are in negotiation. Through the VFM 
assessment and the sensitivity analysis, it will examine which PPP model is the 
most beneficial to government (Chapter 5 to 9).  
 
In the fifth and final step, the results of the five case studies comparing the 
BTL and BTO models in South Korea are analysed. The optimal PPP model for 
road and rail in South Korea is concluded and the suggestions for the Korean 
government are explored. Lastly, the contributions and limitations of the thesis 
are discussed and a future study plan is added (Chapter 10 and 11).  Byungwoo Gil    Introduction 
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CHAPTER 2   
THE PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN 
TRANSPORT 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The PPP has been broadly used in various public service areas in the World 
including transportation for a long time, though names and types of the PPP 
have varied by time and country (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2004). 
Historically, some of current public services were originated from the private 
sectors or included to the private service area such as the turnpike in the 17
th 
century in the UK and early rail industry in transport (Glaister et al., 2006). The 
PPP has become more prevalent since the PFI (Private Finance Initiative) of the 
UK was introduced in the 1990s. Many countries turned to PPP to seek higher 
efficiency and effectiveness in public service not only for budget savings but 
also for improved quality of service.  
 
The broad context and variable types of the PPP make its concept and terms 
ambiguous. This ambiguity is a big obstacle to sharing the experience and 
knowledge of respective countries with researchers. Therefore it needs to 
clarify the concept of PPP models and to identify general characteristics of the 
PPP regarding the standardised model first. 
 
In this chapter, general features of the PPP are reviewed for finding an optimal 
PPP model in transport. For this, the concept of the PPP which has many 
definitions and characteristics should be reviewed first. Then various PPP 
models in the World and their classification are explored. Lastly, the history of 
the PPP for transport infrastructure, PPP projects in transport and their 
appraisals are addressed in more details.   Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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2.2 The Concept of the Public Private Partnership 
 
2.2.1 Definition of the PPP 
 
The Public Private Partnership 
 
It seems difficult to define PPP clearly due to blurred boundary between the 
public and private sectors. In recent years, relations between the public and 
private sectors got more complicated and connected to each other. Also, there 
are too many different forms and variations in the PPP. Grimsey and Lewis 
(2005) said that “… (PPP is what) fills a space between traditionally procured 
government projects and full privatization”. HM Treasury (2009) defined PPP as 
follows: “Public private partnerships (PPPs) are arrangements typified by joint 
working between the public and private sectors. In the broadest sense, PPPs 
can cover all types of collaboration across the interface between the public and 
private sectors to deliver policies, services and infrastructure.”   
Standard and Poor’s (2005) defined that the PPP is a long-term relationship 
between the public and private sectors to deliver public service by sharing risks 
and using skills, expertise and finance of each sector. The European 
Commission (EC, 2004) also used the term as a form of cooperation between 
the public authorities and the private businesses of funding, construction, 
renovation, management and maintenance of a social or economic 
infrastructure.  
 
According to an OECD report on the PPP (2008), these unclear definitions may 
be due to a broad space between the public and private sectors in a 
partnership or cooperation to deliver public services. Trying to clarify the 
meaning of partnership and the difference with the concession, the OECD 
defined that the PPP is an agreement between the government and private 
partners where the private partners provide the service in such a way that the 
service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with their profit 
objectives through a sufficient risk transferring to them.  
 
Though the definition of the PPP is broad and sometimes it looks unclear, 
several common factors can be discussed. Allan (1999) found some common 
factors in various definitions of PPP as follows:  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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• A cooperative between the public and private sectors, built on the 
expertise of each partner, which best meets clearly defined public needs 
through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards. 
 
• An arrangement between two or more entities that enables them to 
work cooperatively towards shared or compatible objectives and in which 
there is some degree of shared authority and responsibility, joint 
investment of resources, shared risk taking and mutual benefit. 
 
Based on Allan’s common factors, it seems that three factors are important 
commonly to understand the PPP clearly: Resource, Risk, and Benefit. The 
definition of Standard and Poor’s and the European Commission shows the 
resources are skills, expertise and finance for construction, renovation, 
management and maintenance.  Risks are transferred to the private sector by a 
contractual agreement and the public sector tends to transfer them as many as 
possible (OECD, 2008). Benefit of each sector looks different. In the view of the 
private sector, the benefit from the PPP is making a profit while the benefit to 
the public sector is to achieve high service quality and save the cost the public 
sector has to burden to provide the public service. In these three factors, the 
most important thing looks the benefit of each sector in that such benefit is 
the key factor to initiate and improve the partnership between the public and 
the private sectors. Resources and risks are just negotiated and shared 
between the public and the private sectors to maximise the benefit of each 
sector. It means that resources and risks are tools for the PPP to meet the 
interest of each sector in the PPP.  
 
Therefore, the PPP can be defined as a cooperative working between public and 
private sectors to provide high quality public services which are affordable to 
the public sector and are profitable to the private sector by sharing skills, 
expertise, finance of each sector and risks from construction to operation.  
 
 
The Private Finance Initiative  
 Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was introduced by the Conservative 
government of the UK in 1992 (Allen, 2001). For the initial periods, the PFI did 
not boom. In 1997, the Labour government renovated the PFI to benefit all 
participants and transparently deliver better value for money. The basic 
motivation to introduce the PPP was to cope with increasing the government’s 
investment demands for infrastructures (Chege and Rwelamila, 2001). However, 
the main reason for developing the PFI was to adopt private creativity and 
competition to public services (HM Treasury, 2009). This characteristic seems 
to stand for the PFI and impact many other countries trying to find more 
effective way to deliver the public service. In other words, the PFI focused not 
only on the efficiency in finance but also on the effectiveness in public service 
when compared to previous efforts to use private financing.  
 
The definition of the PFI is quite clear, because this is created by the UK 
government with intentions as mentioned above. 
 
Scottish Parliament defines the PFI as follows (1999); 
 
   PFI is a means of using private finance and skills to deliver capital 
investment projects traditionally provided by the public sector …. Instead of 
the public sector body directly procuring capital assets and subsequently 
owning, operating and regulating them, PFI generally involves the private 
sector owning and operating, but the public sector having a larger role in 
regulation. 
 
However, in this definition, it is difficult to find the reason why the PFI got 
developed in the UK differently with previous private involvement in the public 
sector. 
 
To this question, HM Treasury (2009) explains as follows: 
 
The PFI is based on its commitment to efficiency, equity, accountability, and 
the PFI is only used where it can meet these requirements and deliver clear 
value for money.  Where these conditions are met, PFI delivers a number of 
important benefits. By requiring the private sector to put its own capital at risk 
and to deliver clear levels of service to the public over the long term, PFI helps Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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to deliver high quality public services and ensure that public assets are 
delivered on time and to budget.  
 
Hence, the PFI mainly emphasizes on a process to guarantee these benefits 
compared with traditional procurement. In short, the PFI can be defined as a 
means of using private finance and skills for high quality public services to be 
delivered on time and to budget, based on the commitment to efficiency, 
equity and accountability. 
 
Difference of the PPP and PFI 
 
The PFI was a creation of the Conservative government of the UK in the early 
1990s and the Labour government has expanded the PFI to the PPP from 1997 
(McNulty, 2002, Higton, 2005). The PPP and PFI seem to be used 
interchangeably in the UK and other countries, although the PFI is also 
described as one of the PPP types in many papers (Cartlidge, 2006, Alshawi, 
2009). HM Treasury (2009) also explained the PFI as the most common form of 
the PPP in the UK. More specifically, the PPP and PFI have the same aim to 
improve mutual benefits in public services through allocation of resources and 
risks. However, since the PPP has no regular formation, the process and 
scheme of each country or project can be different. The PFI has formatted 
process to deliver the public service effectively. Figure 2.1 shows the 
procedure of the PFI from clarifying the objectives of the PFI to awarding 
contracts and managing them. Especially, while project financing rests mainly 
on the private sector (Hardcastle and Boothroyd, 2003) and the Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) is usually made to distribute high risks of the private sector in the 
PFI, it is more flexible in the PPP (see section 2.2.3). Therefore, the PFI can be 
understood as a particular method with a substantial process for the private 
sector to design, build, finance and operate facilities. The PPP is a generic term 
used to describe partnerships with more various methods (Hale et al., 2004). 
 
For this reason, the PFI can be distinguished from various PPP models such as 
BOT, BLT, BOO, etc. The most common PFI model is a DBFO (Davies and 
Fairbrother 2006), but other models can be also used in the PFI scheme.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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Figure 2.1Step by Step Guide to the PFI Process 
Clarify objectives by establishing 
business need 
↓ 
Appraise the options 
↓ 
Produce outline business case and 
outline PSC (Public Sector Comparator) 
↓ 
Assemble project team 
↓ 
Decide tactics for selection Stage 
↓ 
Invite bids by issuing contract notice 
in OJEU(Official Journal of EU) 
↓ 
Prequalification of bidders 
↓ 
Selection of bidders 
(short listing) 
↓ 
Reappraise business case 
and refine the PSC 
↓ 
Invitation to negotiate 
↓ 
Receipt and evaluation of 
bids 
↓ 
Selection of preferred bidder 
and final evaluation 
↓ 
Award contract and 
financial close 
↓ 
Manage contract 
Source: Based on Treasury Taskforce, Step by Step Guide to the PFI procurement 
Process, November 1999; recited from House of Common, UK 
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2.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the PPP/PFI 
 
Though the definition and spectrum of the PPP are not unified and the contents 
and terms are sometimes ambiguous, several common characteristics are 
discovered in the PPP. Specifically, five elements are shown in several 
researches as the general characteristics: two or more participants; the 
principal role in negotiation of each participant; enduring and stable 
relationship; resources able to be transferred to the partnership; and shared 
responsibility for outcomes (Li and Akintoye, 2003, Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  
 
By introducing the PPP having these general characteristics to the public 
service, the PPP has several advantages. Li and Akintoye (2003) described six 
benefits of the PPP: enhance government’s capacity to develop integrated 
solutions; facilitate creative and innovative approaches; reduce the cost and 
time to implement the project; transfer certain risks to the private sector; 
attract larger, potentially more sophisticated, bidders to the project; and 
access advanced skills, experience and technology. However, these advantages 
can be controversial in other view points. Yescombe (2007) summarised 
debates about avoiding limitations on the budget of the public sector without 
additional demand on budget, risk transfer instead of higher financing cost of 
the private sector, the complexity of the PPP, the flexibility of the public sector, 
etc. The disadvantages of the PPP are also compared with advantages in many 
researches. Stainback (2000) explored advantages and disadvantages of the 
PPP based on respective views of the private and the public sectors. In the view 
of the public sector, there were such advantages as reduced risks on the 
ownership, development and operation, utilising the expertise and creativity of 
the private sector, reducing the investment of the public sector, generating 
long term investment of the private sector, etc. Disadvantages were the 
reduced level of control over the design and building quality, the possibility of 
inappropriate risk sharing and legal dispute, the economic return to the public 
sector depending on the private sector, the predevelopment process open to 
the public by media, etc. In the view of the private sector, advantages were the 
chance to use the government owned real estate, the shared risk with the 
public sector, etc. while disadvantages were the complicated process, more 
time in predevelopment process, the affection of the political stability, etc. 
Corner (2005) summarised the advantages and disadvantages based the PFI Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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deals of the UK. There are many other discussions of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the PPP when compared with the direct investment of the 
public sector. They can be summarised by the stage of a project as seen in 
Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 Potential advantages and disadvantages of the PPP/PFI 
Stage  Advantages  Disadvantages 
Plan    Greater price certainty 
  Integrated plan covering whole 
life cycle of facility 
  Uncertainty of planning for long-
term period (political risk, 
regulation change, etc.) 
Contract    Clear aim of delivering public 
service  
  Performance measurement and 
incentives for upgrading the 
quality of service 
  Competition among the private 
sectors for the public service 
  Long (re)negotiation time to get 
an agreement 
  Late response to the demand for 
the change of the contract  
  Limitations of terms and 
conditions to allocate risks well 
  High transaction cost (consulting 
fee, more resources in the 
private and the public sectors) 
Design    Innovation and creativity in 
design 
  Design considering life cycle  
  Possibility of overdesign to push 
up prices in construction 
Finance    Long-term investment of the 
private sector 
  Reduction of spending of the 
public sector for public service  
  Restriction of future budget 
(depends on PPP model) 
  Financing at commercial rates 
which tend to be higher than 
government borrowing rates 
Construction    On time construction 
  On budget construction 
  Existence of unexpected 
problems (e.g. natural disaster 
which cannot be forecasted) 
Operation    Timely delivery of service 
  No involvement of the public 
sector in none core service 
  Inflexibility of operation for a 
long term period (20-30 years) 
Source: (1 Stainback, 2000, 2 Herpen, 2002, 3 Li and Akintoye, 2003, 4 Yescombe, 
2007, 5 Thomson and Goodwin, 2005) Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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2.2.3. Risks of the PPP and risk allocation 
 
Risks of the PPP 
 
Risks of the PPP are various and following lists are regarded as risks in the PPP: 
site acquisition risk, feasibility study risk, acquiring planning approval risk, 
design risk, construction risk, commissioning risk, operating risk, demand 
(revenue) risk, obsolescence/technology risk, residual value, 
legislative/regulation risk, taxation risk, bid process/complicated negotiation 
risk, political risk, corruption risk, consortium structure risk, local partners risk, 
project management ability, existing infrastructure risk, raw material (supply, 
availability, etc), financing risk, force majeure risk, market competition risk, 
inflation risk, and foreign exchange risk (Private Finance Panel, 1995, Birnie, 
1999, Salzmann and Mohamed, 1999).  
 
Risks can be classified by a different perspective and some risks are more 
relevant than others for each project (NAO, 1999). They are affected by the 
economical or political circumstances of each country. Thus, it is important to 
identify appropriate risks for a project. According to NAO (1999), in the case of 
transport (especially for road), key risks were expected to be demand, design, 
construction and maintenance.  
 
Risk allocation  
 
Risks should be allocated to the sector which is best able to control them (HM 
Treasury, 2008). The reason of using the PPP in the viewpoint of the public 
sector is to provide the public service effectively and efficiently, but it is for 
making a profit to the private sector (ADB, 2012). Thus, risks can be 
successfully allocated when it satisfies each sector and is agreed between two 
sectors (Li et al., 2005a). Some researchers prefer to allocate risks to three 
stakeholders: the public sector sponsor, the private sector and the end users 
(Arndt, 1998). However, the public sector covers the interest of the end users 
in most cases, so risks can be assigned to the public sector and the private 
sector or shared between the two sectors (NAO, 1999).  
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Risks should be allocated by a rational systematic manner, because some of 
them can be overlooked (Wang et al., 2002). Risk allocation is conducted 
through the negotiation process between two sectors and it is finally 
concluded by making a contract (Li et al., 2005a, NAO, 1999).  
 
Contractual framework for risk allocation  
 
Usually the private sectors make a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which is a 
key feature of most PPPs, to share risks between private sectors (ESCAP, 
2011). The SPV undertakes a project and negotiates contract agreements 
with the public sector. It is used for the PPP project implementation in 
limited or non-recourse situations, where the lenders depend on the cash 
flow and security over its assets to recoup its investment. An SPV has whole 
risks of the private sectors and each private sector is partly responsible for 
its shares. Thus, it is good to manage a mega project with high cost and 
risks. 
 
Figure 2.2 Contractual structure of the PFI  
 
 
Source: (Palmer, 2000) Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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2.3 The models of the Public Private Partnership 
 
2.3.1 The PPP models in the World 
 
A PPP project can be launched by making a contract through the agreement 
between the private and the public sectors and it is much affected by the 
characteristic of each project and circumstances of each country (ADB, 2008). 
There are a lot of ambiguity and difference in making a PPP contract and these 
increase transaction cost
1 which is one of the most significant negative factors 
(Li et al., 2005a, Ezulike et al., 1997). In here, transaction cost includes not 
only cost for negotiation between the private and the public sectors, consultant, 
and education for officers but also time to get an agreement (House of Lords, 
2010). Many countries made their own PPP models having unique processes 
and standard forms to be suitable for their countries (see table 2.3 and 2.4), so 
the PPP model can be defined as the standardised form with a substantial 
process.  
 
Every country has socially and economically different circumstances, so many 
PPP models are made and changed by the needs of each country. In South 
Korea, several PPP models are listed as examples in the PPP Act which was 
legislated in 1993, but the most predominant PPP models are the BTO (Build 
Transfer Operate) and the BTL (Build Transfer Lease) models. In the UK, the 
DBFO model is common in transport (especially in road). These PPP models can 
be diversified by the following functions: design; build; finance; operate; 
maintain; own; transfer; lease; develop; and buy (Menckhoff and Zegras, 1999, 
Zhang and Kumaraswamy, 2001). These combinations make many models of 
PPP and each function implies various levels of responsibility and risk of the 
private sector (ADB, 2008). However, these models are not exclusive and there 
can be many variations (Steinmann, 2007). It is also possible that each project 
can have their own model by selecting benefits from different models of PPP, 
and these models can be expressed by two ways. One is focusing on the stage 
of project such as a design (D), build or construct (B or C), rehabilitate (R), 
operate (O), maintain, and manage (M). The other way is focusing on the 
                                           
1 The cost in the process of negotiating contracts because of legal, financial, and 
technical issues Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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ownership of the facility, which is expressed as transfer (T), own (O), lease (L), 
etc. For example, the BOT, BTO, BOO, BROT, BTL, BLT, etc. are the most 
common models.  
 
PPP models by the stage of project 
 
Following PPP models are diversified by the stage of project where the private 
sector has a responsibility.  
 
DBO (Design-Build-Operate) 
 
In DBO model, the private sector is in charge of design, build and operate. The 
public sector owns and finances the construction of new facility. Generally, the 
private operator is taking no financing risk and is paid a sum for construction 
cost and operating fee by the procurement authority (PPP IRC, 2011). 
 
DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate) 
 
DBFO is the PPP model where the private sector undertakes the design, build 
and operate a facility with its own finance for a contracted period, mostly 25 or 
30 years. It is generally for the PPP/PFI roads (Scottish Future Trust, 2011).   
 
DBOM (Design-Build-Operate-Maintain), 
 
Under DBOM model, the private sector is responsible for the design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility for a contracted period.  
The private sector should meet all agreed performance standards relating to 
physical condition, capacity, congestion, and ride quality (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2007). 
 
DCMF (Design-Construct-Manage-Finance) 
 
This model is very similar to DBOM or DBFO and it is generally for the PPP 
prison projects. The main difference is that the majority of services are 
provided by private sector employees unlike PPP schools where the facility is Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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maintained by the private sector, but the core teaching role remains within the 
public sector (Scottish Future Trust, 2011). 
Table 2.2 PPP models by the stage of the project 
PPP 
model  Design  Build  Finance 
Manage 
Example  Operate 
(Core Service) 
Maintain 
DBO  Private  Private  Public  Private/Public  Private 
North Ballarat 
Wastewater  Plant 
Upgrade 
(Australia) 
DBFO  Private  Private  Private  Private/Public  Private 
A1(M) Alconbury 
to Peterborough  
road (UK) 
DBOM  Private  Private  Private/ 
Public  Public  Private  Hudson-Bergen 
LRT (USA) 
DCMF  Private  Private  Private  Private  Private  DCMF prison, 
library (UK) 
Source: (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2007, Scottish Future Trust, 2011), 
http://www.infrastructure.org.au  
 
PPP models by the ownership of facility 
 
Following PPP models are diversified by the ownership of facility in above 
mentioned functions of the PPP projects.  
 
BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) and variants 
 
BOT(Build-Operate- Transfer) is one of the most preferred PPP model and a 
term that got coined by Turgat Ozal, prime minister of Turkey in the 1980s 
(Delmon, 2005). The private sector is in charge of financing, designing, 
building and operating the project (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). BTO, BOT (Build-
Operate-Transfer), ROT (Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer), BROT (Build-
Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer) have the same scheme for returning private 
investment. After building or rehabilitating a facility, the private sector 
operates and gets revenues from end users directly for a contracted period. At 
the end of contract period, the facility is transferred to the public sector. BTO 
is different from BOT in the time of transferring the facility. ROT is used for the 
existing facility (Park, 2003). BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) and ROOT 
(Rehabilitate-Own-Operate-Transfer) are models emphasising on the ownership Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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of the constructed or rehabilitated facility. In the pure BTO model, the private 
sector does not have to own the facility (Outsourcing Law Global, 2011). 
BLT (Build-Lease-Transfer) and variants 
 
BLT is a model of PPP where the private sector designs, builds and operates an 
infrastructure facility and leases it to the public sector. BTL (Build-Lease-
Transfer) is different from BTL just in the time of transferring. In the BTL model, 
the private sector uses its own funds to build infrastructure facilities and 
transfers ownership to the public sector. The public sector in turn grants the 
company “rights to manage and operate the facilities” to take charge of its 
operation. However, the public sector makes payments for the services 
rendered by the company which enables the company to recover its investment 
and operation costs (Park, 2003).  
 
LDO (Lease-Develop-Operate) / LBO (Lease-Build-Operate) 
 
In this model, the private sector is given a long-term lease to develop and 
operate an existing facility. The private sector invests in the improvement of 
the facility and recovers its investment and a reasonable profit. It is particularly 
appropriate when the public sector retains ownership of the existing facility 
and receives payments under lease agreement with the private sector. This 
model is well suited for developing airport, seaport or rail infrastructure, as 
due to strategic reasons government would like to retain their ownership (Mital 
and Mital, 2006, Davies and Fairbrother, 2003). 
 
BOO (Build-Own-Operate) / BBO (Buy-Build-Operate) / LOO (Lease-Own-Operate) 
 
BOO is a model of PPP where the private sector owns the facility for unlimited 
period, so it is the nearest to the privatisation. The public sector constrains the 
operation of the private sector by various regulations (Department of Education 
and Children's Services of South Australia, 2011). BBO (Buy-Build-Operate) is a 
model that the private sector buys an existing facility and after building or 
repairing, the private sector operates under the regulation of public sector 
(Park, 2003). LOO (Lease-Own-Operate) is similar to a BOO but an existing 
asset is leased from the public sector who takes ownership from that time 
(Arndt, 1999, Chege and Rwelamila, 2001).  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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Other models 
 
Besides those mentioned above, there can be various similar models like 
BLOT(Build-Lease-Operate-Transfer), BOD(Build-Operate-Deliver), BOL(Build-
Operate-Lease), BOOST(Build-Own-Operate-Subsidize-Transfer), BRT(Build-Rent-
Transfer), DBOT(Design-Build-Operate-Transfer), FBOOT(Finance-Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer), and RTL(Rehabilitate-Transfer-Lease) (Arndt, 1999, Chege 
and Rwelamila, 2001, Song, 2005, Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
 
Table 2.3 PPP models by the ownership of facility 
PPP 
model  Ownership  New / Existing  Operate  Main source of 
revenue 
BOT  Private / Public 
(mostly private for a 
specified period) 
New facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
BTO  Public 
(grant operation right) 
New facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
ROT  Private / Public 
(depends on a case) 
Existing facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
BROT  Private / Public 
(mostly private for a 
specified period) 
Rehabilitate 
existing facility 
and add on new 
facility 
Private  End user’s tariff 
BOOT  Private 
(for a specified period) 
New facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
ROOT  Private 
(for a specified period) 
Existing facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
BLT  Private  New facility  Private  Lease fee from 
public sector 
BTL  Public  New facility  Private  Lease fee from 
public sector 
LDO(LBO)  Public  Existing facility  Private  Collect end user’s 
tariff and pay 
lease to public 
sector 
BOO  Private  New facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
BBO  Private (Buy)  Existing facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
LOO  Private 
(for a leasing period) 
Existing facility  Private  End user’s tariff 
Source: (Arndt, 1999, Chege and Rwelamila, 2001, Park, 2003, Mital and Mital, 2006, 
Delmon, 2005, Davies and Fairbrother, 2003, Outsourcing Law Global, 2011, Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2004) Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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2.3.2 Classification of the PPP models 
 
The PPP models are various and they could be continuously made to reflect 
rapidly changing circumstances. It is not appropriate to say that one particular 
PPP model is universally better than another, because efficiency and 
effectiveness can be varied by given situations of project, sector, and country. 
Thus, it needs to classify various PPP models to identify relevant lessons from 
other projects, sectors, and countries. Delmon (2010) suggested five key 
parameters to classify many PPP models in the World. These parameters are 
business (New or Existing), construction obligation (Build or Refurbish), private 
funding (Equity contribution, Debt contribution, Subordinated contribution, 
Project finance), service delivery (Bulk or User), and source of revenue (Lease 
fee or End user tariff).  
 
Song (2005) described that the PPP models could be classified by the way of 
proposal and the way of repayment. If the private sector proposes a project 
then it is called an unsolicited project while the public sector proposes a 
project then it is called a solicited project. The PPP models are classified as a 
“financially free standing” model and a “service sold to the public sector” model 
by the way of repayment. In the financially free standing PPP model, the source 
of repayment is the tariff from the end users and, in service sold to the public 
sector model, it is the fee from the procurement authority. Similarly Allen 
(2001) divided the PFI projects of the UK into three types: Financially free 
standing projects, Joint ventures, and services sold to the public sector. 
Financially free standing type is the PPP where the private sector builds and 
operates the facility by the fee from the end users without the financial support 
from the public sector. In the services sold to the public sector model, the 
public sector pays lease fee for the service provided by the private sector 
regardless of the fee. In the case of the joint ventures type, the public sector 
directly joins the project and provides various supports such as subsidy. 
However, joint venture can be used with any other types of PPP and it is very 
common in South Korea, so this type does not need to be classified 
independently for studying the cases of South Korea.  
 
In this study, it looks better to classify various PPP models by the way of 
repayment as seen in Table 2.5. This study comparing the BTO and the BTL Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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model of South Korea and these two models are ‘financially free standing’ 
model and ‘services sold to the public sector’ model. Thus, this classification 
of PPP models can help other countries to understand this study. Table 2.5 
shows that the Queen Elizabeth II bridge project of the UK is a ‘financially free 
standing’ type and the M1-A1 motorway link DBFO project is a ‘services sold to 
the public sector’ type. 
Table 2.4 Classification of PPP models by the way of repayment 
Classification  Characteristics 
Relevant 
PPP 
models
2 
Relevant transport 
projects 
Financially 
free standing 
projects 
(Tariff base) 
The private sector is responsible for a 
project and costs will be repaid 
through a charge to the end user. The 
Government may be involved in 
making an initial plan and procedure 
like determining the route of road. The 
role of public sector is limited to 
secure wider social benefits, such as 
road decongestion resulting from an 
estuarial crossing. 
BOT, BTO, 
ROT,  
BOOT, 
BOO, etc. 
Queen Elizabeth II 
(Dartford) Bridge 
(UK) 
Incheon Airport 
Expressway 
(Korea) 
Services sold 
to the public 
sector 
(Fee base) 
The private sector provides public 
services to the public sector and the 
investment of the private sector is 
recouped from the fee of the public 
sector. For example: a private sector 
firm selling kidney dialysis services to 
a hospital; the private sector providing 
accommodation and day-to-day care 
for the elderly; or the provision of 
prison places by the private sector 
through designing, building, financing 
and operating new prisons. 
DBFO, BTL, 
BLT, etc. 
M1-A1 Motorway 
Link, A1(M) 
Alconbury to 
Peterborough  
(UK) 
Daegok-Sosa 
Railway (Korea) 
Source: Partnerships UK (2011), Allen (2001), Song (2005), MLTM 
                                           
2 Details of PPP models are varied by the situation of each project or country, so there 
can be exceptional projects. For example, M6 toll road (UK) is usually known as a DBFO 
project, but it is close to financially free standing project.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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2.4 The Public Private Partnership in transport 
 
2.4.1 The PPP projects for transport infrastructures 
 
Road, railroad, seaport and airport are the most common transport 
infrastructures which can be constructed and operated by the PPP in the world. 
According to the World Bank, 81 countries have adopted a private sector 
involvement to build or operate transport infrastructure from 1990 to 2009. 
During the same period, the private sector has involved in 1,202 transport 
projects with the investment amount reaching more than US $ 255,363 million. 
 
Figure 2.3 PPP projects by transport sector in developing countries 
 
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org) 
 
Figure 2.3 shows that around half of them are road projects and the rest are 
for seaports, rails, and airports. The number of road PPP projects from 1990 to 
2009 is 605, seaports 352, airports 134, and railroads 111. The amount of 
road investment is US $130,131 million, seaports $51,502 million, airports 
$29,646 million, and railroads $44,085 million. 
 
Since the PPP for transport infrastructures is likely to be for a mega project 
which needs much private investment, it is easy to be affected by the economic 
circumstances. As seen in the Figure 2.4, the number of PPP projects and the 
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investment in them had increased until 1997 when the financial crisis hit Asian 
countries including South Korea. The economy recovered in a very short time 
and reached the peak in 2006. However, the investment has rapidly decreased 
since 2006 and it seems that the PPP market has been negatively affected by 
the global financial crisis (Liyanage, 2011, Thadden, 2009, Raisbeck, 2009, 
Burger et al., 2009).  
 
Figure 2.4 Annual trends of PPP projects in transport in developing countries 
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2.4.2 The PPP models for transport infrastructures 
 
In this study for comparing two different PPP models (BTO and BTL) of South 
Korea, the most effective way to classify the PPP models is based on the 
repayment method: financially free standing and services sold to the public 
sector model (see section 2.3.2). With regard to the PPP models for transport 
infrastructures, most of them are ‘financially free standing’ models except the 
cases of the UK.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows that 83.4% (1,002 projects out of 1,202 projects) of transport 
PPP projects used the financially free standing model such as BOT, BROT, ROT, 
BOO, etc. The rest of them used lease contract, management contract, etc. 
Generally, transport PPP has incomes through charging end users, so it seems 
that the public sector prefers to use the financially free standing model.  
 
Figure 2.5 The PPP models for transport infrastructures 
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Especially, in the cases of road, non-financially free standing model 
represented only 7% of investment for PPP projects from 1985 to 2004 in the 
World
3 (Aecom Consult, 2007).  
 
However, PPP models for transport in the UK are quite different from those in 
the above mentioned countries. The most predominant PPP model in transport 
in the UK is the service sold to the public sector model and few projects were 
done by the financially free standing PPP model.  
 
The UK is the most advanced European country in terms of the private 
participation in the public service either through direct private provision or 
through the PPP as seen in Table 2.6 (Vickerman, 2003). A total of 898 PPP 
projects in the UK have been carried out since 1992, and of which 68 projects 
are for transport. While 22 of the transport projects are mainly about street 
lighting, shipping, bus service, the rest 46 projects are about transport 
infrastructure. Among the 46 projects, 29 projects are for roads 16 for rail 
including underground and tram or light rail, and 1 for an airport terminal. 
Total amount of investment for 43 transport infrastructure projects is ￡23,770 
million: roads ￡3,615 million, rails ￡20,145
4 million and airport terminal ￡10 
million (Partnership UK, 2011; see Appendix 1).  
 
Table 2.5 The PPP of European countries 
 
No. of 
signed 
projects (%) 
Value of 
signed 
projects 
(%)   
No. of 
signed 
projects  
(%) 
Value of 
signed 
projects (%) 
Austria  0.2  0.6  Latvia  0.1  0.0 
Belgium  0.7  1.1  Malta  0.1  0.1 
Cyprus  0.3  0.4  Netherlands  1.0  1.7 
Czech Rep.  0.2  0.4  Poland  0.4  0.9 
Denmark  0.0  0.0  Portugal  2.3  5.8 
Finland  0.2  0.2  Romania  0.3  0.1 
France  2.8  3.9  Slovak Rep.  0.1  0.0 
Germany  2.4  2.9  Slovenia  0.1  0.0 
                                           
3 Cases of USA were excluded. 
4 The most of them are for London underground(£17,594 million for 8 projects) Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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Greece  0.6  3.9  Spain  8.6  12.8 
Hungary  0.8  2.7  Sweden  0.1  0.2 
Ireland  0.7  0.7  UK  76.2  57.2 
Italy  2.1  3.7  Total  100.0  100.0 
Source : EIB, HM Treasury, Irish PPP Unit and various commercial databases : recited 
from  Blanc-Brude et al (2007). 
 
In these transport PPP projects of the UK, only three projects were done by the 
financially free standing model: Birmingham Northern Relief Road (M6 Toll), 
Second Severn Crossing, and Skye Bridge. Even including a partly subsided 
joint venture project, only four projects used financially free standing model 
(House of Commons, 2000, Partnerships UK, 2011). 
 
2.4.3 The appraisal for the PPP in transport 
 
Various efforts were made to use the finance, creativity and the competition of 
the private sector, and the PFI is the most controversial and best-known form 
of the PPP in the UK (Cartlidge, 2006). Therefore many of the experiences in 
the UK are based on the PFI scheme compared with the conventional public 
procurement scheme. Traditional procurement of transport project which is 
mostly large scale had problems of late delivery and overran the estimated cost 
(NAO, 1998). One of the most important reasons to use the PPP was to solve 
these problems. According to the Nation Audit Office of the UK (1998), the PFI 
had managed to keep the expected time and cost of construction. 
 
As the investment in the PPP projects had gradually increased, however, some 
criticisms were also followed. These criticisms seemed to mostly focus on the 
risk allocation, efficiency and transparency of the PFI projects. Glaister (1999) 
listed five misused PPP instances. First, it was possible to evade from the 
political spending control such as a government change. Generally the period 
of the PPP contract lasted more over 20 or 30 years, so it could not be changed 
to spend money on that for the contracted period. Second, the interest rates 
were difficult to change, so it was hard to cope with flexible financial markets. 
Third, the process to make a contract was quite complicated and took a long 
time, so this mechanism obfuscated the public cost of investment decisions. 
Debande (2002) also pointed out this problem. The transaction cost such as Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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staff costs, and consultant fee was relatively high regardless of the project size 
and the procurement model of the PPP. Fourth, the complexity of contract 
between the public and private sectors made it difficult to have a chance to 
criticize the faults in the construction and operation phases and to find the 
reasons. Lastly, though people frequently misunderstood that they did not 
have additional financial burdens to use the facilities which were funded by the 
private sector, the public sector had to repay the private sector by tax or other 
public fund. After all, though the government advertised the PPP as a new 
funding, actually it was just financing. 
 
Vickerman (2002) analyzed some experiences of the UK from the fully privately 
financed Channel Tunnel project to the PPP in the provision of new urban 
public transit projects. In the Channel Tunnel case which was financially 
independent, the uncertainty of scale, construction costs, and traffic forecasts 
was a major problem. In the Railtrack case to upgrade the West Coast line, 
transaction costs, problem of complexity and risks were highlighted. 
 
There were various attempts to induce the private sector to participate in the 
road projects, but many of them were executed by the DBFO scheme. As 
mentioned above, the DBFO scheme was generally beneficial in keeping to the 
planned construction period and cost, but the possibility that the government 
could pay more than 25% than the original construction cost was also raised. In 
other words, it was the complaint that the DBFO for roads was too expensive 
(Shaoul et al., 2006, NAO, 1998). 
 
With regard to the financially free standing model like a BOT, the investment of 
the private sector is recovered through charging tariffs to the end users. Thus, 
the most attractive thing to the public sector was the possibility to spend little 
government budget on the project while the facility was procured in time. 
 
However, the private sector has an exclusive right to operate the private 
funded facility, so it can lead to inefficiencies due to lack of competition 
(Herpen, 2002). In most cases, since the private sector has a right to operate in 
monopoly, high tariff level which the private sector was a big controversial 
issue in several countries using the financially free standing model.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
The PPP covers various public service areas and the responsibility and risk of 
the private and public sectors depend on the agreement between both sectors. 
The variety of PPPs makes its definition difficult and the concept ambiguous. 
Confusing terminology and so many models were obstacles to exchanging 
knowledge and experiences between countries. Thus, it is needed to review the 
concept of PPP clearly and explore the PPP models broadly.  
 
Through literature reviews, the PPP could be broadly defined as a cooperative 
working between public and private sectors to fulfil the public needs and 
maximize the mutual benefit by sharing skills, expertise, finance of each sector 
and risks in construction or operation. Especially, risks in PPP projects are 
complicated and high, so they are difficult to be managed well by only one 
private company. Therefore, in order to limit the risks of private sector within 
the shares they have, a SPV is broadly used as a contractual frame. 
 
The PPP had broad spectrum and PPP models are also various, so it is needed 
to classify these models. Though several ways to classify the PPP models exist, 
the PPP models in this study are classified into the financially free standing 
model and the service sold to the public sector model based on the way of 
recoupment or source of revenue. This classification explains well the BTO and 
the BTL models which are the most predominant PPP models in South Korea. 
Joint venture, where the public and private sectors jointly invest, is often used 
not only in the UK but also in Korea. However, since it can be used in any PPP 
model, this type is not regarded as an independent classification in this study. 
 
In the transportation field, the PPP has a long history and historically many 
transport services were operated by the private sectors. However, they became 
difficult to be fully delivered in the private arena as society and economies 
rapidly developed. However, the public sector did not have enough fiscal 
resources to fulfil public needs in transport. The private sector was also limited 
in its ability to satisfy various public demands given its own motive to make a 
profit. Thus, many countries introduce the PPP to the transport field while 
many of them preferred the financially free standing model. On the contrary, 
the UK mainly used the service sold to the public sector model.Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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CHAPTER 3   
The Public Private Partnership in Transport 
in South Korea 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The PPP in South Korea was rarely used on a project before 1994. As the 
national economy was rapidly developed, the demand for the transport 
infrastructures was steeply increased. Though the government enlarged the 
investment in the transport such as road and rail, it was not enough to cope 
with the regional demand. Moreover, the economic crisis in Asian countries 
including South Korea in 1997 made the government decrease the financial 
expenditure. The Korean government was requested to save the budget for a 
large scale investment in transport infrastructures. Such circumstance made 
the Korean government expand the PPP urgently and focus on budget savings 
by using the BTO model. The government explained that the BTO projects 
mainly for road and rail could be constructed and operated without the 
financial burden of the government. However, it was not true because the 
government guaranteed the minimum revenue which was up to 90% of the 
forecast This Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) scheme which was commonly 
shown in early BTO projects in South Korea was severely criticised. 
 
This chapter explores the regulation and prospect of PPP mainly focusing on 
transport in South Korea. Firstly, it introduces the transport in South Korea 
focusing on the road and rail and provides an overview on the regulation of the 
PPP such as history, procedure, and the MRG regulation. Next, PPP models in 
South Korea are explored in detail. Especially, the features of the BTO and the 
BTL model, which are dominant in South Korea, are discussed. Advantages and 
disadvantages are deeply compared for both PPP models. Then, the PPP 
projects in road and rail in South Korea are reviewed. Lastly, the appraisal on 
the PPP for transport in South Korea is explored.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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3.2 Transport in South Korea 
 
3.2.1 Introduction to transport in South Korea 
 
In the early 1900’s paved road and rail were newly introduced to Korea, but 
most of them were destroyed during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. Korea 
was divided into South and North Korea, and main road and rail networks 
disconnected. Development of transport infrastructure in South Korea was 
resumed from the 1970’s with rapid economic growth. 
 
In 1970, the Gyeongbu Expressway linking Seoul and Busan was opened. It was 
the first expressway and the first toll road in South Korea. South Korea, which 
was one of the poorest countries in the World until the 1960’s, was suffered 
from the lack of budget to invest in SOC (Social Overhead Capital) like road and 
rail. Thus, most expressways were constructed as toll roads to lessen the 
financial burden of the government. Road pricing on expressways was widely 
regarded as necessary under the difficult fiscal situation in South Korea and 
the agreement of people on toll road policy became an important factor for the 
BTO project. In other words, a ‘financially free standing’ model was widely 
adopted by toll charging without the government direct investment. Figure 3.1 
shows that expressways charging tolls have steeply increased and reached 
3,860 km in South Korea in 2010 (MLTM, 2010a). 
 
Figure 3.1 Length of road in South Korea 
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Most expressways except the PPP roads in South Korea are operated by KEC 
(Korea Expressway Corporation) which is owned by the government. KEC is in 
charge of not only operation but also construction. The MLTM provides land 
cost and 50% of construction cost to KEC for building new expressways. Then 
the rest of construction cost is financed by KEC with toll revenue. KEC is also in 
charge of maintenance and expansion of existing expressways with the 
operation right including charging a toll.  
 
Rail had been a dominant transport mode until the 1960s since the Jemulpo-
Noryangjin rail was firstly opened in 1899, though it was severely devastated 
during the Korean War. Some 88% of freight and 53% of passengers in South 
Korea had been carried by rail transport until the 1960s. This was gradually 
changed by the development of cars, and only 11% of freight and 15% of 
passengers were carried by rail in the 2000s (Lee, 2006). However, rail began 
to stand out in urban transport and high speed transport (Won, 2006). Since 
the Subway line no. 1 in Seoul opened in 1974, urban rail like a subway has 
become an important public transport mode carrying 2,273 million passengers 
per year in 2011 as seen in Figure 3.2. The total length of urban rail in major 
cities including Seoul increased to 549 km in 2011 (MLTM, 2011a). 
 
Figure 3.2 Passengers and the length of urban rail 
 
Source: (Korea Transport Database, 2010, MLTM, 2011a) Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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Korean rail can be divided into two types: the national arterial rail including 
high speed rail and the urban rail. Figure 3.3 shows the national rail system in 
South Korea. In Korean national rail and the high speed rail, construction and 
operation are separated. The construction and maintenance of facility are done 
by KRNA (Korea Rail Network Authority) and the train and station operation are 
done by KORAIL (Korea Railway Company). The MLTM, which is a government 
department supervising two organisations, annually provides subsidies to them 
for compensating for construction cost of rails without profitability as well as 
the operation cost on sustaining low tariff level. Though KRNA charges usage 
fee to KORAIL, it is not enough to burden whole construction cost of rail. 
KORAIL also charges tariff to end users, but it is strictly restricted by the 
government.  
 
Figure 3.3 National rail systems including the high speed rail in South Korea 
 
 
 
However, the urban rails are constructed and operated by different authorities. 
In Seoul, there are four public companies and one private company operating 
subways. Five other cities also have their own public operators and also other 
small cities are trying to construct several LRT (Light Rail Transit) projects. 
Urban rail can be constructed and operated independently, so most PPP 
projects in rail are for urban rails including the LRTs. In the case of national 
arterial rail, the BTL model was introduced to induce the private sector 
involvement to the construction of rail excluding operation, which is done by 
KORAIL. 
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3.2.2 Investment plan for the transport infrastructure in South Korea 
 
Since the economy of South Korea was rapidly developed in a short period after 
1970s, so infrastructures are still regarded as insufficient. Recently, the MLTM 
revised the master plan for national transport from 2000 to 2020 as seen in 
Figure 3.4 (MLTM, 2011b). According to this plan, expressway will be increased 
from 3,776km in 2009 to 5,470km in 2020 and rail including high speed rail 
will be increased from 3,378km in 2009 to 4,955km. Total investment in 
arterial road and rail is expected to be around ₩142 trillion (road 70/rail 72).  
 
Figure 3.4 The plan for transport network in Korea in 2020        
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3.2.3 Prospect of the PPP in transport in South Korea 
 
Transport infrastructures like road and rail are still needed in South Korea, but 
the central and local governments cannot afford to meet all of the public 
demand. Thus, the MLTM suggests the project with high profitability should be 
considered ahead as the PPP (MLTM, 2011b). The Korean government has 
made an enormous effort to induce the private investment in the construction 
of infrastructures as seen in Table 3.1. These efforts gave a big contribution to 
increasing the quantity of infrastructure, and to reduce the financial burdens 
on the government by mostly using the BTO model where the private sector 
recoups its investment from end users directly (KDI, 2006a). 
 
Table 3.1 Private investment in national infrastructures in South Korea 
(Unit: trillion KRW) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Private investment(A)  1.0  0.6  1.2  1.2  1.7  2.6  3.0  3.1 
Government 
investment(B)  15.2  16.0  16.0  18.4  17.4  18.3  18.4  18.4 
A/B(%)  6.6  3.4  7.5  6.6  9.8  14.2  16.3  16.8 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, South Korea 
 
Expressway is the most advanced transport field for the PPP. According to the 
MTLM (2011c), 15 projects with ₩18.1 trillion estimated cost are under 
planning. Five projects out of them were already signed while three projects 
are in negotiation with the preferred bidder. Five projects are in the VFM 
assessment by the MLTM. In the case of rail, two projects are under planning 
by the BTO model. 101 LRT projects which would cost ₩66.6 trillion are also 
under discussion at the level of local governments (Park, 2011a). 
 
However, the PPP market seems to be depressed because of the low 
involvement of the private sector after the recent global financial crisis though 
necessity from the public sector is increasing. Uncertainty of national economy 
has been raised since the global financial crisis in 2008, and the private sector, 
especially the financial investors, have hesitated to invest in the PPP projects 
which usually need the long-term financial support and have high risks.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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3.3 The Regulation of the PPP in South Korea 
 
3.3.1 History of the PPP in South Korea 
 
The history of the PPP in Korea can be divided into four stages according to the 
changes of PPP regulation. Figure 3.5 shows the history of the PPP regulation 
shortly. The first period was from 1960s to 1994 when “the Act for the 
promotion of private capital into social overhead capital investment” was 
legislated. The second period was from 1994 to 1998 when the regulation for 
the PPP got totally revised to “the Act for the private participation in 
infrastructure” for removing the obstacles in the previous regulation and 
introducing incentives to the private sector (Wang, 2005). The third period was 
from 1998 to 2005 and a risk sharing mechanism between the private sector 
and public sector was developed during that time. The last period is after 2005 
when the BTL was newly introduced to various infrastructures. 
 
Figure 3.5 History of PPP regulation of South Korea 
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After the World War II, Korea has recovered the sovereignty from Japan, but 
was separated soon into the South and North. The Korean War from 1950 to 
1953 between South and North Korea destroyed most of the infrastructure in 
Korea. The economic development was launched by the strong drive of the Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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government from the late 1960s, and it was mainly funded by foreign loans. 
The main interest of the government for developing economy was to construct 
infrastructures like an expressway, power station and dam. There were not 
enough capital and ability for the private sector to do a big public project at 
that time. Though there was an attempt to use the private finance to the public 
service in 1968 by individual laws such as the Act for toll road, the Act for 
urban railway, and the Act for seaport, the PPP was just one of the financial 
resources to grow the stock of infrastructures backing up the economic 
development (Lee, 2003, Song, 2004).  
 
However, the investment in the infrastructures decreased in the 1980s and 
many problems such as congestion occurred. Without expanding the 
government investment, the PPP was newly highlighted as an innovative tool 
for building the infrastructures and improving public services. The first 
systematic approach to the PPP started from 1994 by enacting “the Act for the 
promotion of private capital into social overhead capital investment”. The 
background of adopting the PPP to Korea is explained by the following four 
factors: 1) the quick fulfilment of Infrastructure; 2)  the creativity and efficiency 
of the private sector; 3) risk transfer; and 4) support for government (Wang, 
2005). Though the early PPP project was difficult to be proceeded because of 
the lack of experience and the financial crisis in 1997
5, it was meaningful to try 
to induce the private sector to the public sector more systematically. 
 
For the last period after 2005, the BTL scheme was introduced to the school, 
military accommodation, and sewage facility, and then recently expanded to 
the railway. This was a big change in the PPP history of Korea. In the BTO 
scheme, the government was mainly interested in how to save government 
expenditure and transfer risks to the private sector, but the BTL scheme 
started comparing the VFM (Value for Money) and the quality of the public 
service. 
 
3.3.2 Regulation on PPP models 
 
                                           
5 The launched projects were only five for the second period from 1994 to 1998. Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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According to “the Act for the private participation in infrastructure”, although 
the BTO, BTL, BOO, BOT, BLT, ROT, ROO, RTL are representative PPP models in 
Korea, it is allowed for the procurement authority to use the different PPP 
models by its own decision. However, most PPP projects in Korea have been 
done by the BTO and BTL models. The MOSF regulates that the BTO model is 
for the project with the sufficient income to have enough the profitability like a 
toll road while the BTL model is for the project with insufficient income like the 
school or military accommodation (MOSF, 2009a).  
 
3.3.3 Regulation on the Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
 
The MRG (Minimum Revenue Guarantee) was a standard risk sharing method in 
BTO projects in South Korea between the private sector and the government 
(KEC, 2007). In 1998, the government expressed to expand the PPP projects by 
supporting the private sector in sharing the demand risk with the government. 
The MRG regulation, which was introduced in 1999, was the most attractive 
incentive to the private sector in the BTO model. The government promised to 
compensate for the gap with the contracted revenue when the income did not 
reach the expected level for a contracted period. For a transport BTO project, 
the most important risk was traffic demand which was the source of revenue. 
Thus it looked natural for the public sector to share the demand risk with the 
private sector by the MRG condition. The government did not have to worry 
about financing at the construction stage, because the government should pay 
the guaranteed revenue at the operation stage. It meant that the government 
could evade the early investment, and could save budget on operation only if 
demand was high enough for the private sector to recourse the construction 
and operation cost. However, the MRG became the most criticised PPP 
regulation after operation in the 2000s by providing too high level of 
compensation reaching 80% or 90% of the contracted revenue. Consequently, it 
was helpful to vitalise the PPP projects in early 2000s in South Korea, though it 
also raised the sceptical opinions on the PPP. Total investment of the private 
sector was ₩0.3 trillion from 1995 to 1997, but the investment in the BTO 
projects in 2008 was expanded to ₩3.4 trillion. 
 
Considering the increasing criticism from people concerning the 
competitiveness of the private sector, the level of MRG regulation was reduced Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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in the BTO scheme (MOSF, 2009c). Table 3.2 shows the change of MRG 
regulation well. At first, the guaranteed level was up to 80% (in the case of 
unsolicited project) or 90% (in the case of solicited project) for 20 or 30 years, 
but in 2003 not only guaranteed period but also guaranteed level was lowered. 
The MRG has not been provided to the unsolicited project suggested by the 
private sector since 2006 and to the solicited project since 2009. However, the 
government is considering a different type of revenue guarantee
6 for the 
private sector in difficult economic circumstances after the global financial 
crisis (MOSF, 2009b). 
 
  Table 3.2 Change of MRG regulation 
   
Guaranteed 
period 
Level of 
guarantee 
Guarantee 
condition 
Apr. 1999 
~ 
May 2003 
Solicited 
projects 
20~30 years  Up to 90% 
- 
Unsolicited 
projects 
20~30 years  Up to 80% 
May 2003 
~ 
Dec. 2005 
Solicited 
projects 
15 years 
First 5 years 90% 
Next 5 years 80% 
Last 5 years 70%  No MRG below 
50% 
Unsolicited 
projects 
15 years 
First 5 years 80% 
Next 5 years 70% 
Last 5 years 60% 
Jan. 2006 
~ 
Nov. 2009 
Solicited 
projects 
10 years 
First 5 years 75% 
Next 5 years 65% 
No MRG below 
50% 
Unsolicited 
projects 
Abolition 
Nov. 2009 
~ 
Present 
Solicited 
projects 
Abolition 
Unsolicited 
projects 
Abolition 
Alternative 
after 2009 
Solicited 
projects 
Guarantee of recovering the investment of the private 
sector with the minimum profit 
Unsolicited 
projects 
Abolition 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2009) 
                                           
6 Korean Government announced a plan to guarantee the return of the private sector’s 
investment with minimum profit rate, which is same with national bond interest, 
instead of abolishing the MRG in 2009. Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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3.4 The PPP models in South Korea 
 
3.4.1 The BTO model 
 
The BTO is the most prevalent PPP model in Korea and the Korean government 
has promoted BTO projects, focusing mainly on transport infrastructures such 
as road and rail since the enactment of the PPP Act in 1994. Under the BTO 
scheme, the private sector builds the infrastructure facilities, transfers the 
ownership to the government when the construction is completed. Instead, the 
government grants the operating right to the private sector for a contracted 
period and the private sector recovers its investment by collecting tariffs from 
the end users during the operation. The infrastructures using the BTO models 
are roads, railways, ports, sewage treatment facilities, complex cargo terminals, 
etc. (KDI, 2006).  
 
Generally, the BOT is the one of the most common PPP models in the world 
because its concept that the private sector builds, returns its investment and 
an appropriate profit during the contracted operation period and transfers the 
ownership to the public sector, is easy to understand and relatively simple. 
However, the tax on the BTO, where the ownership is at the government, is less 
than that on the BOT, where the ownership is at the private sector, in Korea 
(Wang, 2005). Table 3.3 shows that the property tax, education tax and office 
tax are added to the BOT model, though they are free in the BTO model. Thus, 
the BOT model is rarely used in Korea though it is legally possible to choose.  
 
 Table 3.3 Tax on the BOT and BTO model 
Tax  BOT  BTO 
Property tax  0.3% of reference market 
price 
Free 
Education tax  20% of the property tax  Free 
Office tax  ₩250/m
2  Free 
Source: Wang (2005) Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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There are solicited and unsolicited projects in Korean BTO model. A solicited 
project is led by the government and an unsolicited project is suggested by the 
private sector. Figure 3.6 shows the procedure of solicited BTO project. The 
procurement authority executes the feasibility and VFM test and submits the 
project plan to the Ministry Of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) of Korea. MOSF 
reviews the project and designs the fiscal plan such as land cost provided by 
the government. The procurement authority announces the RFP, evaluates bids, 
selects the preferred bidder, negotiates and makes a contract.  
 
Figure 3.6 Procedure of solicited BTO project 
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Source : KDI (2006) 
 * DEDPI: Detailed Engineering and Design Plan for Implementation 
 ** RFP: Request for Proposal Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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Figure 3.7 shows the procedure of unsolicited BTO project. This procedure is 
almost same with that of a solicited project. However, an unsolicited project is 
proposed respectively by the private sector, so the government tests the 
feasibility and VFM of the project after receiving the proposal of the private 
sector.  
 
Figure 3.7 Procedure of unsolicited BTO project 
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      Announcement of 
request for other 
proposals 
   
   
     
    Submission of 
project proposal     
    Bid evaluation/Selection 
preferred bidder     
           
    Negotiation and 
contract award     
           
    Approval of DEDPI     
     
    Commencement of 
construction     
    Confirmation of 
construction completion     
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3.4.2 The BTL model 
 
The BTL model was introduced for the construction of social infrastructures 
which are difficult for the private sector to impose on user fees high enough to 
recover its investment and profit in 2005. Instead, the government pays for the 
lease of a facility during 10 to 30 years operation for which the operational 
right is granted to the private sector. Facilities eligible for the BTL scheme are 
schools, military housing, sewers, libraries and cultural/welfare facilities. Some 
railway projects which seem difficult to provide enough profit based on 
incomes collecting from user’s tariffs are also under way as BTL projects (KDI, 
2006). The procedure of the BTL model is as follows. 
 
Figure 3.8 Procedure of BTL project 
MOSF    Procurement authority    Private sector 
         
Review & establishment 
of BTL ceiling 
  Submission of BTL 
project plan     
 
             
Submission to National 
Assembly           
             
     
VFM test     
   
           
    Announcement of RFP     
     
    Submission of 
project proposal     
    Bid evaluation/Selection 
preferred bidder     
           
    Negotiation and 
contract award     
           
    Approval of DEDPI     
     
    Commencement of 
construction     
    Confirmation of 
construction completion     Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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In Figure 3.8, after the announcement of RFP, the procedure of BTL project is 
same with the BTO project. But here, several procurement authorities submit a 
project plan then the MOSF reviews them and set up the maximum budget for 
them. Annual budget on the BTL project should be ratified by the National 
Assembly, because the BTL contract affects the future budget in the name of 
leasing fee during the 20 years of contracted PPP period.  
 
According to the Allen’s classification, the BTO is “the financially free standing” 
model and the BTL is “the service sold to the public” model (Allen, 2001). Many 
researchers in South Korea seem to confuse that the BTL of Korea is similar to 
the PFI of the UK (Joo, 2007, KDI and MOPB, 2005, Baek, 2005). However, this 
opinion appears not exactly correct, because the PFI looks like the scheme for 
the PPP procurement and it includes the financially free standing model. In 
other words, the PFI of the UK can choose any model between the BTO and BTL 
according to the project. The most important difference between the BTO and 
the BTL is who pays the fee for using a facility. The responsibility of payment in 
the BTO model is on the end users, but that of the BTL is on the government.  
 
The BTL model is similar to the DBFO model of the UK in the point that the 
public sector pays fee to the private sector. However, the BTL model does not 
transfer the demand risk to the private sector as the DBFO did by shadow toll. 
According to STANDARD & POOR’S report (Bain and Wilkins, 2003b), now the 
DBFO model in the UK uses “active management payment mechanism” without 
demand risk sharing such as a shadow toll mechanism. The BTL model of 
Korea uses a payment mechanism based on the availability and performance 
assessment, so it can be thought that the BTL model is similar to the recent 
DBFO model without using demand risk sharing by a shadow toll.  
 
3.4.3 Difference between the BTO and the BTL model 
 
The BTO is almost same with the BOT model which is historically one of the 
oldest PPP model in the world. In the BTO, the Special Purpose Company (SPC) 
made by the private sector provides public services to the end user and 
recovers its investment and profit from the end user directly. The government 
grants operational rights to the private sector, and has little role in the 
operation of the SPC. Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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In the BTL, the SPC leases the facility to the government and the government 
pays a lease fee. The core public service like education in schools is provided 
by the government, and the non-core service like the maintenance of the 
facility is done by the private sector. The relationship between the government 
and the private sector is very important to operate the facility effectively. 
Figure 3.9 Concepts of the BTO and BTL 
Source: KDI 
The differences of the BTO and BTL are clearly shown in the following table, 
but these are not fixed and can be changed by the negotiation between the 
government and the private sector in the form of a contract. For example, the 
railway PPP starts to use the BTL model recently, and core services in some 
facilities like a library can be provided by the private sector in the BTL. 
 
Table 3.4 Difference between the BTO and the BTL 
  BTO  BTL 
Investment 
recovery 
Private sector collects user fee to 
recover investment and make 
profit 
The government makes unitary 
payments covering construction 
costs, profits and operating costs 
during contracted period 
Facility 
types 
Facility with income 
- Roads, railways, ports, 
environmental facilities, etc. 
Facility with a little or no income 
- Schools, military 
accommodation, sewage pipes, 
cultural and welfare facilities, etc. 
Operation 
Full responsibility of the 
operation on the private sector 
Responsibility of the core service 
on the government, the 
maintenance on the private 
sector 
Project 
risk 
and return 
Relatively more risks on the 
private sector, variable rate of 
return based on the demand 
Allocated risks to each sector 
Fixed rate of profit 
Source: KDI Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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The key factor discriminating between the BTO and BTL is who pays the private 
sector. The end user pays a tariff to the private sector in the BTO, but the 
government pays a lease fee in the BTL model. Though it is possible for the 
government to have some conditions on payment in a contract, basically the 
government guarantees the steady income to the private sector in the BTL 
model. The incomes in transport infrastructures like a toll road and rail depend 
on traffic and passengers which are variable in different social economic 
circumstances. Traffic and passengers can be understood as demand in 
transport, so the demand risk in the BTO model, in which the private sector 
collects tariff from the end user, is on the private sector. The demand risk in 
the BTL model, in which the government collects unsteady tariff from end user 
and pays steady lease fee to the private sector, is on the government. 
Consequently, the difference between the BTL and BTO in transport 
infrastructures is made by where the demand risk is. The demand risk is on the 
private sector in the BTO model, but it is on the government in the BTL model.  
 
A particular problem is the BTO with MRG model. The MRG introduced in 1999 
is the tool for the government to share the demand risk with the private sector. 
It can make little difference between the BTO and BTL. The level of MRG in 
early PPP projects in Korea was 80 to 90%, but the rate of profit of the BTO with 
MRG project was not modified at all. It is true that the MRG regulation made 
the BTO invigorated, but it seems to weaken the strength of the BTO model.  
 
3.4.4 Advantage and disadvantage of the BTO and the BTL model 
 
This section is to compare the advantages and disadvantages between the BTO 
and BTL from a different view of each sector. The government should consider 
other views than just those of the private sector and the end user for the 
success of the PPP project. The government is not only one of the partners of 
the PPP but also a decision maker who is responsible for providing the public 
services, so it needs to make an effort to include other views. Mostly, the 
government seems to be interested in budget savings which can be expressed 
as the affordability
7. If the affordability of the government is enough, the PPP 
                                           
7 The affordability does not mean only financial capacity to do the PPP but also includes 
the efficiency of the investment, which is expressed by the Value for Money. Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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projects can be achieved by the participation of the private sector. Hence, the 
view of the private sector decisively affects the achievability of the project. The 
focus of the common end users is on the public service itself whoever it is 
provided by, so the view of the end user represents the serviceability of the 
project. Considering these three factors of affordability, achievability and 
serviceability is essential to the process of the PPP procurement, so the 
qualitative VFM assessment in the UK includes the analysis of these factors. 
The qualitative VFM assessment in the following case studies deals with things 
related to the project itself, so the general characteristics of the BTO and BTL 
from these three views are reviewed whatever the project is. Also, the BTO 
model in this section is the “free standing model” without the financial support 
from the government, though it can vary when the construction subsidy and 
minimum revenue guarantee regulation are applied to a concession contract. 
 
The most important interest in the view of the Korean government seems to be 
the budget savings. It is easily seen in the VFM guidance for the BTO and BTL. 
The quantitative VFM assessment, which is the decisive factor to choose the 
PPP, is comparing the life cycle costs measured by the government capital 
expenditure in both BTO and BTL (KDI, 2007a, KDI, 2009a). The qualitative 
VFM assessment does not affect anything on deciding the PPP scheme– the 
reason being that the qualitative experiences are not thought to be sufficient 
though the simple guidelines are suggested by KDI (Korea Development 
Institute).  Based on this status, the advantage of the BTO model (without any 
subsidy from the government) is to eliminate or minimize the direct financial 
investment from the government. It is changeable according to a construction 
subsidy or minimum revenue guarantee condition, but the government 
expenditure is expected to be smaller than that of most BTL projects with little 
income from the end user. Instead, the private sector in the BTO may be more 
affected by the end user paying the tariff than the government paying nothing 
when it is operated, so the managing role of the government in operation 
stage in the BTO seems weaker than in the BTL. It means that the flexibility of 
the government policy for such public service can be restricted during 20 to 30 
years of operation in the BTO. The BTO model is more independent from the 
government. Instead, it financially burdens the private sector more. Also, the 
competition is relatively high in BTL because the revenue is given by the 
government. So the government has more benefit in negotiation with the Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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private sector. The following two tables show the percentage of projects with 
only one bidder. Average percentage of the BTO projects with one bidder is 
60%. By contrast, the percentage of the BTL projects with one bidder is only 
28%, less than half of the percentage of the BTO project. Although there is an 
opinion that a project with fewer competitors would be appropriate for the PPP 
such as infrastructure, power transmission or network, and water and gas 
supply (Chan et al., 2008), it is not deniable that  more competition 
incentivises the private sector to make an effort to improve their performance. 
 
Table 3.5 Bidding status in BTO projects 
  Road  Rail  Seaport  Environme
nt 
Logistic, 
etc.  SUM 
No. of project 
(A)  41  9  17  54  33  154 
No. of project 
with one 
bidder (B) 
31  4  14  33  11  93 
B/A  76%  44%  82%  61%  33%  60% 
* This result came out from the 154 projects having data of bidder in KDI until 2007. 
Source: Kim et al (2008b) 
 
Table 3.6 Bidding status in BTL projects 
  Education  Rail 
Library & 
Culture 
centre 
Environme
nt 
Science 
centre, 
etc. 
SUM 
No. of project 
(A)  155  3  15  60  6  239 
No. of project 
with one 
bidder (B) 
56  0  1  10  0  67 
B/A  36%  0%  7%  17%  0%  28% 
* This result includes data until 2009, but several programmes without data of bidder 
such as military accommodation are excluded. 
Source: NABO of Korea (Program Evaluation Division, 2009) 
 
In the view of the private sector, the most important interest is the profit and 
risk. Since demand risk in the BTO is on the private sector, it is financially more 
risky than the BTL, in which the government guarantees the income only if the 
private sector fulfils the agreement with the government. However, the BTL 
provides relatively low rate of profit instead of guaranteed incomes from the 
government. It means that the BTO project has high risk and high return, while Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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the BTL project has low risk and low return. The private sector decides to 
participate in the PPP project through comparing the risk and rate of return. 
Therefore, the government tries to minimize the disadvantage in each model 
for increasing attractiveness of the project. In the BTO model, it is possible for 
the Korean government to provide the MRG for sharing the demand risk. In the 
BTL model, the rate of profit is decided at the level of national bond plus an 
additional rate considering the risk of the project despite the relatively low rate 
of profit. It means that the rate of profit in the BTL is steady while that in the 
BTO is variable and risky.  
 
The view of the end user affects serviceability of the project. One of the most 
important reasons for introducing the PPP to the public service is to improve 
the quality of service by using the creativity and competitiveness of the private 
sector. If the service including the level of tariff cannot fulfil the expectations 
of end users, the PPP can be criticised for its unsatisfactory delivery compared 
with the public sector. Also it can affect the long term PPP policy, as shown in 
the criticisms of the early PPP cases in the Korea. It is not easy to compare the 
quality of service between the BTO and BTL, because there is no experience in 
similar projects using different PPP models. However, it can be easily expected 
for the BTO to be sensitive to the needs and complaints of the end user, 
because the revenue comes from the choice of the end user
8. There is the 
government between the private sector and the end user in BTL model when 
the public service is provided. It makes the private sector in the BTL more 
sensitive to the government than to the end user. On the other hand, the 
possibility that the end user gets discounted tariff in case of BTL model with 
user fee seems higher, because the government role as an arbiter between the 
private sector and the end user is easily affected by the complaints on the price 
of the public service. The government has little right of interference with 
changing the contracted tariff because of the complaints of users in the BTO 
model.  Above mentioned advantages and disadvantages between the BTO and 
BTL from different viewpoints are summarised in the Table 3.7. 
                                           
8 It is only right when the private sector does not have the monopoly on the public 
service through the BTO project. The environmental facility for sewage works which 
does not need to attract customers can have little difference between the BTO and BTL 
in the view of end user.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
  55   
 
Table 3.7 Advantage and disadvantage between the BTO and BTL 
Viewpoints  BTO  BTL 
Government 
 
Main 
interest : 
Budget 
Advantage 
Minimum direct financial 
burden
9 
Low risk in demand 
Continuous inspection 
through the payment 
mechanism 
Relatively high competition 
Chance to have profit
10 
Disadvantage 
Hard to manipulate the 
plan or project during 
operation 
Relatively low 
competition 
Long term burden of budget 
High risk in demand 
Private 
sector 
Main 
interest : 
Profit 
Advantage  High rate of return  Low risk in demand 
Disadvantage 
High risk in demand  Low rate of return 
End user 
Main 
interest : 
Service 
Advantage 
Sensitive to the end 
user’s needs and 
complaints 
Relatively low tariff 
Disadvantage 
Relatively high tariff  Less sensitive to the 
customer 
 
Through this analysis about the advantages and disadvantages between the 
BTO and BTL, it is found that the way to maximize the creativity and 
competitiveness of the private sector is different in the BTO and BTL models. In 
specific, it can be achieved by an effort to earn more incomes from the end 
user in the BTO while it can be attained by the the private sector competition in 
bidding for the project in the BTL.  
                                           
9 Theoretically, financial burden of the Government in the BTO model should be very 
small or nothing, but the Government provides subsidy or shares the demand risk 
through the minimum revenue guarantee in many real cases. 
 
10 The BTL projects with revenue from the end user can provide opportunity for the 
Government to have profit if the demand is enough to cover the lease and operation 
cost.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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3.4.5 PPP projects by model in South Korea 
 
In South Korea, 426 PPP projects have been carried out or under negotiation 
since 1994, among which 82 projects are for the transport infrastructures as 
seen in Figure 3.10. Among these, 33 projects are for roads, 15 for rail, 17 for 
seaports, and 7 for airports. The total amount of investment in these 82 
transport projects is ₩60,910 billion: ₩19,606 billion for roads, ₩37,074 
billion for rail, ₩3,722 billion for seaport, and ₩508 billion for airport (Source: 
Korea Development Institute PPI centre; see Appendix 2). 
 
The BTO model is mainly used in transportation services including roads, 
railways and seaports. Road projects account for more than half of all 
investment. The BTL model is used for building or rehabilitating old 
educational facilities like elementary schools and vocational colleges, making a 
great contribution to sewage systems and military residences. 
 
Figure 3.10 Investment for PPP projects in Korea 
 
Source: KDI(2009) Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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3.5 Financial and organisational support for the PPP  
 
3.5.1 Financial support for the PPP in South Korea 
 
With regard to the financial issues, there are several supports from the 
government in South Korea. 
 
Firstly, the private sector is granted land acquisition rights as well as the right 
to use national and state / public land free of charge. In order to maintain an 
appropriate user fee level, the government usually provides land acquisition 
costs and may give construction subsidies to the private sector, if necessary 
(KEC, 2007).  
 
Secondly, the government takes over the management and operation rights of 
the facility, and offers a certain amount of termination payment to the private 
sector when PPP projects are terminated for unavoidable reasons during 
construction or operation. The private sector may request the government to 
buyout the project in the case of termination of construction or operation of 
facility due to unavoidable incidents including force majeure (KEC, 2007). 
 
Thirdly, various tax benefits granted for PPP projects include the following: 0% 
tax rate is applied to value added tax for construction services of revertible 
infrastructure facilities; and acquisition and registration taxes for BTO projects 
are exempt (KDI, 2006a). 
 
3.5.2. Organisational support for the PPP in South Korea 
 
The Public and Private Infrastructure Investment Management Center (PIMAC) is 
a supporting organization for the government. It was established in 2005 in 
order to provide professional support for PPP projects and to conduct research 
on PPP policies. PIMAC provides professional services throughout the entire PPP 
procurement process such as carrying out feasibility studies and VFM tests, 
formulating RFPs, evaluating proposals, and supporting negotiations. At the 
same time it works on promoting PPP projects in Korea by offering training 
programs for government officials, and exploring cooperation opportunities 
with international organizations and foreign countries (KDI, 2006a). Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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3.6 The appraisal for the PPP in transport in South Korea 
 
The PPP has been appraised to play an important role in the construction of 
social infrastructures during the rapid economic growth of South Korea. In 
2010, the investment in the SOC (Social Overhead Capital) through the PPP was 
₩7.7 trillion, which was 30.7% of the government SOC investment of ₩25.1 
trillion (MOSF, 2010). According to the MOSF (2010), 100% of the PPP projects 
were constructed on time among which 36% in rail was constructed by the 
public sector and 76% was in road. The operation cost was also expected to be 
cut by 20~30%.  
 
The reliable construction cost in the PPP was also appraised positively. The 
construction cost in the PPP is not basically allowed to be changed. One of the 
most serious problems of construction cost in the public sector project is 
increase in the cost even during the construction for various reasons such as 
the change of design. In the case of national arterial roads, average 
construction cost was increased by 12% compared to the first  signed cost, 
excluding an inflation factor (Shim et al., 2006).   
 
However, many criticisms have risen from the National Assembly, press and 
NGO. Lee (2005) described the major problems in the PPP projects could be 
classified with 5 parts as follows: excessive guaranteed revenue; low 
competition among private sectors, high charge to the end user; expensive 
construction cost in the sewage facility; and insufficient maintenance after 
construction. In these problems, the first three problems seem directly related 
to the transport PPP projects. Recently, the long delay in negotiation is also 
pointed out (Park, 2009).  
 
High inaccuracy of traffic forecast and excessive MRG 
 
Early PPP projects in South Korea were done by the BTO model with the MRG of 
the government. The main purpose of introducing the BTO model was to 
lessen the financial burden on the public sector to construct infrastructures, 
which mainly focused on transport facilities. The revenue in the transport BTO 
projects was based on the toll charged to traffic. Generally, the inaccuracy of 
traffic demand forecast and over-optimism were broadly pointed out for road Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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and rail (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005, Bain and Polakovic, 2005). These problems 
were discovered in many countries and lead to overbidding for a PPP project 
(Bain et al., 2012). The traffic demand risk is difficult to be managed by the 
private sector alone, so the Korean government decided to share the traffic 
demand risk through the MRG scheme. The MRG regulation affected on the 
views that the traffic could be forecasted optimistically (Shim et al., 2006). 
NGOs doubted that the excessively optimistic forecast might be due to the 
intentional exaggeration in traffic forecast by the moral hazard of the private 
sector. Consequently, this caused the scepticism on the PPP itself.  
 
Table 3.8 Traffic forecast and MRG in transport PPP projects of the MLTM 
Project  Open  Length 
Traffic (cars or persons/day)* 
MRG 
(Max)  Forecasted 
(A) 
Actual 
(B) 
B/A (%) 
Incheon Airport Rd.  12/2000  40km  110,622  51,939  47.0%  90% 
Cheonan-Nonsan Rd.  12/2002  81km  55,624  32,390  58.2%  90% 
Daegu-Busan Rd.  01/2006  82km  52,000  29,300  56.3%  90% 
Incheon Airport Rail  03/2007  40km  207,421   13,312  6.4%  90% 
Seoul Outer Ring Rd.  12/2007  36km  72,068  55,512  77.0%  90% 
Busan-Ulsan Rd.  12/2008  47km  66,000  28,000  42.4%  100%  
Seoul-Chuncheon Rd.  07/2009  61km  44,953  30,153  67.1%  80% 
Incheon Grand bridge   10/2009  21km  34,779  25,549  73.5%  80% 
Seosuwon-Pyeongtaek 
Rd.  10/2009  39km  37,480  14,269  38.1%  80% 
* It is the average daily traffic for the first one year after operation.        Source: MLTM 
 
High charge to end users 
 
Much higher tariff level in the BTO projects than in the public sector projects 
was severely criticised.  In case of the Incheon Grand Bridge, toll was up to 
3.47 times higher than the public operating case. Some of them were parts of 
national arterial transport network, so there were few alternative choices to the 
users. It evoked the problem of equity by regions. In some regions, the public 
sector provides the transport service with low tariff, while in some other 
regions, the end users have to pay more for the same kind of transport service. 
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Table 3.9 Tariff level of the PPP (BTO) expressways 
Expressway  Open  Length 
Tariff level for a car (KRW) 
PPP (A)  Public 
standard(B)  A/B 
Incheon Airport  12/2000  40km  7,500  2,800  2.68 
Cheonan-Nonsan  12/2002  81km  8,400  4,100  2.05 
Daegu-Busan  01/2006  82km  9,300  4,200  2.21 
Seoul Outer Ring  12/2007  36km  4,300  2,600  1.65 
Busan-Ulsan  12/2008  47km  3,500  3,100  1.13 
Seoul-Chuncheon  07/2009  61km  5,900  3,500  1.69 
Incheon Grand bridge  10/2009  21km  5,200  1,500  3.47 
Seosuwon-Pyeongtaek  10/2009  39km  2,800  2,000  1.40 
Source: Korea Expressway Corporation (KEC) 
 
Delay in negotiation 
 
One of the strengths of the PPP is the on-time construction, but in many cases, 
it takes much time to get an agreement between the private and the public 
sectors before construction. According to Lee (2008a), the negotiation period 
for the BTO projects was from 36 months up to 92 months after the 
announcement of the project with the average period being 60 months. 
Considering that it takes around 6 years for the public sector to make a master 
plan including a design for an expressway before starting the construction, a 
long negotiation period can make PPP’s advantage of the on-time construction 
less meaningful.  
 
Low competition among the private sectors 
 
Early PPP projects in transport were mostly done by the BTO model, so most 
risks in construction and operation were on the private sector. It made the 
private sectors hesitate to bid for the project, and the competition among the 
private sectors was low as seen in Table 3.5. Considering that high competition 
among the private sectors is an important factor to make the private sectors 
competitive and creative, low competition was unbeneficial to the public sector.  Byungwoo Gil    The PPP in Transport in South Korea 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
The economy of South Korea has grown rapidly since the 1970s, and the 
transport infrastructures have been developed to support the economic growth. 
However, a large amount of investment was needed to construct transport 
facilities in a very short period and the government struggled to provide the 
required budget. Charging tolls to transport infrastructure was a good 
alternative to expanding the investment. The PPP was also introduced with this 
reason, and the BTO model which is financially free standing PPP became 
prevalent in Korea.  
 
The Korean government introduced the PPP to other fields like schools, 
environmental facilities, military facilities, etc. in 2005. Since these facilities 
did not have enough income from the end users, the BTL model was 
introduced. The most important thing discriminating the BTL from the BTO 
model is who has the demand risk. In the BTL model, whole demand risk is on 
the public sector and the public sector pays a unitary lease fee to the private 
sector, which therefore is called “service sold to the public sector” model. It is 
similar to the DBFO model of the UK, but the revenue risk is often shared with 
the private sector in the UK by a shadow toll. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each PPP model are different based on three viewpoints. The 
main interest of the government is in saving budget and the BTO model is 
better to lessen the financial burden. On the other hand, the interest of the 
private sectors is in making a profit. The BTO model is high risk and high 
return while the BTL model is a low risk and low return structure. The end 
users are interested in the service quality including tariff level. In this regard, 
the BTO model can be better because the private sectors recoup their 
investment through charging the end users. 
 
In Korea, the BTO model has been predominant for the transport PPP. Recently, 
the BTL model was introduced to a few railway projects for the first time. Thus, 
the appraisal on the transport PPP was mainly on the BTO model. Regardless of 
several achievements like on-time and on-budget construction, problems such 
as inaccurate traffic forecast, excessive MRG, high tariff levels, long 
negotiation periods, and low competition emerged and dominated the 
discourse concerning PPPs.Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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CHAPTER 4   
Research Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this thesis is to suggest an optimal PPP model between the 
BTO and the BTL to save the governmental expenditure and to provide higher 
quality of service to the end users for road and rail in South Korea. Also, the 
examination of appropriate demand risk sharing, which is a key issue in a BTO 
project in South Korea, is an important objective of the thesis.  
 
For these examinations, multiple method approach is necessary. Quantitative 
method is needed to calculate the government expenditure between the BTO 
and the BTL cases. Qualitative method is needed as well to compare the quality 
of service provided. Appropriate demand risk sharing also should be examined 
quantitatively. In the BTL case of South Korea, demand risk is on the public 
sector, while is shared with the public sector in the BTO case by the MRG 
condition. Thus, these examinations are done by the case studies of BTO and 
BTL projects in South Korea rather than the theoretical approach, because the 
PPP is much affected by the circumstances of a nation and the characteristics 
of the projects.  
 
This chapter consists of three sections: 1) the available methodology, 2) VFM 
assessment, and 3) the case studies. Firstly, in the available methodology 
section, several tools to evaluate the feasibility of PPP project will be explored 
and it is critically discussed why the VFM assessment is the most appropriate 
method. Next, quantitative and qualitative VFM, are introduced and the 
modified VFM method will be newly suggested to compare the BTL with the 
BTO model. The sensitivity analysis of various input factors to the VFM will be 
explored. Lastly, the case study as a methodology is explored.  Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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4.2 Available methodology 
 
Traditionally, public sector which constructs the infrastructure usually
11 
undertakes the economic appraisal, tests of affordability, etc. Cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) and net present value (NPV) analysis are the most common ways 
to evaluate the economic feasibility of projects. IRR (Internal Rate of Return) is 
also used as a sub tool to decide the project by analysing more feasible option 
(MLTM, 2007, Adler, 1987, Cole, 2005). These methods represent the interest 
of the government which is in analysing the social benefit of a project.  
 
However, above mentioned analyses are mainly used in traditional public 
procurement procedure through the direct investment of the public sector. 
South Korea government published the guideline for the financial feasible test 
for the transport PPP projects, and regularly upgrades it. According to this 
guideline (2007), three kinds of analysis are mainly used for the feasibility of 
the PPP project: FNPV (Financial Net Present Value), FIRR (Financial Internal Rate 
of Return), and Revenue/Cost Ratio. These methods are used after the general 
feasibility of a project is tested by the traditional CBA, so it represents the 
interest of the private sector through analysing the profitability of a project 
based on the revenue. Thus, these methods are used for transport PPP projects 
with revenue, which are mostly the financially free standing BTO projects. It 
means that if only a project has an economic feasibility and is proved to be 
financially sustainable, the government allows the private sector to participate 
in the project. The government mainly aims to save the budget for the 
investment in infrastructures and to prevent the project failure by the private 
sector which causes the government subsidies. These methods mainly reflect 
the interest of the private sectors, so the PPP model having higher FIRR, FNPV 
and R/C can be optimal to the private sector. The FIRR, which is mainly used 
for the BTO projects in Korea, is the discount rate making the NPV of revenue 
equal to the NPV of cost as shown in the following formula (KEC, 2007). 
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  * Here, R is the revenue (cash income), C is the cost (cash outcome), r is the FIRR 
                                           
11 In South Korea, infrastructure projects of which cost is over 10billion KRW have to 
pass the economic evaluation (National Finance Law, Korea). Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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However, it is difficult to be optimal to the public sector and the end users as 
well because the PPP model providing high profit to the private sector may not 
be beneficial to the public sector and the end users. Especially, in the “service 
sold to the public sector” model such as the BTL of South Korea and the DBFO 
of the UK, these kinds of analysis, which just examine the profitability of the 
project, are less useful because the revenue, which is the source of the 
profitability, is decided not by the market but by government policy.  
 
Medda (2004) suggested a model to analyse the optimality of PPP from a 
welfare-economic point of view. However, it does not look appropriate to 
analyse the standardised PPP models of South Korea, because it is not 
applicable for the specific PPP model of Korea and empirical data are not 
enough to examine the cases of South Korea with this model. 
 
The VFM assessment analysing the life cycle cost (LCC) of the PPP option 
compared with the public sector comparator (PSC)
12 option is more common. 
The VFM assessment in the PPP is to examine whether the private investment 
in the public service is more efficient and effective than public direct 
investment (see section 4.3.1). The Korean government is also using the VFM 
assessment for the BTL projects based on the guidance of KDI from 2005. 
There are quantitative and qualitative methods in the VFM assessment. The 
quantitative method is calculated by the comparison of the LCC between the 
PPP option and the PSC option. Here, the LCC is analysed in the view of the 
public sector, so the cost in LCC means the capital expenditure of the public 
sector. The quantitative VFM assessment basically reflects on the interest of 
the public sector which wants to save budget. However, the interest of 
taxpayers using the public service as end users is not considered enough in 
this assessment, though the public sector should not think of only taxpayers 
who do not use the public service but also taxpayers who are end users. 
Consequently, there are many criticisms on the VFM assessment which does 
not cover such interest as service quality for end users (Lee, 2005, NABO, 
2007). The VFM assessment has distinct problems, and recently, the UK 
government launched Private Finance 2 (PF2) to reform the PFI and is trying to 
replace the existing VFM guidance (HM Treasury, 2012).  
                                           
12 PSC is a public funded option to compare with a private funded PPP option.  Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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However, the limitation of VFM assessment is another big issue which should 
be dealt with independently. The VFM assessment is a very effective method to 
compare the LCC and it is commonly used in the world. This study needs to 
focus on comparing the different PPP models in South Korea and this 
comparison can be acceptable to the government when its method is based on 
the current assessment way. Therefore it seems effective to use the VFM 
assessment in this study. Instead, the qualitative VFM is more deeply tested in 
this thesis, because the qualitative method deals covers the interests of the 
private sector and the end user. 
 
After the introduction of VFM assessment to South Korea, the Korean 
government started to use the concept of the VFM assessment to the BTO 
cases. Generally, the BTO is a kind of financially free standing PPP model where 
the public sector does not have to pay the private sector, so it was thought 
that the VFM assessment for comparing the public expenditure is unnecessary 
(Allen, 2001). However, since large projects like new road and rail construction 
needs much investment, it is difficult to fund entirely by the private sector. In 
South Korea, the government gives subsidy for the land acquisition cost to the 
private sector and, sometimes provides construction subsidy. Thus, KDI 
(2007a) suggested using the VFM assessment in the BTO model to compare the 
public expenditure in the BTO option and the PSC option. It means that the 
VFM assessment is able to be used for the BTO cases.  
 
This study is to compare the BTL with the BTO model, so the detailed method 
may be different from the general procedure to compare the PPP with the PSC 
option. However, the concept of the VFM assessment analysing the LCC of 
different procurement options can be used. Especially, this is the practical 
research for supporting the PPP policy decision of the government. Currently, 
the Korean government uses the VFM assessment to decide the feasibility of 
the PPP in both models. Thus, the VFM assessment is the only method used in 
both PPP models to test the feasibility of the PPP projects while the R/C, FNPV, 
and FIRR analysis are only for the BTO projects. Table 4.1 summarised the 
assessment methodology of the feasibility of the PPP in South Korea shortly. 
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Table 4.1 Assessment methodology of the feasibility of the PPP in South Korea 
PPP model (comparing with 
the PSC option)  BTO  BTL 
Assessment 
Methodology 
(before 2007) 
View of the 
public sector  -  VFM assessment 
View of the 
private sector 
R/C, FNPV, FIRR analysis 
(Financial decision) 
VFM assessment 
(qualitative) 
View of the 
end user  -  VFM assessment 
(qualitative) 
Assessment 
Methodology 
(after 2007) 
Views of the 
public, private 
& end user 
VFM assessment  VFM assessment 
* The feasibility of a project itself is done by the CBA, NPV, IRR analysis commonly in 
both PPP models. 
 
In this thesis, the optimal PPP model between the BTO and the BTL model in 
South Korea means the PPP model saving government expenditure and 
upgrading the quality of the public service (see Chapter 1). The VFM 
assessment in South Korea basically focused on comparing the PPP option with 
the PSC option through the LCC analysis. Thus, it reflected the interest of 
taxpayers who did not use the service, but it did not cover enough the interest 
of taxpayers who used the service as end users enough. It was also insufficient 
to examine whether a project is attractive enough to induce the investment of 
the private sector. In the UK, the VFM assessment deals with these issues by a 
qualitative method (HM Treasury, 2006b). The qualitative VFM assessment was 
introduced to South Korea for the same reason, but it does not look enough to 
deal with the issues related with the end users and the private sector (see 
section 4.3.3).  
 
Consequently, the VFM assessment can be the best method in this thesis to 
find the optimal PPP model saving the government expenditure and upgrading 
the quality of service only if the qualitative VFM assessment can cover the 
issues of the end users and the private sectors. Thus the qualitative VFM 
assessment needs to be discussed and an appropriate method needs to be 
suggested to compare the BTO with the BTL option (see details in the section 
4.3.3).  If the VFM assessment satisfies this condition, then the optimal PPP 
model in this thesis can be shortly defined as the PPP model having better VFM. Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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4.3 The Value for Money Assessment 
 
4.3.1 The concept of VFM assessment 
 
The VFM of a PPP project is generally examined by the public sector to choose 
a PPP option instead of a direct investment option. The VFM can vary according 
to the views of the public sector (in many cases, the government). The 
government should consider not only taxpayers but also end users as well as 
their interests in saving budget and improving the quality of service (if the 
quality of service is same, then lower user tariff). Thus, the concept of VFM in a 
project is related to the efficiency and effectiveness of the project (Heald, 
2003). For the government, efficiency means to provide the public service with 
lower budget while effectiveness means to upgrade the quality of service for 
end users. Shortly, the VFM assessment is to examine whether the PPP option 
is more efficient and effective than direct public investment. This is the 
process to choose the best combination of the cost and serviceability for 
fulfilling the public demands by comparing the VFM of the PPP option with the 
VFM of the PSC (KDI, 2009b). 
 
There are quantitative and qualitative assessment to compare the cost and 
serviceability. Quantitative assessment is for the VFM to taxpayers and 
qualitative VFM is for the VFM to end users. Many parts of the serviceability 
cannot be assessed by a quantitative method while the cost of each option can 
be measured exactly by a countable method. Therefore, most countries using 
the PPP such as Korea and the UK recommend considering not only the 
quantitative assessment but also the qualitative assessment which covers non 
quantitative but definitely existent factors before deciding on the PPP option. 
Of course, the VFM assessment at the country level can be different from other 
countries because the social and economic circumstances of respective 
countries are quite different. Therefore, each country seems to have its own 
procedure and method to assess the VFM, although the basic concept for the 
VFM assessment looks same. 
 
According to the UK HM Treasury (2006b), the procuring authorities should 
execute the VFM assessment respectively in three stages; programme level, 
project level, and procurement level. This seems to be the case because the UK Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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government started the PFI widely as the alternative procurement model not 
for each project but for general public programme such as the rehabilitation of 
hospital, school, military accommodation, etc. to improve the efficiency and 
quality of the public service. 
 
In the case of South Korea, the PPP started to cope with the lack of budget to 
implement a huge construction project, so the VFM assessment guidance is 
mainly about such project. It looks that the VFM assessment program level is 
not needed because the PPP cases for transport infrastructures in Korea was 
launched not as part of a general PPP programme but as an independent 
project. Especially, since this study is about the case of Korea, the VFM 
assessment should be based on the social and economic circumstances of 
Korea. Thus, the basic procedure to assess the VFM will follow the VFM 
guidance of Korea, but it needs to be modified for comparing the BTL with the 
BTO option. Especially, the qualitative assessment was criticised for the reason 
that it was too slightly dealt with despite its importance.  In following two 
sections (4.3.2 and 4.3.3), the VFM assessment method is fitted to compare 
different PPP models instead of comparing the PPP option with the PSC option.   
 
4.3.2 Quantitative VFM assessment 
 
According to the Korean VFM guide (2009a) to calculate the quantitative VFM 
test in transport infrastructures, it needs to compare the LCC of each 
procurement model. The Korean VFM guidance suggests calculating the 
present value of total capital expenditure of government in each factor of the 
PSC and PPP as seen in the Table 4.2. These expenditure factors can be 
diversified into two parts: one is the investment to build a facility, and the 
other is the investment to operate and maintain the facility. These can be said 
as building cost and operating cost. In building cost, there are facility part and 
financial part; facility part consists of construction cost, land acquisition cost, 
utility cost, operating reserve and other cost such as feasibility test, insurance 
cost, etc. Here, the construction cost includes surveying cost, examining cost 
and design cost. In operating cost, there are management cost, maintenance 
cost and supervising cost.  
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Total capital expenditure in the PSC is the sum of building cost and operating 
cost, but in the BTL model, an appropriate profit to a private sector should be 
added. The BTL model is for the public sector to lease the facility built by the 
private sector, so the whole lease fee compensating for a building cost and an 
appropriate profit is the governmental expenditure for building the facility. 
Consequently, total capital expenditure in the BTL model is the sum of total 
lease fee from the public sector and operating cost. In the BTO model which 
has revenue collected from end users, there is no lease fee but there can be a 
subsidy for construction from the government. Therefore, the expenditure of 
public sector is just measured by a subsidy for construction (KDI, 2009a).  
Table 4.2 Summary of capital expenditure 
  PSC  PPP 
Building 
Cost 
Facility 
Part 
1) Construction & Design 
    - surveying & examining 
    - design 
    - construction 
1) Construction & Design 
    - surveying & examining 
    - design 
    - construction 
2) Land acquisition  2) Land acquisition* 
3) Utility  3) Utility 
4) Operating reserve  4) Operating reserve 
5) Other cost 
   - feasibility test 
   - environmental effect test 
   - traffic effect test 
   - insurance 
5) Other cost 
   - feasibility test 
   - environmental effect test 
   - traffic effect test 
   - insurance 
Financial 
Part 
6) Tax and financial cost   6) Tax and financial cost 
Lease(in BTL)  -  Building cost with profit 
Subsidy(in BTO)  -  Subsidy for construction 
Operating cost 
7) Management  7) Management 
8) Maintenance  8) Maintenance 
9) Supervising  9) Supervising 
Total expenditure 
(in BTL) 
Building cost + Operating 
cost 
Lease + Operating cost 
Total expenditure 
(in BTO) 
Building cost + Operating 
cost – Revenue 
Subsidy 
LCC (Life Cycle Cost) 
Calculated by considering 
nominal financial discount 
rate and inflation 
Calculated by considering 
nominal financial discount 
rate and inflation 
Source KDI (2009) Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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The quantitative VFM of a PPP project is measured by comparing the LCC of the 
PPP with the PSC. The LCC of the PSC is the NPV of the sum of building cost 
and operating cost. It is also the same with the government expenditure in the 
PSC option. However, the LCC in the PPP option means the capital expenditure 
of the government and it does not mean project cost which is invested by the 
private sector. In the BTO model, the government expenditure is subsidy for 
land acquisition cost or construction subsidy (KEC, 2007). Revenue collected 
from end users can be understood as a kind of subsidy from the government 
because the government granted the right to charge tariffs instead of giving 
subsidy. Consequently, the LCC in the BTO option is the NPV of total revenue 
and subsidy if it is provided by the government as seen in Figure 4.1. In this 
thesis, the VFM in the BTO model is written as the VFMo. 
 
Figure 4.1 Basic concept of the VFM in the BTO model 
 
 
In the BTL model, the LCC of PSC option is the same with the case of the BTO 
model, but the LCC of BTL option is the same as the NPV of total lease fee 
covering whole contract period and operating cost. The lease fee paid by the 
government is decided to compensate for building cost with an appropriate 
profit to the private sector. Operating cost is separately provided by the 
government. The Figure 4.2 shows the basic concept of the VFM in the BTL 
model. In this thesis, the VFM in the BTL model is written as the VFMl. 
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Figure 4.2 Basic concept of the VFM in the BTL model 
 
 
 
The VFM should be modified to compare the BTL with the BTO model. The 
quantitative VFM of the BTL to the BTO can be analysed by calculating the 
difference of the LCC between the BTL and BTO option as seen in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3 Basic concept of the VFM for comparing the BTL with the BTO option 
 
 
The LCC of the BTO option is same as the NPV of the sum of governmental 
subsidy and revenue. The LCC of the BTL is the same as the NPV of the lease 
and operating cost.  
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Hence, the VFM of the BTL model compared with the VFM of the BTO is newly 
suggested as follows; 
 
  (Equation 1) 
   VFMl – VFMo  = BTO (LCC) – BTL (LCC) 
                        = BTO (Subsidy + Revenue) – BTL (Lease + Operating cost) 
 
Here, VFMo is the VFM of the BTO model compared with the PSC and VFMl is 
the VFM of the BTL model compared with the PSC. In case that both BTO and 
BTL model have revenue like a toll from the end users, the revenue is assumed 
as same in the BTO and BTL. 
 
Then,  
 
(Equation 2) 
     VFMl – VFMo  = BTO (Subsidy) – BTL (Lease + Operating cost – Revenue) 
 
This formula shows that the VFM can be measured by the capital expenditure 
of the government, because the subsidy in the BTO model and lease, operating 
cost in the BTL are paid by the government. If there is no subsidy from the 
public sector like the Incheon Airport Expressway, then the formula can be 
simplified as follows; 
 
(Equation 3) 
     VFMl – VFMo  =  BTL (Revenue – Lease –  Operating cost) 
 
Shortly, VFMlo is substituted for VFMl – VFMo. 
 
(Equation 4) 
     VFMlo = BTL (Revenue – Lease – Operating cost) 
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4.3.3 Qualitative VFM assessment 
 
Qualitative VFM assessment is to analyse the factors, like a service quality, 
which are not easy to quantify but are likely to have value of risk transfer (HM 
Treasury, 2006a). Especially the quantitative assessment between different PPP 
options can be less decisive than between the PPP and the PSC options, 
because the BTL and the BTO options share more common factors in the 
quantitative assessment than the PPP and PSC options. It means that the role of 
the reasonable qualitative assessment is important to find better PPP option. 
According to the Korean VFM guidance (KDI, 2009b), considering that the 
result of the qualitative assessment can be different with the result of the 
quantitative assessment, the methodology for the qualitative VFM assessment 
should be clear also.  
 
Various methods for the qualitative assessment can be used, but there are 
three common methods; observation, interviews, and documentary analysis 
(Berg, 2007, Patton, 2002). Observation can be divided into participant 
observation and direct observation, but both are not suitable for this research, 
because the qualitative VFM assessment for the PPP projects has been cursory 
until now. Documentary analysis is very limited, because the comparison of the 
BTL with the BTO option was tried for the first time in this thesis, so there is no 
document directly related with the choice of the PPP models. Interviews are 
useful for getting the opinions based on experiences of interviewees and 
particularly, in-depth information around the topic can be obtained (McNamara, 
1999). Qualitative VFM assessment for comparing the BTL with the BTO option 
needs to be done by the experts who understand two PPP models and have 
enough experiences. Therefore interviews seem to be appropriate for the 
qualitative VFM assessment based on the assumed situation comparing the BTL 
with the BTO option. 
 
Usually, there are three types of interviews (Arksey, 2004, Yin, 2009): an open-
ended interview, where the interviewer asks the interviewee for facts or 
opinions on the subject without any pre-organised questions; a semi-structured 
interview, where the interviewer asks prepared questions as an interview  
guidance, but the direction of response can be taken by the interviewee; and a 
structured interview, where the interviewer follows structured list of questions Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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like a formal questionnaire and responding of the interviewee is limited to the 
questions.  
 
Considering the qualitative VFM assessment for transport PPP in South Korea 
has been cursory, it is thought that the semi-structured interview is 
appropriate. This research tries to compare the BTL with the BTO model for a 
project for the first time in South Korea, so interviewees may not understand 
the comparison concept only based on a questionnaire. Thus, a set of 
questions can be helpful to proceed to interview not only for the investigator 
but also for the respondent. Also, the PPP has quite different characteristics by 
transport mode, project, and details of contract, so the result of interviews can 
be quite different by the personal experience of the interviewee. Therefore, it 
needs to allow the respondent to lead the direction of the interview and the list 
of questions is used only for the interview guidance. 
 
The VFM assessment guidance of Korea gives an example of issues and 
questions for the qualitative VFM assessment comparing the PPP option with 
the PSC option through interviews as follows; 
 
Table 4.3 Issue and questions in the qualitative VFM assessment for the PPP 
Issue  Question 
Service quality  ▪  Can  the  service  quality  be  improved  by  the  creativity  of  the 
private sector and the competition with the public sector? 
Contract  & 
Management 
▪ Is it appropriate to make a contract with the private sector under 
the current regulations in construction and operation? 
▪  Does  the  procurement  authority  have  enough  ability  and 
capacity to manage and supervise the project? 
▪ Can the efficiency of the public work be risen by transferring the 
construction and operation to the private sector? 
Risk 
management 
▪  Is  the  risk  management  clear  enough  to  operate  the  project 
continuously and stably? 
Effect  to  other 
industry 
▪  Can  the  technology  and  the  management  skill  of  the  private 
sector affect the public sector in a positive way? 
▪  Can  the  financial  market  be  developed  through  the  advanced 
financing tool? 
Special condition  ▪  Is  there  any  limitation  to  the  project  because  of  the  national 
security? 
▪  Is  it  appropriate  for  the  private  sector  to  provide  the  public 
service without the dispute about fairness? 
Source: KDI (2009) Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
  76   
However, this is comparing the PPP with the PSC, so these are not enough to 
compare the PPP models with each other. It is not easy to find the meaningful 
difference between the BTL and the BTO model in these questions. The VFM 
assessment guidance of the UK shows more specific issues and questions in 
each of the programme, project and procurement level. There are 10 issues 
and 49 questions including the overall question in three categories (viability, 
desirability, achievability) in the project level on which this study focuses (HM 
Treasury, 2006b). Hence, new qualitative VFM guidance focusing on comparing 
the BTL and BTO model needs to be suggested based on these issues and 
questions of Korea and the UK’s qualitative assessment guidance. 
 
Basically, the issues for the qualitative assessment to compare the BTL with the 
BTO are similar to compare the PPP with the PSC, because it needs to be 
compared with the PSC whether the BTL or the BTO is chosen. Questions need 
to be modified also to fit to compare the PPP models with each other. Based on 
the guidance of the UK (HM Treasury, 2006b), there are four issues which are 
appropriate to compare the BTL with the BTO. These are operational flexibility, 
risk management, incentives and monitoring, and market interest. They are 
related with three issues (service quality, contract and management, risk 
management) of Korean guidance. The issue about the incentives and 
monitoring is for increasing the service quality. The issue about the market 
interest is for checking the possibility of making a contract. This study is 
mainly about Korean cases, so three issues of service quality, contract and 
management, and risk management based on the Korean VFM guidance are 
used (KDI, 2007a, KDI, 2009a). In addition to that, the issue of operational 
flexibility in the guidance of the UK is added. Consequently, detailed questions 
in these issues in the qualitative VFM assessment for comparing the BTL with 
the BTO option are listed in Table 4.4. 
 
Basically, the qualitative assessment in this thesis is based on the assumed 
case comparing the BTL with the BTO option in a specific PPP project. Thus, the 
semi-opened interview is selected and the questionnaire is a tool for leading 
the in-depth discussion. It means that the interviewee can discuss qualitative 
factors freely regardless of questionnaire, and suggested issues and questions 
in Table 4.4 are only for the referral purpose and they look enough to do the 
interview without deeper discussion on the questionnaire. Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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Table 4.4 Issue and questions in the qualitative VFM assessment for comparing 
the BTL with the BTO option 
Issue  Question 
Service quality  ▪  Is  it  possible  to  use  an  incentive  through  the  payment 
mechanism for improving the quality of the public service? 
Contract  & 
Management 
▪  Does  the  procurement  authority  have  enough  ability  and 
capacity to manage and supervise the project? 
▪ Does the private market have enough experience and knowledge 
to deal with the PPP? 
▪  Is  it  possible  for  the  government  to  have  a  supervising  tool 
through the payment mechanism on the contract to monitor the 
project? 
Risk 
management 
▪  Can  the  payment  mechanism  and  contract  terms  incentivise 
good risk management? 
Operational 
flexibility 
▪ Is there a practical balance between the degree of operational 
flexibility that is desired and long term contract? 
Source: VFM assessment guidance of Korea and the UK 
 
However, more important thing in the qualitative assessment is the selection of 
interviewee rather than the questionnaire. The qualitative assessment has not 
been tried to compare the BTL with the BTO option before, so interviewees 
should have enough experiences and expertise on two PPP models. The 
problem is that the PPP experts understanding two models broadly in South 
Korea are very limited and few of them have experiences in a real PPP case. 
Thus, 8 general PPP experts who deeply understand both PPP models were 
selected as interviewees (see details in APPENDIX 3). They are from the 
government, a financial investor and institutes researching the PPP issues on 
transport. 15 interviewees are also selected from 5 PPP projects in which they 
were involved. They have direct experiences on a specific PPP model which was 
used in the project, but they are difficult to answer the different PPP cases.  
 
Consequently, 3 people from each project and 8 general PPP experts execute 
the qualitative assessment on 5 case studies. Considering the number of PPP 
experts is very limited and around 3 to 5 experts usually do the qualitative 
VFM assessment in South Korea, 11 experts look enough to examine the VFM. Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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4.3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Basically, the result of the quantitative VFM assessment in this study is driven 
by the single point estimation. It is not easy for the procurement authority to 
have the confidence that the PPP is better than the PSC based on the result of 
the quantitative VFM only once assessed. To deal with this kind of uncertainty, 
the sensitivity analysis to various input factors in the quantitative assessment 
is widely used.  
 
Sensitivity analysis is variously defined in different area such as engineering, 
economics, physics, social sciences, etc., but the main concept looks almost 
same. According to the IMF (2007), the sensitivity analysis is “a what-if type of 
analysis to determine the sensitivity of the outcomes to changes in parameters. 
If a small change in a parameter results in relatively large changes in the 
outcomes, the outcomes are said to be sensitive to that parameter”. It can be 
defined as “the study of how the uncertainty in the output of a model 
(numerical or otherwise) can be apportioned to different sources of uncertainty 
in the model input” (Saltelli et al., 2004).  
 
To do the sensitivity analysis, it needs to decide the appropriate input 
parameters. For the PPP of the transport infrastructures, the MLTM (2007) 
recommends the input parameters should be analysed as follows; construction 
and operation period, toll price, traffic volume, construction cost, operation 
cost, government subsidy. However, this study is to find the optimal PPP model 
through the VFM assessment, so it needs to examine the sensitivity of the 
quantitative VFM to the input parameters which are used to test the VFM.  
 
There are various sensitivity analysis methods and they can be classified in 
different ways. Saltelli et al. (2000) classify them as : (1) mathematical; (2) 
statistical; and (3) graphical. Mathematical methods analyse the sensitivity of 
outputs to the variable range of inputs. In most cases, the output is calculated 
with a few values of a possible range of the input. Statistical methods assess 
the effect of variance in inputs, which can be expressed in the type of 
probability distribution, on the output distribution (Neter et al., 1996). There 
are regression analysis, analysis of variance, response surface method, Fourier 
amplitude sensitivity test, mutual information index, etc. in the statistical Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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method, and the range of inputs can be determined by using various 
techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation (Cullen and Frey, 1999, Frey and 
Patil, 2002). Graphical methods are to do the sensitivity analysis in the form of 
visual indication like graphs, charts, etc. These are possible to be used as a 
complementary tool for the mathematical and statistical methods for better 
representation (Baird, 1989, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 1998). 
 
The MLTM (2007) suggests using the deterministic nominal range sensitivity 
analysis in the reason that there are not enough experiences and accumulated 
data of the PPP in Korea for the stochastic analysis. Thus, this study which is 
focused on Korean cases basically follows the suggestion of the MLTM. About 
the items for the sensitivity analysis, Woodward (1995) said that variables 
which should be examined were inflation, revenue, construction costs, interest 
rate, operating costs, the construction time, the project life, etc. through his 
survey. The MLTM (2007) also gives a guideline for the input factors of the 
sensitivity analysis: construction and operation period, toll, demand, 
construction cost, operation cost, government subsidy. This study is for 
Korean cases, so it needs to follow the guidelines of the MLTM. 
 
However, the inaccuracy of traffic forecast is one of the most important factors 
which can affect the quantitative VFM. This factor is usually tested by the 
sensitivity analysis, but actual traffic was frequently out of test ranges because 
of the high inaccuracy of forecast. However, accumulated traffic data in 
transportation by now is likely to make it possible be expressed by the 
probability. Most countries have their formal procedure to forecast the traffic 
by using the common factors such as the O/D data, forecast model, etc. It 
means that the inaccuracy of traffic forecast can have a tendency which is 
statistically meaningful in the level of country or region. Thus, the stochastic 
analysis on the traffic factor is done based on the probability of the traffic 
forecast, and it can be calculated by the random process such as the Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation is a methodology to simulate the phenomena or 
formula with high uncertainties of input factors by randomly iterated runs 
based on the probability distribution of input factor (Glasserman, 2003). Many 
areas such as finance, engineering, physics, etc are using the Monte Carlo Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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method or simulation. In this study, traffic demand risk is the most decisive 
but highly risky. Also, the formula calculating the quantitative VFM assessment 
has various input factors, and the Monte Carlo simulation easily deals with 
these factors having high uncertainties at the same time by the computer 
based random iteration. Consequently, the Monte Carlo simulation can be used 
to assess the sensitivity of VFM to traffic demand based on the probability of 
accuracy of traffic forecast in road and rail in South Korea.  
 
There are several software packages for the Monte Carlo Simulation such as “at 
Risk” and “Crystal Ball”, but this thesis deals with only one input factor (traffic 
demand), so the Excel of Microsoft is enough to find out the result (see 
APPENDIX 5).  Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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4.4 Case studies 
 
4.4.1 The purpose of the case study 
 
The optimal PPP model was defined as the PPP model providing better VFM. At 
the level of transport mode, the optimal PPP model means the PPP model 
giving higher VFM in each transport mode. However, the VFM is varied by the 
social and economical circumstances of each project and transport mode, 
which are complicated and changeable. Thus, it seems to be effective to be 
analysed by the empirical research rather than theoretical research. 
 
There are many strategies for an empirical research: an experiment, archival 
analysis, historical analysis, survey, case study, etc. (Yin, 2009). An experiment 
is not possible in a real PPP project and archival analysis and historical analysis 
do not look enough to find a general conclusion on the optimal PPP model 
though the general features can come out. Using the BTL instead of BTO for 
transport PPP is unusual in South Korea, so a survey can mislead the opinions 
under the situation that the research concept is not understood clearly to the 
respondents. A case study is suitable for the investigators to find out holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as organisational and 
managerial process, maturation of industries, school performance, etc. (Yin, 
2009) To find the optimal PPP model in transport, it is necessary to research 
the PPP process, situation of transport field, the performance of PPP. Therefore, 
a case study looks useful for the optimal PPP model research. 
 
Consequently, a case study as a main research methodology is used to find out 
the optimal PPP model for road and rail in South Korea, though archival and 
historical analyses through the literature review are partly used for general 
features of the PPP models. The VFM assessment and the sensitivity analysis 
are methodologies are used at a project level, and case studies of several PPP 
projects helps the optimal PPP model at the general levels of road and rail.  
 
4.4.2 The selection of the case study 
 
There are many PPP projects for road and rail in South Korea, so a case for 
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models. For the rational appraisal of the PPP models, not only successful cases 
but also failed cases should be studied. The role of the public sector in the PPP 
is also an important factor to affect the choice of the optimal PPP model. Cases 
need to cover various roles, which have such types as the subsidy from the 
public sector, MRG, etc., of the public sector. Thus, five cases are selected in 
this thesis; two cases (Incheon Airport Expressway, Oksan-Ochang Expressway) 
are for road and three cases (Incheon Airport Railway, Daegok-Sosa Railway, 
Seoul Metro9) are for rail. 
 
Figure 4.4 Location of case studies 
 
Source: MLTM 
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The most representative BTO project in road is the Incheon Airport Expressway. 
This expressway is the first BTO project in South Korea, and many other 
projects followed this case in making the PPP contract as the example of the 
BTO project. Also, it was already opened from 2000 and there are many 
evaluations and debates on the project. Especially, the public sector shared 
traffic demand risk with the private sector in this project by the MRG condition 
which was 90% at first. Thus, the Incheon Airport Expressway is studied for 
analysing the road PPP case with the MRG condition. 
 
The second case for road is the Oksan-Ochang Expressway using the BTO 
model where the MRG condition is not included. This expressway is an 
unsolicited project suggested by the private sector and is in negotiation 
between the MLTM and the preferred bidder for making a contract. The 
suggestion of the private sector was assessed to be inappropriate at first, and 
the private sector changed its suggestion. However, the project has been 
delayed for several years because the private sector was difficult to finance the 
project without MRG condition. The construction cost in the BTO option is 
higher than the PSC option, and almost doubled toll level is supposed to be 
charged. It shows current problems of the BTO model in road, so it is good to 
assess the BTL model as the alternative of the BTO road. 
 
Rail has many different characteristics with road. Construction and operation 
are much more complicated than road and cost is also higher. Though toll level 
is limited by the government, but tariff in rail is much more regulated by the 
government because rail is a dominant public transport. Thus, the contents of 
PPP are easy to be more complex and various than road. In this thesis, the 
Incheon Airport Railway which is the first railway PPP project in South Korea is 
studied first. This project followed the PPP scheme of the BTO with MRG model 
for road cases, but now, it was severely criticised because of the excessive 
MRG and most equities of the private sectors were sold to the public sector. 
This case shows the appropriateness of the BTO with MRG model to rail. 
 
The second case for rail is the Daegok-Sosa railway using the BTL model 
including the operation for the first time in transport in South Korea. The 
project is a part of national arterial rail, so the level of tariff is strongly limited 
by the government and the BTO model is difficult to be chosen. This case can Byungwoo Gil    Research Methodology 
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show the possibility of using the BTL model for the construction and operation 
of transport infrastructures. 
 
The third case for rail is the Seoul Metro line no. 9 using the BTO model with 
MRG and construction subsidy. In fact, the urban rail in a metropolitan city 
shows different characteristics with the nation arterial rail connecting local 
regions. The public needs are various and much in urban rail and the 
construction and operation are more complex not only than road but also than 
any other common rail. 
 
Table 4.5 Main features of five case studies 
Mode  Project  Current PPP 
model  MRG  Subsidy from the 
government  Progress 
Road 
Incheon Airport 
Expressway  BTO  O  X  Operation 
Oksan-Ochang 
Expressway  BTO  X  O  Negotiation(Delay) 
Rail 
Incheon Airport 
Railway  BTO  O  O 
Operation 
(sold to the public 
sector) 
Daegok-Sosa 
Railway  BTL  -  X  Negotiation 
Seoul Metro 9  BTO  O  O  Operation 
 
 
 
4.4.3 Methodological framework  
 
An optimal PPP model was defined as a PPP model having higher VFM in this 
chapter, and it needs several methodologies to assess the VFM and to know 
the characteristics of the BTL and the BTO model in different transport mode. 
Figure 4.5 shows the methodological framework to explore the optimal PPP 
model in road and rail in South Korea. 
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Figure 4.5 The methodological framework 
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Thus, this chapter explored the research methodology based on the 
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The available methodologies were reviewed, and the VFM assessment which 
can be used for both PPP models was chosen to evaluate the optimal PPP model 
for road and rail in South Korea. Thus, the optimal PPP model could be defined 
as the PPP model having higher VFM between the BTL and the BTO model. In 
this case, optimal refers to the best financial option for the government. 
 
The VFM assessment was divided into the quantitative assessment and the 
qualitative assessment. Quantitative VFM assessment was calculated using the 
LCC analysis in the Korean VFM guidance, but this thesis modified the VFM 
guidance so that it could compare the PPP options with each other instead of 
the PSC option. To date, qualitative VFM has been cursory in Korea, but it was 
important to cover the interest of the private sector and the end users who are 
key participants in the PPP. Thus, it was decided to be assessed by the in-depth 
interview of over 20 PPP experts in South Korea. This permits consideration of 
the financial impacts on the private sector of wider social benefits. The 
alternative of detailed economic modelling of the impacts on end users was 
precluded by the lack of data. 
 
However, the VFM assessment was done by the point estimation and it did not 
consider variable input factors. Thus, the sensitivity analysis of VFM to various 
input factors was chosen to increase the fidelity of the VFM assessment. In 
particular, in various input factors to the VFM assessment, traffic was found to 
be the most risky, and the main difference between the BTO and the BTL model 
was due to who bore the traffic demand risk. Thus, stochastic analysis is added 
to the sensitivity analysis of the VFM to determine the impact of traffic demand 
risk.  
 
Though the VFM assessment shows the optimal PPP option for a project, the 
different features of a project and transport modes such as road and rail need 
to be studied. Thus, the case study approach was thought to be appropriate as 
a methodological strategy, and five cases having specific characteristics for 
road and rail in South Korea were selected. The Incheon Airport Expressway 
and the Oksan-Ochang Expressway was chosen for road PPP and the Incheon 
Airport Railway, the Daegok-Sosa Railway, and the Seoul Metro 9 were chosen 
for rail PPP.
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CHAPTER 5   
Case study in the Incheon Airport 
Expressway 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Incheon Airport Expressway is the first BTO road with MRG condition to 
connect Seoul with the Incheon International Airport under the current PPP 
regulation. This project affected not only the public sector but also the private 
sector as the first PPP example. Other transport BTO projects including rail and 
seaport followed this project in deciding a rate of profit, MRG, etc. However, 
this project was severely criticised because the actual traffic was much lower 
than expected, so the government had to pay the guaranteed revenue. It made 
people sceptical about the PPP itself, though it was due to the guaranteed 
revenue in the BTO model.  
 
This road was only way to link Seoul to the Incheon International Airport when 
the airport was opened in 2001. The issue on the Incheon Airport Expressway 
was not to decide whether to do but to decide how to do. However, the Korean 
government chose the BTO model without any specific assessment like a 
current VFM test. The main interest of the government seemed to do the 
project on schedule without excessive burden on the budget. 
 
This chapter, firstly, summaries details, history, and appraisal of the project. 
Secondly, it conducts a quantitative VFM assessment for comparing the BTL 
with the BTO option. Thirdly, it executes a qualitative VFM based on interviews 
from the PPP experts of South Korea. Lastly, the sensitivity of VFM to important 
input factors is analysed. Also, in this section, it explores whether the level of 
MRG, which reached 90% of expected revenue, was appropriate. 
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5.2 Summary of the project 
 
5.2.1 Details of the project 
 
The Incheon Airport Expressway is the first transport infrastructure linking the 
Incheon Airport to Seoul as a part of new international airport construction 
project for Seoul. The Incheon International Airport was officially suggested in 
1989 by the Ministry of Transportation of Korea, and its construction was 
launched from 1992. The Korean government aimed to complete in 2000 and 
to open from 2001. It was planned as an exclusive expressway with toll to 
minimise the travel time (IIAC, 2001).  
 
It was only way to the Incheon Airport until the Incheon Bridge, which is the 
second way to link the airport and Incheon Songdo International city, opened in 
2009. The government invested ₩284 billion for connecting road and the 
private sector invested ₩1,460 billion for main road constructed by the PPP. It 
has a total length of 40.2km and four to six lanes. Main bridge to connect 
Yeongjong-Do, which was reclaimed from the sea between two islands, with 
land was designed to have two layers for road and rail. The construction period 
was from November 1995 to November 2000, but a part of main bridge was 
constructed from 1993 by the government. 
Figure 5.1 Incheon Airport Expressway route map 
Source: MLTM Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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5.2.2 History of the project as a PPP 
 
The Incheon Airport Expressway was supposed to be built by the public sector 
and the construction of the bridge was partly started in 1993 by the 
government. However, the Korean government made a decision to change the 
traditional direct investment procurement way to the BTO model in 1994. Main 
reasons were relieving the financial burden of the government and introducing 
the efficiency of the private sector to transport service. According to Yeo et al 
(2003), the minimum demand of the investment for transport infrastructures in 
South Korea was expected to be ₩364 trillion during 1996~2011, but the 
Korean government was anticipated to be able to afford to ₩241 trillion.  
 
In 1995, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT, now MLTM) 
requested proposals of the private sector, and there was only one bidder which 
was a consortium consisted of major construction companies in Korea
13. The 
government made a contract and the construction resumed again in November 
1995 and the partly constructed part by the public sector was agreed to be 
paid by the private sector (MOCT, 1996). 
 
The operation period of the private sector was 30 years and there was no MRG 
regulation when the contract was made at first. However, the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 made it difficult for the private sector to continue the project, so 
the government decided to share the demand risk with the private sectors 
without decreasing the rate of profit in 1999. Also, the private sector had to 
make a contract based on traffic forecast suggested by the MOCT in June 1994 
as a solicited project already in progress (Yeo et al., 2003). Thus, the MOCT 
guaranteed 90% of the expected revenue to the private sector for 20 years in 
30-year operation period. However, the government confronted criticisms on 
the excessive MRG after operation and the private sector which was consisted 
of construction companies wanted to sell their equity. Thus, the MRG condition 
got changed from 90% to 80% instead of allowing refinancing of the private 
sector and selling equities of construction companies in 2003 (MOCT, 2003).  
                                           
13 Equity holders of the Incheon Airport Expressway: Construction companies (76.57%, 
Samsung, Donga, Posco, Kolon, LG, Kumho, Gukdong, Lotte, Punglim, Doosan) Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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5.2.3 The appraisal of the project as a PPP 
 
The Incheon Airport Expressway is the first BTO project under the current PPP 
regulation and its appraisal is distinctively divided. Proponents think the 
project was successful in the point that the facility was constructed on time, on 
budget (Kim et al., 2004). This project was an essential facility for the Incheon 
International Airport located in a small island, so it was very important to 
complete the construction before opening the airport. Especially, major 
structures such as Yeongjong Grand Bridge needed the high technology which 
was newly introduced in South Korea at that time. Yeongjong Grand Bridge is 
the main bridge to connect the airport to land and it is a suspension bridge 
which has double decks for a six-lane expressway on upper deck and four-lane 
expressway and double rail on lower deck (New Airport Hiway Co., 2002).  
 
Figure 5.2 Yeongjong Grand Bridge 
 
Source: MOCT, NAVER encyclopaedia 
 
However, opponents criticise that there are many problems as the first PPP 
case. The most serious problem is an excessive financial burden of the public 
sector differently with the original expectation. They think the purpose of the 
PPP, to lessen the financial burden of the public sector by inducing the private 
investment, was not achieved (Kim, 2006). It is due to the MRG condition under 
the situation that the traffic forecast is inaccurate. The government guaranteed 
90% of expected revenue to the private sector for 20 years in 30-year operation 
period. However, the actual traffic was around 50% of the forecasted because 
of overestimated accompanied persons, delayed land development in 
Yeongjong Island, incorrect modal split, increase of average occupancy, etc. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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(Lee, 2005, Kim et al., 2004, Yeo et al., 2003). According to Lee (2008b), 
subsidy for the guaranteed revenue is estimated up to more than ₩1,500 
billion for 20 years.  
 
Table 5.1 Traffic volume of the Incheon Airport Expressway 
Unit: cars per day 
Year  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Forecasted 
traffic (A) 
110,622  121,496  133,438  146,554  119,026  125,322  131,965  138,930 
Actual 
traffic (B) 
51,939  54,244  55,323  59,780  62,831  65,571  68,711  64,956 
B/A (%)  46.9%  44.6%  41.5%  40.8%  52.8%  52.3%  52.1%  46.8% 
Source: MLTM (2009) 
 
End users also complained the higher toll charge than the public sector 
operating expressway. Toll price of the Incheon Airport Expressway is 2.38 
times of the public expressway though the government guarantees 90% of the 
expected revenue (Kim, 2006).   
 
Table 5.2 Toll prices of Public Expressway and the Incheon Airport Expressway 
  Public Expressway 
(A) 
Incheon Airport 
Expressway (B) 
Rate 
(B/A) 
Note 
Toll  ₩2,686  ₩6,400  2.38  40km(Eight-lane) 
Source: MOCT, recited from Kim (2006) 
 
Consequently, the Incheon Airport Expressway has problems about inaccurate 
traffic forecast, excessive MRG by which most risks were transferred to the 
public sector, and high toll price although it was successfully constructed 
before opening the airport and has been operated. Especially, the Incheon 
Airport Expressway was the first PPP case in South Korea and many other PPP 
projects followed this case in making a MRG, rate of profit, etc. Thus, problems 
in this case were also seen in other PPP cases for transport infrastructures.   Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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5.3 Quantitative VFM assessment 
 
5.3.1 Basic assumption 
 
For a rational comparison between the BTL and the BTO option, social and 
economic circumstances when the contract got made should be considered. 
This BTO project started from 1995, but its contract was revised in 2003 for 
refinancing of the private sector. Most data collected from the MLTM was value 
in 1999 to analyse the finance of the project, so the year for calculating life 
cycle cost is 1999. 
 
The quantitative VFM is assessed through the analysis of the discounted cash 
flow of the project, so it needs to assume a financial discount rate to calculate 
this. According to the financial report of the Incheon Airport Expressway 
(MLTM, 2009), a nominal financial discount rate in 1999, which was used in 
analysing the cash flow of this project, was 8.87%. A financial discount rate is 
decided by the financial circumstances of each country, and the Korean VFM 
guidance for the BTO model (KDI, 2007a) recommends using 6% (real) based 
on the WACC (Weighted Average Capital Cost) method. However, the financial 
discount rate in the BTL option should be equal to the value around 1999, so 
the nominal financial discount rate in this case study will be used as the same 
value, 8.87%.  
 
In the VFM assessment of the BTO model, generally real value is used in 
calculating cash flow to adjust the level of toll regularly by inflation. On the 
other hand, in the case of the BTL model, nominal value is used to calculate 
lease fee which is annually paid for operation period in general. It helps the 
government to predict the financial burden on future budget. Thus, the 
inflation needs to transfer these different values into one kind of value. The 
inflation used in the financial report of the MLTM was 5.0%, so the same value 
is used in this case study.  
 
The rate of profit in the BTO model is determined by the FIRR (Financial 
Internal Rate of Return) which is based on the discounted cash flow of the 
project (KEC, 2007). In this study, the contracted real FIRR (Internal Rate of 
Return) of the BTO option is 9.70%, which is calculated by the cash flow of the Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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Incheon Airport Expressway. Thus, the rate of profit in the BTO case is 9.70% in 
nominal and it is 15.19% when the inflation is 5.0%.  
 
The nominal rate of profit of the BTL option is assumed as 9.37%. Generally, 
the rate of profit of private sector in the BTL model of which revenue paid by 
the government seems lower than that of the BTO model where revenue is 
collected directly from the end user. Furthermore, a revenue risk in the BTL 
model, which is usually used for facilities without incomes from the end users, 
is on the government. It means that the government guarantees revenue to the 
private sector in the BTL model, although the government can put some 
conditions like serviceability on this revenue. The Korean VFM guidance 
suggests an appropriate rate of profit in the BTL model is the sum of the 
interest of five-year Korea national bond and mark-up including premium 
interest for long term investment, construction and operation risks.  In a recent 
railway BTL project, the MOCT(2007c) suggested 0.77% as an appropriate 
mark-up rate which was calculated by the long term investment premium, the 
construction risk and the operation risk. In addition, there are two more BTL 
cases of rail in Korea, and mark-up rates are suggested as 0.76% and 0.70%, so 
the highest 0.77 will be used in the BTL option of the Incheon Airport 
Expressway as a common mark-up rate. In 1999, the mean value of interest of 
five-year Korea national bond was 8.60%, so an appropriate rate of profit in BTL 
option is assumed as 9.37%. The real rate of profit is 4.16% when the inflation 
is 5%.  
 
5.3.2 Construction subsidy 
 
There was no construction subsidy for this BTO project. This project was 
already started and partly constructed by the public sector. However, partly 
invested expense by the public sector was repaid by the private sector. 
Generally, there is no construction subsidy in the BTL model, so it is not 
considered in the BTL model either. 
 
5.3.3 Lease fee 
 
Lease fee is the payment of the public sector to compensate for the total 
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sector. If there is any additional income through the granted commercial right 
by the public sector, it should be excluded to the total cost because the profit 
for the private sector is already considered. Mostly, the public sector pays 
lease fee annually, so the annual lease fee equation can be shown as follows 
(KDI, 2009a); 
 
 
incomes additional the of value present the investment Total
k
fee lease Annual
N
t
t  
 
1 1
 
  k n PVIFA
incomes additional the of value present the invesment Total
fee lease Aunnal
,

  
 
 * Here, PVIFA is the present value index for annual lease fee. 
   
  
 

N
t
t k
k n PVIFA
1 1
1
) , (  
    N is operation (lease) period 
    k is the rate of return and it stands for the profit of private sector 
 
This is same with the annually equal payment equation as follows. 
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There is little additional income in the Incheon Airport Expressway, so what 
should be considered is to calculate the present value of the total investment 
or cost through the life cycle of the Incheon Airport Expressway. 
 
In this case, N which is the operation period of this project is 30 years. The k 
means the rate of profit, so the k value in this case is 9.37%. Total investment 
of the private sector for construction is building cost and it is ₩1,460.2 billion. 
Consequently, the PVIFA (30, 9.37%) is 9.9457 and the annual lease fee is 
₩146.8 billion in nominal price. 
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5.3.4 Operating cost 
 
Operating costs are assumed the same in both models. This project was 
transferred to the BTO projects from the government direct investment project 
just before starting main construction with the completed design. Therefore, 
there was no advantage of private sector for operating this expressway in 
design. On condition that there is no additional incentive or penalty for 
operation, it is thought for operating costs to be the same in both models. 
 
According to the financial report of the MLTM (2009), operating cost for 30 
years in the BTO model is ₩2,169.8 billion (real price). This chapter uses the 
same cost in the BTL model.  
 
5.3.5 Revenue 
 
Revenue is decided by the toll level and traffic demand and they are much 
related with each other. If toll rises, traffic volume is decreased. On the 
contrary, if toll drops then traffic volume is increased. In the BTL model, the 
public sector pays lease fee, so it can be difficult to increase toll price higher 
than other expressway operated by the public sector. It means that there is 
possibility that the toll in the BTL case is lower than the BTO case, and traffic 
volume might be increased. However, revenue in the BTL case is assumed the 
same in the BTO case, because expressway toll is a very political issue and it 
seems better to be dealt with qualitatively. The expected revenue for operation 
period is ₩6,844.9 billion in the BTO case, so the same revenue is assumed in 
the BTL case.  
 
5.3.6 Summary of the analysis factors 
 
  Building cost: ₩1,460.2 billion (nominal) 
  Operating cost: ₩2,169.8 billion (real) /  ₩5,938.8 billion (nominal) Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
  96   
  Operation period: 30 years 
  Annual lease fee: ₩15.1 billion (nominal) 
  Rate of profit 
Nominal: 9.37% in the BTL, 15.19%
14 in the BTO 
Real: 4.16% in the BTL, 9.70% in the BTO 
  Real financial discount rate: 8.87% 
  Inflation: 5.0% 
  Revenue: ₩6,844.9 billion (real) 
 
5.3.7 Result 
 
In this case, there is no construction subsidy from the government, so the VFM 
can be calculated by following formula. 
 
     VFMlo  = BTL (Revenue – Lease – Operating cost) 
 
The calculated data of 30 years and the sum of them are listed in Table 5.3. 
The quantitative VFM of the BTL model in this project compared with the BTO 
model is ₩693.4 billion. 
 
  Table 5.3 Quantitative VFM assessment in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
Unit: billion KRW 
Year  Revenue 
(Real) 
Lease  Operation 
(Real) 
VFM 
Nominal  Real  Real  NPV 
Sum  6844.9  4404.0  2149.2  2169.8  2525.9  693.4 
2001  192.0  146.8  133.2  23.1  35.8  30.2 
2002  210.9  146.8  126.8  19.1  64.9  50.3 
2003  231.6  146.8  120.8  28.0  82.8  58.9 
2004  254.4  146.8  115.0  44.2  95.1  62.2 
2005  206.7  146.8  109.5  43.9  53.3  32.0 
2006  217.6  146.8  104.3  58.4  54.9  30.3 
2007  229.1  146.8  99.4  51.4  78.4  39.7 
2008  241.3  146.8  94.6  57.8  88.8  41.3 
                                           
14 Rate of profit in the BTO model means FIRR (Financial Internal Rate of Return). Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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2009  254.0  146.8  90.1  65.6  98.3  42.0 
2010  181.6  146.8  85.8  57.5  38.2  15.0 
2011  187.1  146.8  81.7  54.5  50.8  18.3 
2012  192.1  146.8  77.9  74.9  39.3  13.0 
2013  198.9  146.8  74.1  64.4  60.3  18.3 
2014  205.0  146.8  70.6  70.1  64.3  18.0 
2015  211.4  146.8  67.3  90.7  53.5  13.7 
2016  217.8  146.8  64.0  74.3  79.5  18.7 
2017  224.9  146.8  61.0  77.0  87.0  18.8 
2018  232.0  146.8  58.1  95.3  78.7  15.7 
2019  239.4  146.8  55.3  82.3  101.7  18.6 
2020  247.0  146.8  52.7  94.8  99.5  16.7 
2021  247.0  146.8  50.2  86.9  110.0  17.0 
2022  247.0  146.8  47.8  86.1  113.1  16.0 
2023  247.0  146.8  45.5  86.7  114.8  14.9 
2024  247.0  146.8  43.4  102.8  100.9  12.1 
2025  247.0  146.8  41.3  97.2  108.5  11.9 
2026  247.0  146.8  39.3  88.1  119.6  12.1 
2027  247.0  146.8  37.4  88.5  121.0  11.2 
2028  247.0  146.8  35.7  90.2  121.2  10.3 
2029  247.0  146.8  34.0  89.4  123.7  9.7 
2030  247.0  146.8  32.3  126.5  88.1  6.3 
 
This result shows that if the Incheon Airport Expressway had been done by the 
BTL model, it could have more VFM than the BTO model which was used in the 
real case. This result seems reasonable because the difference of the 
construction and operation cost between two models is not so big, so the rate 
of profit is a decisive factor to affect the VFM. The rate of profit of the BTL 
model seems lower than the BTO model, because the revenue in the BTL model 
of Korea is guaranteed by the government only if the private sector does not 
have any problem in providing the service. 
 
It is an important clue to demonstrate that if the traffic volume is close to an 
expected value, then the BTL can have more VFM than the BTO in general 
because of its lower rate of profit.  Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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5.4 Qualitative VFM assessment 
 
This section examines four issues of the qualitative VFM assessment suggested 
in Chapter 4; service quality, contract & management, risk management, and 
operational flexibility. This is assessed based on the opinions the PPP experts 
gave through the face to face interview which was done in South Korea from 
the 6
th November to the 21
st November 2010.  
 
5.4.1 Service quality 
 
Services in expressway can be assessed by various criteria. The MOCT (2007b) 
evaluated a service quality of expressway only by the traffic volume to road 
capacity. However, this does not look enough to deal with other important 
factors in service quality. Son (2006) divided service quality into two: 
quantitative factors such as speed, congestion, and the geometric structure of 
road and qualitative factors such as cleaning road, environmental effect, and 
driving manner. Kim (2007b) suggested including some factors such as driving 
circumstance, safety, and traffic information to service quality index. 
Hostovsky et al (2004) argued that density could be a measure to cover quality 
of service generally. Washburn et al (2004) presented more factors affecting 
service quality such as speed variance, pavement quality and driver etiquette. 
In addition to these studies, it needs to consider toll level to achieve a 
requested service quality. Even if the quality of service is same, the assessment 
on VFM can be different by how much end users pay. 
 
With respect to the service quality, several interviewees said that this project 
was done by the BTO with MRG model, and the level of MRG was 90% at first 
introduced, so it was difficult to expect for the private sector to make an effort 
to improve the service quality (○ A  in section 3.1 in APPENDIX 4). The profit of 
the private sector was guaranteed regardless of end users complaint in service 
quality. A government officer who was in charge of this project argued that 
even if the BTL model had been used, there had been little difference with the 
BTO model in the service quality (○ B  in section 3.1 in APPENDIX 4). He argued 
that most factors in service quality such as speed, physical condition, driving 
etiquette, etc. seemed to be decided not by the effort of the private sector but Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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by the geographic route, a physical standard of expressway, and transport 
culture. He pointed out that the service factor which can be managed by the 
private sector looked to affect little for the end users to choose the road even 
in the BTO case without MRG condition.  An officer of BAI (Board of Audit and 
Inspection) of Korea added that people would be more interested in toll price 
than general service quality (○ C  in section 3.1 in APPENDIX 4). The toll price 
could be lower in the BTL model in which the government pays lease fee to the 
private sector. In addition, this road is only way to the Incheon Airport and 
there is no other choice to users. Thus, considering difference between the BTL 
and the BTO model in the service quality is subtle regardless of MRG condition, 
the BTL model could be better to the end users in terms of toll. Especially, the 
BTL model can have several conditions in a contract to improve the service 
when the government pays lease fee to the private sector as seen in the PFI, 
which is similar to the BTL model in the view that the government pays for the 
private sector, road cases of the UK. The PFI road projects in the UK can use 
“the active management payment mechanism” where the payment of the 
government is made by the congestion management, safety performance, etc. 
(Bain and Wilkins, 2003a). Thus, the BTL model can be expected to have this 
kind of payment mechanism to improve the service, and the BTL seems better 
in this case than the BTO regardless of MRG condition.   
 
5.4.2 Contract and Management 
 
This issue is about the ability and experience of the public and private sectors 
for supervising and managing the PPP project. The Incheon Airport Expressway 
was the first BTO project in South Korea, so it took much time to negotiate 
because of the lack of experience of the private and public sectors (Kim et al., 
2004). Also, the MRG condition was not included when the contract was made 
at first. A rate of profit was a key issue that prolonged negotiation time and it 
was much affected by high traffic demand risk (MOCT, 1996). The MRG 
condition can be thought as an important factor to make a contract in the BTO 
model, considering that many BTO projects are struggling with the financing 
problem after the government abolished the MRG regulation in 2009 (Park, 
2011a).  
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On the other hand, the BTL model looks easier in financing, because whole 
demand risk is on the public sector. An interviewee pointed that if the BTL 
model had been used at that time, negotiation time could have been reduced 
(○ D  in section 3.1 in APPENDIX 4). He explained that a rate of profit depended 
on a risk of the private sector and the risk could be much lower in the BTL 
model. Therefore, the BTL model where the public sector has demand risk 
looks easier to make a contract. 
 
With regard to management and supervision, it has little difference between 
both PPP models in a construction stage because both models have the same 
regulation on construction (KDI, 2006a). This factor is mainly related in the 
operation stage. The management of road in operation stage is mainly about 
the maintenance of the facility (KEC, 2007). The BTO model is basically simpler 
than the BTL in payment mechanism, so the BTO has a benefit in management 
and supervision in the viewpoint of the public sector. However, the 
management of road was relatively simple, so it was difficult to find any 
evidence that the BTO option is better than the BTL option for the Incheon 
Airport Expressway.  
 
5.4.3 Risk management 
 
One of the most important reasons to use the PPP is to allocate risks to the 
sector which can manage it better (HM Treasury, 2008). This issue is about the 
incentivising good risk management through the payment mechanism and 
contract terms. Incentivising good risk management is available to both PPP 
models through the conditions of contract. The difference between PPP models 
in risk management does not look big.  
 
The difference between two models is which sector has a traffic demand risk 
(KDI, 2006a). All interviewees said that there was no incentive to the good risk 
management of the private sector in the Incheon Airport Expressway which 
used the BTO model because it had the MRG condition up to 90% (○ E in section 
3.1 in APPENDIX 4). They argued that it was also difficult to say the BTL model 
was better to incentivise the good risk management, but it had more 
opportunities to incentivise through the performance assessment. 
Consequently, the difference between the BTO and the BTL model does not Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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look big, but the BTL model can have an advantage in demand risk 
management for the Incheon Airport Expressway. 
 
5.4.4 Operational flexibility 
 
With regard to the operational flexibility, opinions of the private sector and the 
public sector were quite different. The interviewee from the private sector said 
that the private sectors would react to the change of circumstances by the 
public sector’s request in the BTL model (○ F in section 3.1 in APPENDIX 4). They 
argued that the public sector could not be more sensitive to this kind of 
change than the private sector because of bureaucracy. However, an 
interviewee from the public sector pointed out that the private sector was only 
interested in the change which was beneficial to the private sector (○ G in section 
3.1 in APPENDIX 4). For example, in this case, it looked to take longer for the 
private sector to introduce the electronic toll charging system than cases of 
public operated expressways (MLTM, 2010a). In particular, he criticised that 
the private sector was difficult to expect to earn more revenue than the 
guaranteed level in this BTO with MRG case even if they had made an effort to 
attract users or cut the operating cost through new technology.   
 
Thus, the BTL seems better than the BTO in operational flexibility in the view of 
the public sector. However, the public sector needs to monitor the operation to 
give the lease fee correctly according to the conditions of payment in the BTL 
model (Baek, 2005). It means that more resources and time are needed to 
check the performance and necessity of operational change in the BTL model.  
 
Consequently, an operational flexibility is a controversial factor between the 
private and the public sectors. However, the public sector has little right for the 
operational change in the BTO model, so the BTL model can be more attractive 
to the public sector. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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5.5 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Many factors in the quantitative VFM assessment such as construction cost, 
operation cost, and the rate of profit are possible to be changed. The VFM 
assessed in the previous section is based on the point estimation, so it needs 
to review the sensitivity of an important input factor.  
 
The MOCT (2007a) recommended analysing the sensitivity of operation period, 
level of toll, traffic demand, construction cost, operation cost and subsidy from 
the public sector. The Level of tariff and demand are related with each other, 
and they can be considered at the same time by the revenue factor. However, 
the sensitivity was not analysed in the real case, because there was no 
guideline in 1995 when the contract was made.  
 
This chapter compares the BTL with the BTO option in the Incheon Airport 
Expressway, but the construction cost, operation cost and profit rate is already 
fixed. The most differently forecasted factor with real value was the traffic 
demand which was a direct source of the revenue. Level of toll is difficult to 
change only because actual traffic demand is different with the expected, so 
the sensitivity of traffic to the VFM can be analysed through the analysis of 
revenue. Thus, this chapter examines the sensitivity of revenue. In addition, 
the excessive inaccuracy of traffic forecast is not only problem in this project 
but easily seen in many other projects, so the stochastic analysis based on 
accumulated inaccuracy of traffic forecast in road is undertaken.  
 
5.5.1 Revenue 
 
The Incheon Airport Expressway is being criticised because of much lower 
traffic than forecasted and excessive minimum revenue guarantee covering 
90% of the expected revenue for 30 years, so the most important sensitivity 
analysis is about the revenue which comes from charging a toll on traffic. After 
the operation of the Incheon Airport Expressway, the actual traffic was around 
50% of the expected. Thus, the range for the sensitivity analysis is from 50% to 
90% of the expected revenue. 
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Table 5.4 Sensitivity of VFM to traffic in the BTO without MRG option 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Actual traffic  Revenue  Lease  Operation  VFM 
100%  2111.3  881.0  537.0  693.4 
90%  1900.2  881.0  537.0  482.2 
80%  1689.1  881.0  537.0  271.1 
70%  1477.9  881.0  537.0  60.0 
67.2%  1418.0  881.0  537.0  0.0 
60%  1266.8  881.0  537.0  -151.2 
50%  1055.7  881.0  537.0  -362.3 
  
Above table shows that if the actual traffic is over 67.2% of the contracted, the 
BTL option has higher quantitative VFM than the BTO without MRG option. It 
also means that if the actual traffic is below 67.2%, then the BTO without MRG 
option is better. Demand risk is on the private sector in the BTO model, which 
can have higher profit rate because of high risk, so if the real demand is 
getting lower than the expected then the BTO model can be beneficial to the 
government if there is no demand risk sharing with the private sector such as a 
MRG condition. However, this project has the MRG covering 90% of the 
expected revenue for 20 years from 2001
15, and the difference with 90% of the 
contracted revenue is compensated for by the government.  
 
Table 5.5 Sensitivity of VFM to traffic in the BTO with MRG option 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV)  
Actual 
traffic 
BTO  BTL 
VFM 
Subsidy for 
operation  Revenue  Lease  Operation 
100%  0.0  2111.3  881.0  537.0  693.4 
90%  0.0  1900.2  881.0  537.0  482.2 
80%  184.4  1689.1  881.0  537.0  455.5 
70%  368.7  1477.9  881.0  537.0  428.7 
60%  553.1  1266.8  881.0  537.0  401.9 
50%  737.5  1055.7  881.0  537.0  375.2 
                                           
15 Operation period is 30 years and the Government guaranteed revenue for the first 20 
years from 2001. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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Considering the MRG, the quantitative VFM can be affected if the actual 
revenue is different with the anticipated. As shown in Table 5.5, because of the 
MRG in the BTO option, the quantitative VFM of the BTL is always higher than 
the BTO in this case. The following graph shows the result of sensitivity 
analysis and the effect of the MRG. 
 
Figure 5.3 Sensitivity analysis of the VFM to traffic 
 
 
The Incheon Airport Expressway was the first BTO project under the current 
PPP regulation. The level of MRG provided by the government for this project 
was 90% for 20 years. There was no rational reason or data to decide the MRG 
as the 90% of expected revenue. The government had to negotiate the level of 
the MRG with the only one bidder, and it seems to be disadvantageous to the 
government under the circumstance that the exclusive way should be opened 
before opening the Incheon International Airport. 
 
This sensitivity analysis shows that the level of MRG of the Incheon Airport 
Expressway BTO project was too high. The reason why the profit rate of the 
BTO was high was that the demand risk was on the private sector, but the 
government had 90% of demand risk in this case. The private sector had little 
risk in operation or demand because of the MRG from the government. 
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5.5.2 Stochastic analysis 
 
The biggest issue in this BTO project is much lower traffic volume than 
forecasted and the excessive guaranteed revenue based on this traffic. It is 
doubted that traffic forecast was exaggerated by the private sector on purpose 
because of the MRG condition. According to the report of the Standard & 
Poor’s (Bain and Polakovic, 2005), overestimated traffic could be generally seen 
in global toll road cases and there seems to be systematic errors in traffic 
forecast of toll road by the optimism bias.  
 
Thus, this section examines a stochastic sensitivity of traffic demand based on 
accumulated data of traffic forecast about toll road. Kim (2007a) researched on 
the inaccuracy of road traffic forecast in South Korea based on 171 projects in 
operation since 2000. 86 projects of them are expressways with toll including 
PPP roads and 85 projects are arterial roads without toll. This case is an 
expressway with toll, so the statistics on 86 toll expressways are used. Figure 
5.4 shows the probability of inaccuracy of expressway in South Korea which 
has been operated since 2000. The mean value is -5.32% and standard 
deviation is 52.61, 
 
Figure 5.4 Inaccuracy of traffic forecast in expressway of South Korea 
 
Cited from Kim (2007a) 
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As explained in the methodology chapter, the Monte Carlo simulation was 
done for the stochastic analysis with the Microsoft Excel and the iteration was 
undertaken 10,000 times. This project was done by the BTO with MRG model, 
so the result of stochastic analysis can be changed by the MRG condition.  
 
In the case of comparison with the BTO with MRG option, the mean value of 
VFM is ₩593.6 billion and standard deviation is ₩672.3 billion. Guaranteed 
revenue by the government is 90% of the expected for 20 years, and the 
private sector has to return an additional profit to the government when the 
traffic is over 110% instead of guaranteed revenue below 90% of the expected.  
 
Figure 5.5 VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO with MRG option 
 
 
Figure 5.5 shows that the BTL case always provides better VFM than the BTO 
with 90% of MRG case. The probability the government pays the revenue 
subsidy by the MRG is 61.0%, and the probability the government be paid back 
by the profit is 28.2%. It means that sharing traffic demand risk was 
inappropriate. In real contract, the government guaranteed 90% of the 
expected revenue instead had a right to get the revenue over 110% of the 
expected. Considering traffic forecast risk, the level of guaranteed revenue 
should have been lowered.  
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In the case of the BTO without a MRG condition, the mean value of VFM is 
₩379.2 billion and the standard deviation is ₩1,245.2 billion. Considering the 
average probability of traffic forecast of expressway in South Korea, this 
project can have more VFM in the BTL option than the BTO option.  
 
Figure 5.6 VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO without MRG  
 
 
Figure 5.6 shows that the probability that the optimal PPP becomes the BTL 
model is 56.6%. Even if there had been no MRG condition in the Incheon 
Airport Expressway, the probability that the BTL model would be better might 
be higher. Thus, even in the case of considering the uncertainty of traffic 
forecast, the BTL model is advantageous for Incheon Airport Expressway. 
 
However, the probability of inaccuracy of traffic forecast in road cannot explain 
a specific case. The average actual traffic for 8 years from 2001 in the Incheon 
Airport Expressway was around 47% of the forecasted. As seen in the section 
5.5.1, the BTO without MRG model can be better for this project if the actual 
traffic is lower than the 67.2% of the forecasted. This result shows that the 
quantitative VFM which has been used as a decisive tool for the PPP seems not 
enough to cope with the uncertainty of input factors. Therefore, it needs to 
deal with the qualitative VFM assessment more importantly than suggested in 
the current VFM assessment guidance of South Korea, though the BTL option is 
still quantitatively better for the Incheon Airport Expressway if the MRG 
condition applies to the BTO option. 
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5.6 Findings 
 
Through the quantitative and qualitative VFM assessment and the sensitivity 
analysis about the BTO and BTL option for the Incheon Airport Expressway case, 
six characteristics were found. 
 
Firstly, the BTL option for the Incheon Airport Expressway can provide better 
quantitative VFM than the BTO option. In this case, the BTL option gives better 
VFM compared with the BTO by ₩693.4 billion. It is because the demand risk is 
on the public sector in the BTL model of Korea, so the rate of profit in the BTL 
option is lower than that of the BTO option where the private sector has the 
traffic demand risk. The government pays a lease fee to the private sector but 
can charge toll to end users, so the government can make a profit in the BTL 
option. It is a different result with common guess that the financial burden of 
BTL model is likely to be bigger than the BTO model because the public sector 
compensates for whole investment and profit of the private sector in the BTL 
model while the public sector burdens partly in the BTO model even in the case 
with the MRG condition. In the BTL model for toll road, the government pays a 
lease fee to the private sector but can charge a toll to the end user, so the 
government can have an opportunity to make a profit. 
 
Secondly, the BTL option can be better than the BTO option to improve the 
quality of service. Generally, the BTO was thought to have a benefit to improve 
the service quality, because the private sector is usually affected by the end 
users more in the BTO model than in the BTL model. However, the Incheon 
Airport Expressway was in monopoly for the first 7 years and revenue was 
guaranteed by 90% of the forecasted, so the private sector seems less sensitive 
to the end user. In the BTL option, the government can impose a condition for 
improving service to the public sector through the payment mechanism.  
 
Thirdly, the BTL option seems to be attractive to the public sector than the BTO 
option in the operational flexibility to cope with the change of future 
circumstances. According the interviews of the PPP experts in South Korea, the 
private sector, which is the operator of the Incheon Airport Expressway, is 
more sensitive to the sector which pays to them. In the BTO option with MRG, 
there were few incentives for the private sector to react to the change of Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
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circumstances. However, the public sector can have more rights to discuss the 
unexpected operational issues through the performance assessment in the BTL 
option.  
 
Fourthly, the BTL option can be better for the public sector to incentivise a 
good risk management of the private sector in operation. The private sector is 
compensated for only by the end users in the BTO option, so it looks harder to 
incentivise risk management which is not related with the direct revenue. On 
the other hand, the public sector can incentivise operational risks which are 
directly related with the revenue through the performance assessment in the 
BTL option. 
 
Fifthly, the level of MRG in this case does not look appropriate. The BTO option 
without MRG can provide better VFM than the BTL option when the actual 
traffic is lower than 67.2% of the forecasted. However, this project guaranteed 
90% of the expected revenue for 20 years, and it is around 87.3% of the 
revenue (NPV) for 30 years. As a result, the BTL option was analysed as it was 
always better than the BTO option with MRG of 90%. Thus, the level of MRG 
should have been lower than 67.2% of the expected revenue to use the 
strength of the BTO model where the private sector has traffic demand risk. 
 
Lastly, despite of the uncertainty of traffic demand risk, the probability that the 
BTL option is better in this project is higher. In the BTO case, the private sector 
has whole traffic demand risk, so the public sector has a benefit when the 
traffic demand risk is high. Especially, recent criticisms on the PPP are mainly 
about the exaggerated traffic demand and excessively guaranteed revenue, so 
the BTO option without MRG seems to be regarded as the best option to the 
public sector. However, the mean value of inaccuracy of traffic forecast in 
expressway in South Korea is only -5.32%. It shows that traffic forecast in road 
in South Korea is relatively accurate when it is compared with rail cases. Thus, 
the probability that the BTL option is better than the BTO option is higher even 
in the case without MRG condition. 
 
Consequently, the BTO model for the Incheon Airport Expressway does not 
look the optimal choice. The level of the MRG was too high, so it made it 
difficult to use the competitiveness of the private sector in the BTO model.  Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Incheon Airport Expressway 
  110   
 Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
  111   
 
CHAPTER 6   
Case study in the Oksan-Ochang 
Expressway 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The Oksan-Ochang Expressway is an unsolicited BTO project suggested by the 
private sector. The original suggestion was rejected by the MLTM because of 
the lack of VFM which was compared with the PSC, but the modified suggestion 
was accepted after all. This chapter examines whether the BTL could be the 
better PPP option than the BTO model through the quantitative and qualitative 
VFM assessment and the sensitivity analysis. Also, it explores why the PPP was 
rejected at first and how it was accepted in the final. 
   
This project is still in negotiation between the private and public sector. 
According to the interviews of the PPP experts of South Korea in November, 
2010, the most important obstacle is the financing plan, because the 
government does not consider the MRG condition in this project. This project 
was supposed to be built by the government direct investment, but the private 
sector proposed the BTO, so the government does not seem to guarantee 
minimum revenue to the private sector. Especially, the MRG regulation to an 
unsolicited project was abolished in 2006. Seven years have passed since this 
project was proposed for the BTO by the private sector, so an interviewee 
criticised that it could have been better for the public sector to do the project. 
 
This chapter mainly focuses on the comparison of the BTO model with BTL 
model but also explores the PSC. Other cases in this thesis were already 
decided to choose the PPP instead of the PSC, so it does not need to compare 
with the PSC. However, the first proposal of the private sector was refused, so 
the better PPP model based on this proposal needs to be compared with the 
PSC to examine whether the PPP is better than the PSC. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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6.2 Summary of the project 
 
6.2.1 Details of the project 
 
The Oksan-Ochang Expressway is a part of National Expressway network to 
connect Cheonan, Asan, and Cheongju area. It aims to invigorate the Cheongju 
International Airport and to improve the accessibility to near national industrial 
complexes such as Osong, Ochang, etc. It has a total length of 13.5km and 
four lanes. The initial plan was to launch the construction in 2006, but it was 
delayed. Though it is still in negotiation, but this case study is for comparing 
the different PPP models in a planning stage. Thus, details of project follow the 
VFM assessment report on the proposal from the private sector. According to 
the VFM report of KDI (2007b), the construction is done from January 2008 to 
end of 2012 and the operation starts from 2013. Total building cost for a 
facility is estimated as ₩225.9 billion in a design level
16. 
 
Figure 6.1 The Oksan-Ochang Expressway line map 
 
    Source: MLTM 
                                           
16 Actual investment can be discounted by bidding, so the cost for the VFM assessment 
is different with the cost in a design stage. More details are explained in section 6.2.2 
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6.2.2 History of the project as a PPP 
 
This expressway was originally planned as a government direct investment 
project to connect Cheonan with Ochang. It has four lanes and the length is 
25.0 km. According to the pre-feasibility test of this project (KDI, 2003), it was 
thought to be inappropriate to use the PPP because it needed an excessive 
construction subsidy reaching 77% of total construction cost. Based on the 
result of the pre-feasibility test of KDI, the MLTM did a feasibility test and was 
making a master plan to construct from 2008 to 2013 by the government 
direct investment. 
 
However, the private sector proposed the BTO with an alternative route which 
was shorter than the plan of the government. They changed the origin from 
Cheonan to Oksan, so the distance became 13.5 km which was shorter than 
the government original plan by 11.5 km. The MRG regulation for the 
unsolicited project has been abolished since 2006, so the MRG condition was 
not considered. Instead, the private sector requested a government subsidy up 
to 24.4%
17 of cost for the facility part. Real rate of profit suggested was 9.23% 
and nominal rate was 14.7%. Operation period was from 2013 to 2042 for 30 
years (KDI, 2007b).  
 
KDI on behalf of the government concluded that the VFM of the BTO was ₩-
12.6 billion. The LCC of the PSC option was ₩60.0 billion and the LCC of the 
BTO option was ₩72.6 billion. It meant that the PSC was better than the BTO 
proposed by the private sector. Thus, the proposed BTO plan was assessed as 
inappropriate (ibid). The main reason seemed that the operation cost and the 
rate of profit for the private sector were too high. The operation cost in the 
BTO option was ₩89.1 billion, but it was only ₩44.7 billion in the PSC option. 
This road connected to two current expressways which were operated by the 
public sector, so the private sector had to plan two more toll gates on main 
road for charging, though it did not need them in case that the public sector 
constructed and operated. It cost almost twice as the PSC option in operation 
(See Figure 6.2). 
                                           
17 The private sector requested 30% at first, but later it was reduced to 24.4%. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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Figure 6.2 Toll gates in the PSC and the BTO option 
 
 
 
The real profit rate which the private sector requested was 9.23%. It was 
thought quite high at that time, because competition in the PPP was getting 
high and the financial market was invigorated with project finances. To 
guarantee this profit rate, the government subsidy was highly needed when it 
was compared with similar projects at that time.  
 
Table 6.1 Profit rate of expressway BTO projects proposed in the mid of 2000s 
Rate of profit  Oksan-Ochang  Siheung-
Pyeongtaek 
Anyang-
Seongnam 
Incheon-
Gimpo 
Real  9.23%  6.11%  6.41%  5.70% 
Source: KDI 
KDI proposed the BTO would be possible if the rate of profit were decreased to 
around 6.07%. The private sector accepted the offer of the government and has 
been in negotiation with the MLTM for making a contract.  
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6.2.3 The appraisal of the project as a PPP 
 
This project is still in negotiation between the government and the private 
sector, so there are few studies about this case. However, several problems 
were found through the literature review and the PPP expert interviews which 
were done in November, 2010 in South Korea.  
 
First, this project has been heavily delayed. One of the purposes of choosing 
PPP instead of government direct investment is to acquire infrastructure early 
(Tvarno, 2010). The government plan was to start construction in 2008, but 
after deciding to use the BTO, even the negotiation has not been agreed yet. 
An interviewee who works for the private sector said that the biggest problem 
was difficult to find a financial investor for a project without the MRG under the 
current circumstances that the uncertainty of global economy was getting high. 
Another interviewee from the public sector also commented on this project 
that he was quite sceptical about the prospect of this PPP contract. Thus, it 
does not look easy to expect to get an agreement and make a contract soon. 
 
Second, the proposed level of toll was too high. It is related with the high profit 
rate, but KDI (2007b) recommended cut the government subsidy by decreasing 
the profit rate. Although it was pointed out that proposed toll was more than 
twice as the PSC (PPP option: ₩1,003 / PSC option: ₩494), but there was no 
recommendation or discussion on an appropriate toll level.   
 
Third, additional toll gates in a short distance in case of the BTO model can 
make people uncomfortable and make additional delays for payment, though it 
was inevitable in the BTO case to charge end users. However, it can evoke a 
protest from road users and make the absurdness of the toll price clearly 
shown as seen in other BTO roads (Kim, 2010c, Carpintero, 2010). 
 
Consequently, the negotiation between the private and public sectors for an 
agreement is still proceeding, but it seems that considerations for end users 
are missing in this project. There seems no excuse and no alternative plan for 
delay. Discussed toll price looks too high and many toll gates may be 
inconvenient. An interviewee from the public sector agreed that the 
government could be seen as irresponsible for this project.  Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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6.3 Quantitative VFM assessment 
 
6.3.1 Basic assumption 
 
The year for calculating life cycle cost is 2004 which was the base year in the 
first proposal of the private sector. Korean VFM guidance for the BTO model 
(KDI, 2007a) recommends using 6% (real) based on the Weighted Average 
Capital Cost (WACC) method. This project was assessed in 2007, and it 
followed basic procedure of the BTO VFM guidance, so this chapter uses 6.0% 
as a real financial discount rate. The inflation is assumed as 5.0% same with 
the VFM assessment report for the proposal.  
 
A rate of profit of the BTO case is proposed as 9.23% in real and 14.7% in 
nominal by the private sector, so the same value is used in this chapter. In case 
of the BTL, the MLTM recommends adding a mark-up rate for the long term 
investment in the five-year Korea national bond, which can be a base interest. 
The MLTM suggested 0.77% as an appropriate mark-up rate in a recent railway 
BTL project (MOCT, 2007c). In addition, there are two more BTL cases of rail in 
Korea, and mark-up rates are suggested as 0.76% and 0.70%, so the highest 
0.77 will be used in the BTL model of the Oksan-Ochang Expressway project as 
a common mark-up rate under Korean financial and construction 
circumstances (MOCT, 2007c). In 2007 when the VFM was assessed, the mean 
value of interest of five-year Korea national bond was 5.28%, so the appropriate 
rate of profit in this case analysis is used as 6.05% in nominal (real rate: 1%) .  
 
6.3.2 Construction subsidy 
 
There is no construction subsidy from the public sector in the BTL model. 
Though land acquisition cost is provided by the government, the difference 
between the BTL and the BTO case is only ₩0.3 billion. It is a very small size 
compared with other costs, so land acquisition cost is not considered in this 
case study like other cases. 
 
In the case of the BTO, the construction subsidy is finally decided through the 
negotiation. Requested construction subsidy by the private sector in this case 
for the BTO option is ₩45.0 billion (real price, nominal price is ₩61.7 billion) Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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which is 24.4% of total building cost for facility part. However, KDI (2007b) 
assessed that government subsidy would be ₩117.4 billion (real price)
18 to 
accept the real rate of profit as 9.23%. Though the private sector requested 
only ₩45.0 billion, but KDI regarded their request as based on the 
overestimated traffic demand, because they also wanted the MRG when the 
project was suggested in 2004. It pointed out that more subsidies would be 
needed if real traffic is lower than what the private sector forecasted. 
Forecasted traffic demand by the private sector was overestimated up to 91.3% 
more than that of KDI as shown in the Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2 Traffic forecast at the proposed toll level 
(Unit: car/day) 
Year  2013  2016  2021  2026  2031 
Proposal (A)  32,343  39,440  49,732  53,872  58,012 
KDI (B)  16,996  20,612  33,665  36,302  38,780 
 (A-B)/B %  90.3%  91.3%  47.7%  48.4%  49.6% 
Source: KDI 
 
This chapter basically follows the result of VFM assessment of KDI, so ₩117.4 
billion is used for construction subsidy in the BTO model. Construction subsidy 
from the government is financed through the 5-year national bond of Korea 
and it is assumed as 4.9% in the KDI report. Thus, government expenditure is 
₩116.9 billion. The reason why the government expenditure is less than the 
construction subsidy is due to the highly assumed inflation. KDI used the 
inflation 5% as proposed by the private sector, but it looks inappropriate as can 
be seen in this case. When inflation is 5%, it is not possible to finance through 
only 4.9% of national bond. However, this study focuses on comparing the BTL 
with the BTO model with the same condition which was used in the VFM 
assessment by the public sector. This project was assessed as better to be 
done by the PSC than the BTO, so it needs to examine the BTL case with the 
same condition. Therefore, this chapter uses the same values with those of the 
KDI assessment. 
 
                                           
18 Land acquisition cost (29 billion KRW in the BTO model) is excluded to this 
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6.3.3 Lease fee 
 
Lease fee is calculated by the following formula as explained in chapter 5; 
  k n PVIFA
incomes additional the of value present the t Building
fee lease Aunnal
,
cos 
  
 
Here, PVIFA is the present value index for annual lease fee and the N, which is 
the operation period of this project, is 30 years. The k means the rate of profit, 
so the k value in this case is 6.05%. Consequently, the PVIFA (30, 6.05%) is 
13.6915. 
 
6915 . 13
0605 . 0 1
1
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t PVIFA  
Lease fee is calculated based on the building cost of the private sector in the 
BTL model. In this case, the design is different in the BTO and the BTL model, 
because two toll gates in main road do not need in the BTL model. Thus, 
construction and land acquisition cost are different in both PPP models.  
 
Table 6.3 shows the building costs of the BTO and the BTL case. The building 
cost of the BTL case was assumed same with the BTO model except 
construction cost and land acquisition cost. Land acquisition cost is paid by the 
government, so this is omitted in the lease fee calculation. 
 
Table 6.3 Building cost in the BTO, and the BTL case 
(Unit: billion KRW, nominal price) 
    BTO  BTL 
Building 
Cost 
Total    213.8  206.8 
Facility 
Part 
1) Construction & Design 
    - surveying 
    - design 
    - construction 
160.1 
0.5 
3.2 
156.4 
153.1 
0.5 
3.2 
149.4 
2) Land acquisition  -  - 
3) Utility  9.9  9.9 
4) Operating reserve  5.2  5.2 
5) Other cost  9.2  9.2 
Financial 
Part 
6) Tax and financial cost   29.4  29.4 
* Data of the BTO case were cited from the VFM assessment report of KDI (2007). Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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There is no additional income in this case, so the annual lease fee from 2013 
to 2042 for 30 years is ₩15.1 billion per year and total lease fee is ₩453 
billion in nominal (₩157.1 billion in real price).  
 
6.3.4 Operating cost 
 
Operating cost is different in the BTO and the BTL model, because the two toll 
gates on the main road in the BTO model need more cost to operate. KDI 
(2007b) suggested two alternatives to the private sector. The first one is to 
decrease the profit rate and the second is the option not to set up two toll 
gates on main road in addition to the first alternative. In case of the second 
option, toll fee can be paid by the public sector operator of connecting 
expressways, though it should be negotiated for counting traffic and payment 
method. Thus, the operation cost of the BTL model is assumed the same with 
this second option of KDI. 
 
According to the VFM assessment of KDI (ibid), operating cost for 30 years in 
the BTO model is ₩138.1 billion (real price), and that of the second alternative 
without two toll gates is ₩111.3 billion. This chapter uses the operating cost 
of the second alternative as the operating cost of the BTL model.  
 
6.3.5 Revenue 
 
Revenue is decided by the toll level and traffic demand and they are much 
related with each other. In other cases of this thesis, revenues in the BTL model 
are assumed the same as in the BTO model, because the toll level is a very 
political issue, so this factor would be better to be dealt with in a more 
qualitative way. However, this case is a part of an expressway network 
operated by the public sector, so it can be difficult to increase the toll level in 
the BTL model differently from the PSC. Thus, this case uses the same level of 
toll with the public sector expressway operator. 
 
According to the VFM assessment report for the BTO proposal (KDI, 2007b), 
average toll price for 13.5 km of whole section from Oksan to Ochang was 
₩494 for a car in the PSC. It was almost half of the BTO proposal which was 
₩1,003. Based on the traffic forecast of KDI, traffic of the BTO was forecasted Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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less than the PSC by up to 14.3%. Total revenue for 30 years was ₩303.3 
billion in the PSC, so the revenue in the BTL model uses the same value as the 
PSC of the KDI assessment.  
 
Table 6.4 Traffic forecast considering toll price in the BTO and PSC 
(Unit: car/day) 
Year  2013  2016  2021  2026  2031 
BTO (A)  16,996  20,612  33,665  36,302  38,780 
PSC (B)  19,835  24,005  36,370  38,728  41,299 
 (A-B)/B %  -14.3%  -14.1%  -7.4%  -6.3%  -6.1% 
Source: KDI 
6.3.6 Summary of the analysis factors 
 
  Building cost (nominal) : BTO: ₩213.8 billion, BTL: ₩206.8 billion 
  Operating cost (real) : BTO: ₩138.1 billion, BTL: ₩111.3 billion 
  Operation period: 30 years (2013~2042) 
  Construction subsidy (BTO model only): ₩117.4 billion (real) 
*Government expenditure: ₩116.9 (real) 
  Annual lease fee: ₩15.1 billion (nominal) 
* Lease fee for 30 years: ₩453 billion (nominal) / ₩157.1 billion (real) 
  Rate of profit 
Nominal: 6.05% in the BTL, 14.7%
19 in the BTO 
Real: 1.0% in the BTL, 9.23% in the BTO 
  Real financial discount rate: 6.0% 
  Inflation: 5.0% 
  Revenue: ₩303.3 billion (real) 
 
6.3.7 Result 
 
The quantitative VFM of the BTL model compared with the BTO model in the 
Oksan-Ochang Expressway project is ₩56.6 billion. It means that the BTL 
model provides more value for money than the BTO model in this project. It 
looks a natural result like other cases, because the profit rate of the BTL model 
                                           
19 Rate of profit in the BTO model means the financial internal rate of return. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
  121   
is much lower than the BTO model. As seen in the following table, revenue 
collected from passengers is ₩303.3 billion and it is greater than the sum of 
lease fee and operating cost. It means that the government has to pay 
construction subsidy in the BTO model, but the government can make a profit 
with revenue after providing lease fee and operating cost in the BTL model.  
 
Table 6.5 Quantitative VFM assessment in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
Unit: billion KRW (real price) 
Year 
BTO  BTL  VFM 
Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue  Real price  NPV 
SUM  116.9  157.1  111.4  303.3  151.7  56.6 
2008          0.0  0.0 
2009  0.1        0.1  0.1 
2010  0.5        0.5  0.3 
2011  2.2        2.2  1.5 
2012  4.1        4.1  2.6 
2013  6.7  9.7  2.8  6.0  0.2  0.1 
2014  11.2  9.3  3.0  6.5  5.4  3.0 
2015  34.3  8.8  2.9  7.0  29.6  15.6 
2016  35.7  8.4  3.1  7.4  31.6  15.7 
2017  22.1  8.0  3.1  7.9  18.9  8.9 
2018    7.6  3.1  8.4  -2.3  -1.0 
2019    7.3  2.9  8.8  -1.4  -0.6 
2020    6.9  3.6  9.3  -1.2  -0.5 
2021    6.6  3.3  9.8  -0.1  0.0 
2022    6.3  5.5  9.9  -1.9  -0.7 
2023    6.0  3.4  10.1  0.7  0.2 
2024    5.7  3.4  10.3  1.2  0.4 
2025    5.4  3.2  10.5  1.9  0.6 
2026    5.2  3.4  10.6  2.0  0.6 
2027    4.9  5.1  10.8  0.8  0.2 
2028    4.7  3.6  10.9  2.6  0.6 
2029    4.5  3.4  11.1  3.2  0.8 Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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2030    4.2  3.6  11.2  3.4  0.7 
2031    4.0  3.5  11.4  3.9  0.8 
2032    3.9  6.6  11.4  0.9  0.2 
2033    3.7  3.3  11.4  4.4  0.8 
2034    3.5  3.3  11.4  4.6  0.8 
2035    3.3  3.1  11.4  5.0  0.8 
2036    3.2  3.8  11.4  4.4  0.7 
2037    3.0  4.4  11.4  4.0  0.6 
2038    2.9  3.4  11.4  5.1  0.7 
2039    2.7  3.6  11.4  5.1  0.7 
2040    2.6  3.1  11.4  5.7  0.7 
2041    2.5  3.7  11.4  5.2  0.6 
2042    2.4  7.2  11.4  1.8  0.2 
 
Comparing LCC (Life Cycle Cost) of the BTL model with the PSC, the BTL model 
also gives better VFM than the PSC. The NPV of LCC in the PSC is ₩37.9 billion. 
KDI suggested two other alternative BTO options with much lower profit rate, 
but the BTL is also better than both options as seen in the following table. 
 
Table 6.6 VFM of various PPP options compared with the PSC 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
  PSC  BTL  BTO  BTO
1  BTO
2 
LCC  37.9  4.3  60.9  27.0  20.9 
VFM(with PSC)  -  33.6  -23.0  10.9  17.0 
 * LCCs of PSC, BTO
1, and BTO
2 are cited from the VFM assessment report (KDI, 2007b). 
Land acquisition cost was excluded in all cases. BTO
1 is an alternative with 6.07 of real 
rate of profit. BTO
2 is an alternative BTO option without two main road toll gates in 
addition to BTO
1 option.  Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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6.4 Qualitative VFM assessment 
 
This section examines four issues; service quality, contract & management, 
risk management, and operational flexibility.  
 
6.4.1 Service quality 
 
Most interviewees agreed that there would be little difference between the BTL 
and the BTO model in the quality of service (○ A in section 3.3 in APPENDIX 4). 
They argued that most factors in service quality such as speed, physical 
condition, diver etiquette, etc. seemed to be decided not by the effort of the 
private sector but by the geographic route, a standard of the government, and 
transport culture. Especially, the Oksan-Ochang expressway is a part of 
national expressway network, so it needs to balance service quality with other 
networks. Though the private sector makes a profit through charging a toll in 
the BTO option, but the service quality except level of toll looks to affect little 
for the end users to choose the PPP road.  An officer of BAI (Board of Audit and 
Inspection) also pointed out that the Oksan-Ochang Expressway was not 
expected to be congested at first as newly constructed road which was 
designed for decades later, so people would be more interested in toll price (○ B
in section 3.3 in APPENDIX 4). The toll price could be lower in the BTL model 
where the government could decide the toll level without negotiation with the 
private sector. Thus, considering the difference between the BTL and the BTO 
model in the service quality is little, the BTL model could be better to the end 
users in toll wise. 
 
6.4.2 Contract and Management 
 
This issue is about the ability and experience of the public and private sectors 
for supervising and managing the PPP project.  The BTO case in this project 
does not have a MRG condition and traffic demand risk is fully on the private 
sector. Thus, most interviewees consented that choosing the BTL model would 
be helpful to finance and make a contract (○ C  in section 3.3 in APPENDIX 4).  
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With regard to the management, it was also difficult to find any evidence that 
the BTO option is better than the BTL option. Though the BTO case needs more 
toll charging facilities, but this factor already considered quantitatively, so 
there would be little difference in management in both PPP models.  
 
6.4.3 Risk management 
 
In the BTO option, the private sector can be incentivised only through 
attracting more traffic (KDI, 2007b). An interviewee argued the traffic demand 
in road was much affected not by the effort of an operator but by the route of 
road which was decided by the government (○ D in section 3.3 in APPENDIX 4). 
Thus, he alleged that it could not be possible to incentivise good risk 
management except traffic demand risk in the BTO model. In the BTL option, it 
can be incentivised in good risk management through the performance 
assessment linked to the government payment (KDI and MOPB, 2005). 
Especially, this project is a short section of national expressway network, so 
the change of traffic demand is expected relatively low when it is compared 
with other long distance roads. It means that the charging a toll can be hard to 
incentivise good risk management and it can affect the BTO model negatively. 
 
Consequently, the difference between the BTO and the BTL model does not 
look big, but the BTL model can have more advantage in risk management. 
 
6.4.4 Operational flexibility 
 
As seen in the case of the Incheon Airport Expressway, opinions of the private 
sector and the public sector were different. Interviewees from the private 
sector said the BTO model would be better to cope with the change of 
circumstances in an operation stage (○ E in section 3.3 in APPENDIX 4). 
Interviewees from the public sector argued that the private sector would not be 
interested in the circumstance change if it was not related with a profit. Thus, 
they said that the BTL model could be better in the operational flexibility (○ F in 
section 3.3 in APPENDIX 4). Like other PPP cases, an operational flexibility is a 
controversial factor between the private and the public sectors. However, the 
BTL model can be more attractive to the public sector. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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6.5 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Considering variable input factors in the VFM assessment, sensitivities of these 
factors need to be analysed. Especially, this project is being delayed, so the 
possibility that assumed factors can be changed or upgraded is rising. It 
means better PPP model can be changed by this uncertainty. 
 
The MOCT (2007a) recommended analysing the sensitivity of operation period, 
level of toll, traffic demand, construction cost, operation cost and subsidy from 
the public sector. Toll and traffic demand are related with each other, and it 
can be considered at a same time with revenue factor. Though inflation is not a 
factor recommended by the MLTM, but it needs to be reviewed, because the 
proposed inflation is too high compared with the 5-year national bond of South 
Korea. Evaluation on the current VFM assessment of KDI is not an objective of 
this study, but the sensitivity of inflation needs to be analysed for comparing 
the BTL and the BTO models. Thus, this section examines the sensitivity of 
inflation in addition to the recommendation of the MLTM.  
 
6.5.1 Revenue 
 
This project is a toll road, so revenue is decided through toll charge on traffic. 
The MOCT (2007a) suggested the sensitivity analysis of toll level instead of 
analysing sensitivity of traffic demand, because they are integrated to the 
revenue and the same effect can be acquired even when one of both is 
analysed. However, toll price was assumed same with that of public sector 
operator in the BTL case, so uncertainty of toll is relatively low. Thus, revenue 
is mainly affected by the traffic demand.  
 
Table 6.7 Sensitivity of VFM to traffic 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Traffic 
demand 
BTO  BTL 
VFMlo  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.) 
Lease  Operation  Revenue 
100%  60.9  54.5  30.4  80.6  56.6 
90%  60.9  54.5  30.4  72.5  48.6 
80%  60.9  54.5  30.4  64.4  40.5 Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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70%  60.9  54.5  30.4  56.4  32.4 
60%  60.9  54.5  30.4  48.3  24.4 
50%  60.9  54.5  30.4  40.3  16.3 
40%  60.9  54.5  30.4  32.2  8.3 
30%  60.9  54.5  30.4  24.2  0.2 
29.7%  60.9  54.5  30.4  23.9  0.0 
20%  60.9  54.5  30.4  16.1  -7.8 
10%  60.9  54.5  30.4  8.1  -15.9 
 
Above table shows that if actual traffic demand is over 29.7% of the forecasted 
then the BTL model has higher quantitative VFM than the BTO. It also means 
that if traffic demand is below 29.7%, then the BTO is better. Demand risk is on 
the private sector in the BTO model, which can have higher profit rate because 
of high risk, so if the actual demand is lower than the anticipated then the BTO 
model can be beneficial to the government.  
 
As explained in the quantitative assessment section, the original BTO proposal 
did not provide the better VFM than the PSC, so the alternative BTO option 
suggested by KDI is in negotiation. Thus, Figure 6.3 shows the result of 
sensitivity analysis of revenue to the LCC of each option. 
 
Figure 6.3 Sensitivity analysis of the revenue (traffic demand) 
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This sensitivity analysis shows that the BTL is the best option for the Oksan-
Ochang Expressway project if traffic forecast is accurate. Considering the 
uncertainty of traffic demand, alternative BTO
1 option which was suggested by 
KDI and is in negotiation can be better if actual traffic is below 72%.  
 
The biggest problem of this project is difficult financing due to high demand 
risk on the private sector, and the contract prospect still looks gloomy. If it is 
delayed longer, the government may have to choose whether to abandon the 
current BTO model or to share demand risk by a method such as a MRG. In 
case of sharing demand risks, above result shows that the MRG should not 
exceeded to more than 72% of expected revenue.  
 
6.5.2 Construction cost 
 
This project is in negotiation, so the construction cost can be changed 
afterwards. Thus, it needs to analyse the sensitivity of construction cost. The 
MOCT recommends doing the sensitivity analysis of construction cost with the 
range from 5% to 15%. Construction cost also affects other costs such as 
design cost, financial cost, etc., so building cost including these costs is 
analysed in this case study. 
 
The following table shows the NPVs of each VFM factors.  
 
Table 6.8 Sensitivity of VFM to construction cost 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Construction 
cost 
BTO  BTL 
VFMlo  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
-15%  44.2  46.3  30.4  80.6  48.1 
-10%  49.8  49.0  30.4  80.6  51.0 
-5%  55.3  51.7  30.4  80.6  53.8 
0%  60.9  54.5  30.4  80.6  56.6 
5%  66.4  57.2  30.4  80.6  59.4 
10%  72.0  59.9  30.4  80.6  62.3 
15%  77.5  62.6  30.4  80.6  65.1 
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6.5.3 Operating cost 
 
The MOCT recommends analysing the operating cost from 10% to 20%. 
Following table shows the result and the operating cost seems not affective to 
the VFM in this case. Operating cost is compensated in the BTL model by the 
public sector, so higher operating cost burdens more cost to the public sector. 
However, the public sector does not cover the variation of operating cost in the 
BTO model. Operating cost is one of factors to decide a profit rate in the BTO 
model, so it is possible to increase the government subsidy to guarantee a 
profit rate of the private sector. However, the risk of operating cost is on the 
private sector in the BTO model, so it does not need to guarantee its profit by 
the change of operating cost. Thus, operating cost does not affect the 
government subsidy in the BTO model.  
 
Table 6.9 Sensitivity to operating cost 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Actual 
Operating 
cost 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
-20%  60.9  54.5  24.3  80.6  62.7 
-10%  60.9  54.5  27.3  80.6  59.6 
0%  60.9  54.5  30.4  80.6  56.6 
10%  60.9  54.5  33.4  80.6  53.6 
20%  60.9  54.5  36.4  80.6  50.5 
 
6.5.4 Rate of profit 
 
The rate of profit is a very important factor to induce the private sector to the 
PPP project, so the sensitivity of the profit rate needs to be considered before 
negotiation with the private sector. In this study, toll level is assumed as fixed, 
so the rate of profit is directly related with the subsidy in the BTO option and is 
related with the lease fee in the BTL model. Profit rate of each model is 
different, so the sensitivity is analysed separately.  
 
Following result shows that the rate of profit affects more to the VFM in the 
BTL model than the BTO model. The investment of the private sector is higher 
in the BTL option than the BTO option where the public sector provides 
construction subsidy, so the rate of profit is more sensitive in the BTL option.  Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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Table 6.10 Sensitivity to rate of profit (BTL)     
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Profit rate 
(Nominal) 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
6.05%  60.9  54.5  30.4  80.6  56.6 
7.05%  60.9  60.2  30.4  80.6  50.9 
8.05%  60.9  66.7  30.4  80.6  44.4 
9.05%  60.9  72.9  30.4  80.6  38.2 
10.05%  60.9  79.3  30.4  80.6  31.8 
 
 
Table 6.11 Sensitivity to rate of profit (BTO)         
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Profit rate 
(Real) 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
6.23% (11.5%)  38.8  54.5  30.4  80.6  34.5 
7.23% (12.6%)  47.6  54.5  30.4  80.6  43.3 
8.23% (13.6%)  54.9  54.5  30.4  80.6  50.6 
9.23% (14.7%)  60.9  54.5  30.4  80.6  56.6 
 
 
6.5.5 Inflation 
 
Inflation which was accepted in the VFM report of KDI was 5.0%, but it looks 
too high compared with other projects or economic circumstance at that time. 
According to the data of the Statistics Korea, average inflation for previous 3 
years before 2007 is only 2.5%. Thus, the sensitivity of inflation needs to be 
examined to analyse the effect of the inflation to the VFM.  
 
Table 6.12 Sensitivity to inflation 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Inflation 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
5.0%  60.9  54.5  30.4  80.6  56.6 
4.0%  63.5  64.0  30.4  80.6  49.8 
3.0%  66.4  75.6  30.4  80.6  40.9 
2.5%  67.8  82.4  30.4  80.6  35.6 Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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Table 6.12 shows that inflation does not affect government expenditure much, 
but affects the lease fee in the BTL case because it is spread for a longer time 
than the period of government expenditure in the BTO case. However, the BTL 
model still provides better VFM than the BTO model, though the VFM can be 
reduced in lower inflation.  
 
6.5.6 Stochastic analysis 
 
This section examines a stochastic analysis of traffic demand on the VFM 
based on road traffic forecast statistics. As seen in Chapter 5, this case is the 
expressway with toll, so the statistics of the inaccuracy of road traffic forecast 
in South Korea based on 86 expressways are used.  
 
Figure 6.4 shows the result of Monte Carlo simulation for the probability of the 
VFM by the traffic demand risk. The iteration was undertaken 10,000 times and 
the mean value of VFM is ₩44.3 billion and standard deviation is ₩47.2 billion. 
The mean value is lower than the VFM presented in the point estimation by 
₩12.3 billion and the probability that the BTL model is better than the BTO 
model is 79.4%. 
 
Figure 6.4 VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO without MRG 
option 
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6.6 Findings 
 
Through the quantitative and qualitative VFM assessment and sensitivity 
analysis about the BTO and BTL option for this Oksan-Ochang Expressway case, 
six characteristics were found. 
 
Firstly, the BTL option for expressway can provide better quantitative VFM than 
the BTO option. In this case, the BTL option gives the quantitative VFM 
compared with the BTO by ₩56.6 billion. It is because the demand risk is on 
the government in the BTL model of Korea, so the government can make a PPP 
contract with the private sector with lower rate of profit than the BTO model 
where the private sector has to be in charge of traffic demand risk which is the 
source of revenue. The government pays a lease fee to the private sector but 
can collect tolls from end users, so the government can make a profit in the 
BTL model. Especially, it seems that the BTL option provides better VFM than 
not only the alternative BTO option in negotiation but also the PSC option 
hypothesised in the VFM report of KDI. Considering this project is delayed for 
more than three years, the quantitative VFM assessment shows that the BTL 
model can be the better choice to continue the PPP project.   
 
Secondly, the BTL model can be better option than the BTO model to finance. 
In recent years, the biggest issue of BTO projects is a difficult financing from 
investors. After the global financial crisis, the uncertainty of the economy is 
still existent and the financial investors seem to avoid long term investment 
with high demand risk. In the BTL case, the public sector has traffic demand 
risk and the lease fee is paid by the government. Thus, the BTL model looks to 
have an advantage in financing.   
 
Thirdly, in the view of the government, the BTL seems to be better than the 
BTO option in operational flexibility to cope with the change of future 
circumstances. This project is a part of national expressway network, so the 
operation is much related with other expressway which the public sector 
operates. It means that more cooperation and discussion are needed to deal 
with operational change for long period.  In the BTL option, the government 
can more easily manage this through the regular payment mechanism. It gives 
the government more flexibility in operation than in the BTO option. Byungwoo Gil  Case study in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
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Fourthly, the BTL option can be beneficial for the public sector to incentivise a 
good risk management of the private sector. The private sector is compensated 
for only by the end users in the BTO model, so it looks difficult to incentivise 
risk management which is not related with the direct revenue. On the other 
hand, the public sector can incentivise operational risks which are directly 
related with the revenue through performance assessment in the BTL option.  
 
Fifthly, several important input factors such as construction cost, operating 
cost, rate of profit, and inflation does not affect much to change the optimal 
PPP model. These factors are not variable as much as traffic demand, so the 
BTL model provides better VFM than the BTO model if only revenue which is 
based on traffic volume is as much as expected.  
 
Lastly, the BTO option can be better if traffic demand is lower than expected, 
but the probability does not look high in this project. In the BTO case, the 
private sector has whole traffic demand risk, so the public sector has more 
benefits when the traffic demand risk is high. Especially, recent criticisms on 
the PPP are mainly about the exaggerated traffic demand and excessively 
guaranteed revenue, so the BTO model without MRG condition seems to be 
regarded as the best option to the public sector. However, considering 
statistics of traffic demand in expressway in South Korea, the probability that 
the BTO model provides more VFM is only 20.6%. Traffic forecast for road in 
South Korea is relatively accurate when it is compared with rail cases. In 
addition, this project is a part of national expressway network which is already 
in operation, so traffic forecast is expected to be more stable than other 
transport projects.  
 
Consequently, the BTO model for the Oksan-Ochang Expressway does not look 
the best choice. Though the MRG condition is not included in this project, high 
traffic demand risk on the private sector is making it difficult to induce the 
financial investor. This resulted in the long delay of the project and the 
strength of the PPP to procure the transport facility early was void. The optimal 
option in this case seems to be the BTL model even when considering the 
alternative BTO option with only around 6.07% real profit rate, PSC option, and 
the traffic demand risk of expressway in South Korea. 
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CHAPTER 7   
Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In South Korea, rail transport has been recognised as a typical field where the 
private sector finds it difficult to build and operate, because it costs much but 
it is easy for the increase in the level of tariff to be limited, which is the major 
source of income. The early industrial and economic development of South 
Korea was driven by the central government, so the tariff of rail services was 
firmly regulated. It was a big obstacle of introducing the PPP to rail. This 
chapter examines how the PPP was introduced to the rail transport in South 
Korea for the first time and whether the chosen PPP model was an appropriate 
decision at that time through the quantitative VFM assessment, the qualitative 
VFM assessment and the sensitivity analysis.  
 
There are many studies about the Incheon Airport Railway as a PPP project. 
Many of them are dealing with inaccurate traffic forecast, project financing, 
appropriate tariff in the PPP scheme, effective operation with other rail network 
operated by the public sector (Kang, 2010, Lee and Yoo, 2009, Kim, 2007b, 
Roh and Kim, 2010, Namkung et al., 2010). However, they are comparing the 
PPP with the direct investment of the public sector, so these studies do not 
consider the appropriateness of the PPP model. 
 
This chapter mainly focuses on the comparison of the PPP models between the 
BTO and the BTL model which are the most dominant PPP models in South 
Korea and examines the possibility of using the BTL model instead of the BTO 
model. This possibility is shown both quantitatively and qualitatively, based on 
the PPP regulation and financial circumstance at that time for the usefulness as 
a practical policy decision tool in a planning stage.  
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7.2 Summary of the project 
 
7.2.1 Details of the project 
 
The Incheon Airport Railway was built to connect the Incheon International 
Airport, which aims to be a hub airport of East Northern Asia, and Seoul 
metropolitan area. It is designed as an electrified double track railway project 
and its total length is 61.0 km. This project is divided into two stages; the first 
stage is 40.3km connecting the Incheon airport with the Gimpo Airport, which 
is the nearest domestic airport to Seoul. This stage has six stations. The 
construction was completed in 2007, and the rail service has been operated 
since then. The second stage is 20.7km connecting the Gimpo Airport with the 
downtown of Seoul (Seoul station), and four stations are operated in this line. 
Construction for the second stage started from 2004, and it opened from 
December 2010 (MLTM, 2010b). Total investment in real price is ₩3,949 
billion, the government subsidy of that investment is ₩763 billion and the 
investment of the private sector is ₩3,186 billion (IIAC, 2001).  
 
Figure 7.1 Incheon International Airport Railway
20 line map  
 
    Source: MLTM 
 
                                           
20 The name of the Incheon Airport Railway was the Airport Express (AREX), and now it 
has been changed to KORAIL AIRPORT RAILROAD since the most equities of the private 
sectors were sold to KORAIL in 2009. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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7.2.2 History of the project as a PPP 
 
This railway was originally planned as a government direct investment project 
like the Incheon airport expressway case. However, the Korean government 
could not afford to pay the whole expense for a new international airport, 
exclusive expressway and railway at the same time. According to the Incheon 
International Airport Corporation (IIAC, 2001), the whole cost for an airport, 
expressway, and railway was ₩9.4 trillion: airport ₩5.6 trillion, expressway 
₩1.7 trillion, railway ₩3.1 trillion. It burdened the budget too much, so the 
government decided to induce the investment of the private sector to the 
expressway in 1994 and the railway project in 1996. It was the first case of a 
railway PPP in Korea.  
 
The PPP contract for the Incheon airport railway was made in March 2001 and 
the construction was started in April 2001. The chosen PPP model is the BTO, 
and the operation period is 30 years after open. The government guaranteed 
the minimum revenue, 90% of the expected revenue for the whole operation 
period when the PPP contract was first made.  
 
7.2.3 The appraisal of the project as a PPP 
 
This project looks a failure as a PPP because KORAIL, which is a public sector 
operator, bought most equities of the private sector because of much lower 
demand than expected and excessive minimum revenue guarantee. 
 
After operation, the real passenger of the first stage which is being operated is 
only 6.4% of the expected number. The reason of inappropriate passenger 
forecast is analysed due to low demand of Incheon airport (67% of expected), 
the delay of region development (30% of planned population in Yeongjong-Do), 
low traffic in Seoul Metropolitan area (78% of expected), error on transport 
mode selection, and 5-year delay of construction (Namkung et al., 2010, MLTM, 
2010b). It was also pointed out that the airport express bus service was much 
more competitive than expected. However, considering the actual traffic of the 
Incheon Airport Expressway is lower than 50% of forecasted, the problem is 
due to generally inaccurate traffic forecast. Recently, the traffic demand was 
examined and forecasted again by KOTI (Korea Transport Institute), but the Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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current status seems not to be improved even if the second stage linking the 
Gimpo airport and the Seoul Station would be operated as expected (KOTI, 
2009a). 
 
Table 7.1 Passengers of the Incheon Airport Railway 
Unit: passengers/day 
Year  2007  2011  2016  2021  2026  2031 
Contracted demand 
(2001) (A)  207,421  492,982  703,309  819,197  819,197  819,197 
Re-estimated 
demand (2009) (B) 
13,312 
(real) 
109,719  159,881  223,475  248,371  268,689 
B/A  6.4%  22.3%  22.7%  27.3%  30.3%  32.8% 
Source: KOTI (2009) 
 
The MLTM was supposed to compensate the difference with the 90% of 
expected revenue, and KOTI (2009a) said the total payment could reach ₩13.2 
trillion for whole operation period. Especially, the private sector did not have to 
make an effort to increase passengers, because their incomes were guaranteed 
by the MLTM. Thus, the MLTM decided to let KORAIL (Korea Railroad Ltd.), 
which is a national railway company owned by the government and supervised 
by the MLTM, buy the 89% of equity from the Incheon Airport Railway Ltd. in 
2009. The government lowered the level of minimum revenue guarantee to 
58% of original contracted revenue. As a matter of fact, it looks like the PPP for 
the Incheon Airport Railway has failed and it was transferred to the public 
sector, although it still has the PPP form between the government and KORAIL. 
 
The Korean government still argues that the PPP was an unavoidable choice, 
because the budgets for connecting transport to new airport was not enough. 
The airport railway was a necessary transport to provide various options to 
travellers and to guarantee safe connection to the airport in case of the 
emergency or congestion of the Incheon Airport Expressway (MLTM, 2010b). 
However, it is still doubtable whether the BTO model was optimal in rail under 
the circumstance that the level of tariff was politically restricted and whether 
the minimum revenue guarantee was excessive.  
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7.3 Quantitative VFM assessment 
 
7.3.1 Basic assumption 
 
This project has a minimum revenue guarantee. It was 90% at first, and now it 
became 58% after refinancing. This study examines the possibility of using the 
BTL model instead of the BTO model in a planning stage, so the minimum 
revenue guarantee used in this chapter is 90%, which was firstly decided in a 
planning stage.  
 
The date for calculating life cycle cost is June 2002 when the actual design was 
done. Most data collected from KOTI are real price in June 2002, so a nominal 
price is not used in this chapter.  
 
The quantitative VFM is assessed through the analysis of the discounted cash 
flow of the project, and it needs a financial discount rate
21 to calculate this. 
Korean VFM guidance (2006b) recommends using the WACC (Weighted 
Average Capital Cost) method to decide the financial discount rate. This 
guidance has suggested 6.0% for the nominal financial discount rate since 
2006, and that rate was based on the economic circumstances around the 
middle of 2000s. The inflation in this guideline was assumed as 3.0%, so the 
real financial discount rate is 2.91%. However, this can be affected by the 
economic circumstances like market interest. According to the General 
guidelines for pre-feasibility study of Korea (KDI, 1999), the real financial 
discount rate for an expressway project in 1999 was 4.83%. Considering the 
contract of this rail case was made in early 2001, it seems more rational to use 
the real financial discount rate as 4.83%, which was used in 1999. Thus, 4.83% 
is used as the real financial discount rate in this rail case. If the inflation is 
assumed as 3.1% which is the average of previous 3 years from 2002, then the 
nominal financial discount rate is 8.08%. 
 
                                           
21 Social discount rate is used to test the economic feasibility in which the social value 
is quantified as the benefit of a project. The quantitative VFM assessment for the PPP is 
based on the cash flow of the project, so the financial discount rate needs to assess 
the financial feasibility of the PPP project. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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Rate of profit, which is the most critical point in making a contract for the PPP, 
is decided by the negotiation between the government and the private 
company. In the BTO model, the rate of profit of the private sector is the FIRR 
(Financial Internal Rate of Return) which is the internal rate of return making 
the NPV of the total revenue equal to the NPV of the total cost for the whole 
operation period. The Incheon Airport Railway was built by the BTO model, and 
the real FIRR of the BTO model, which was decided through the negotiation 
between the government and the private company, was 10.43%. The rate of 
profit in the BTL model should be also decided by the negotiation, and the 
MLTM recommend it should be the five-year Korea national bond, which can be 
a standard interest, plus an appropriate mark-up rate for the long term 
investment. The MLTM suggested 0.77% as an appropriate mark-up nominal 
rate in a recent railway BTL project (MOCT, 2007c). In addition, there are two 
more BTL cases of rail in Korea, and mark-up rates are suggested as 0.76% and 
0.70%, so the highest 0.77 will be used in the BTL model of Incheon Airport 
Railway project as a common mark-up rate under Korean financial and 
construction circumstances (MOCT, 2007c). In March 2001, the year in which 
the PPP contract was made, the mean value of interest of five-year Korea 
national bond was 6.40%, so the appropriate nominal rate of profit in this case 
analysis is used as 7.17%. The real rate of profit is 3.95% when the inflation is 
3.1%. 
 
7.3.2 Construction subsidy 
 
The BTL model does not need a subsidy from the public sector in the 
construction stage, but, in the BTO model, the public sector can provide 
construction subsidy to induce the private sector. The MOSF regulates that the 
maximum subsidy rate which the public sector can provide in the BTO model is 
50% in case of light rail and is 40% in other facilities (Kim, 2010a). In case of 
the Incheon Airport Railway, the government provided a subsidy of 30% of 
construction cost.  
 
According to the report of KOTI (2009a), the signed construction subsidy with 
the private sector is ₩763.1 billion in real prices from 2002 to 2008. Like road 
cases, KDI (2009a) suggests to assume that the construction subsidy of the 
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not financed by the tax, it needs to analyse the government expenditure for 
financing. The most dominant financing for government budget is the 5-year 
national bond, so it is also used in this chapter. Annual average interest of the 
5-year national bond in 2002 was 6.3%, and the real interest is 3.1% when the 
inflation is 3.1%. 
 
7.3.3 Lease fee 
 
Lease fee is calculated by the following formula; 
 
  k n PVIFA
incomes additional the of value present the invesment Total
fee lease Aunnal
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
  
 
Here, PVIFA is the present value index for annual lease fee and the N, which is 
the operation period of this project, is 30 years. The k means the rate of profit, 
so the k value in this case is 7.17%. Consequently, the PVIFA(30, 7.17%) of each 
stage is equal to 12.2. 
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There are two different phases in this projcet, the first is from the Incheon 
Airport station to the Gimpo Airport station and the second is from the Gimpo 
Airport station to Seoul station. The building cost, which is the investment of 
the private sector in the BTL model, for the first stage is ₩1,935.8 billion, for 
the second stage is ₩2,013.2 billion. The additional incomes are assumed as 
nothing, because they are very small part of revenue. Thus, the annual lease 
fee of the first stage until 2036 for 30 years is ₩158.7 billion (nominal) per 
year, and the annual lease fee for the second until 2039 for 30 years is ₩165 
billion (nominal) per year. Considering the inflation is 3.1% in this case, total 
lease fee in real prices for the first stage is ₩2,717.8 billion and total lease fee 
in real prices for the second stage is ₩2,578.4 billion. Thus, whole lease fee 
for the project is ₩5,296.1 billion in real prices for 33 years. 
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7.3.4 Operating cost 
 
Operating cost was assumed as the same in the BTO and the BTL model. 
Though the operating cost can be affected by the private sector making more 
effort to increase customers in the BTO model, in which the demand risk is on 
the private sector, but this is difficult to be quantified. Thus, the issues about 
the operation of rail in PPP models are dealt with in the qualitative VFM 
assessment.  
 
The operation period is 30 years, the first phase operated from 2007 and the 
second phase operated from 2010, so the total analysing period is 33 years. 
According to KOTI (2009a), total cost is ₩3,630.8 billion in real price for 33 
years.  
 
7.3.5 Revenue 
 
The revenue which is the income from the end users through collected tariff is 
assumed same in both PPP model. In fact, the private sector can make more 
efforts to increase the incomes from passengers, but this factor is difficult to 
be quantified, so it is dealt with in the qualitative assessment. According to 
KOTI (2009a), the forecasted revenue of the BTO model is ₩18, 576.8 billion in 
real price for 33 years.  
 
7.3.6 Summary of the analysis factors 
 
  Building cost: ₩3,949 billion  
Facility part: the 1
st stage ₩1,538 billion / the 2
nd ₩1,599.5 billion 
Financial part: ₩811.5 billion (1
st ₩397.8 billion / 2
nd ₩413.7 billion)
22 
  Operating cost: ₩3,630.8 billion 
  Operation period: 33 years 
        The 1
st stage: 2007~2039 
The 2
nd stage: 2010~2039 
 
                                           
22 The collected data of financial cost was not divided into each stage, so the cost of 
each stage was assumed as based on the portion of the facility part cost. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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  Construction subsidy: ₩763.1 billion 
government expenditure: ₩881.4 billion 
  Lease fee for the BTL model 
< Nominal price: ₩9,711 billion >  
       The 1
st stage: ₩4,761 billion (annual ₩158.7 billion, 2007 ~ 2036)   
       The 2
nd stage: ₩4,950 billion (annual ₩165.0 billion, 2010 ~ 2039) 
< Real price: ₩5,296.1 billion >  
       The 1
st stage: ₩2,717.8 billion from 2007 to 2036 
       The 2
nd stage: ₩2,578.4 billion from 2010 to 2039 
  Real rate of profit: 3.95% in the BTL, 10.43%
23 in the BTO 
Nominal rate of profit: 7.17% in the BTL, 13.85% in the BTO 
  Real financial discount rate: 4.83% 
  Inflation: 3.1% 
  Revenue: ₩18, 576.8 billion 
 
7.3.7 Result 
 
The quantitative VFM of the BTL model compared with the BTO model in the 
Incheon Airport Railway project is ₩3,635.3 billion. It means that the BTL 
model provides more value for money than the BTO model in this project. It 
looks a natural result like a road case, because the profit rate of the BTL model 
is much lower than the BTO model. It can be easily seen in the revenue which is 
decided by the level to compensate for the investment and profit of the private 
sector. As seen in the following table, revenue collected from passengers is 
₩18,576.8 billion and it is over the sum of lease fee and operating cost. It 
means that the government has to pay construction subsidy in the BTO model, 
but the government can make a profit with revenue after providing lease fee 
and operating cost in the BTL model.  
                                           
23 Rate of profit in the BTO model means the FIRR (Financial Internal Rate of Return). Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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Table 7.2 Quantitative VFM assessment in the Incheon Airport Railway  
Unit: billion KRW 
Year 
BTO  BTL  VFM 
Gov. 
subsidy 
Gov. 
Expenditure 
Lease 
fee 
Operating 
cost  Revenue  Real  NPV 
SUM  763.1  881.4  5296.1  3,630.8  18,576.8  10,531.3  3,635.3 
2001  -  -        -  - 
2002  16.1  -        -  - 
2003  87.7  0.5                 0.5          0.5  
2004  139.5  3.2                 3.2          2.9  
2005  135.3  7.5                7.5          6.5  
2006  183.2  11.7               11.7          9.7  
2007  128.7  33.5  136.2  54.7  116.1  - 41.3   - 32.6  
2008  72.6  108.6  132.1  56.3  165.0         85.2        64.2  
2009    159.9  128.2  61.9  183.0      152.9      109.9  
2010    151.4  253.6  80.8  378.8       195.9      134.3  
2011    195.1  245.9  78.6  392.7       263.3      172.2  
2012    134.9  238.5  112.8  407.3       190.9      119.1  
2013    74.9  231.4  102.3  422.6       163.8        97.5  
2014      224.4  105.5  438.8       108.9        61.8  
2015      217.7  101.2  528.6       209.7      113.6  
2016      211.1  87.9  551.7       252.7      130.6  
2017      204.8  124.4  576.2       247.0     121.7  
2018      198.6  96.2  602.2       307.4     144.5  
2019      192.6  98.0  629.8       339.2      152.1  
2020      186.8  139.2  659.2       333.2   142.5  
2021      181.2  91.7  659.2       386.3   157.6  
2022      175.8  152.6  659.2       330.8     128.8  
2023      170.5  90.7  659.2       398.0      147.8  
2024      165.4  90.9  659.2       402.9      142.7  
2025      160.4  121.9  659.2       376.9      127.4  
2026      155.6  97.7  659.2       405.9      130.9  
2027      150.9  155.8  659.2       352.5     108.4  
2028      146.4  91.4  659.2      421.4     123.6  
2029      142.0  127.3  659.2      389.9     109.1  
2030      137.7  196.7  659.2      324.8       86.7  
2031      133.5  120.1  659.2       405.6      103.3  
2032      129.5  162.9  659.2       366.8       89.1  
2033      125.6  121.2  659.2       412.4       95.5  
2034      121.9  124.3  659.2       413.0        91.3  
2035      118.2  141.4  659.2       399.6        84.3  
2036      114.6  90.3  659.2       454.3        91.4  
2037      56.7  175.5  659.2       427.0        81.9  
2038      55.0  90.6  659.2       513.6        94.0  
2039      53.3  88.0  659.2       517.9        90.4  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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7.4 Qualitative VFM assessment 
 
This chapter examines the following four issues of the qualitative VFM 
assessment suggested in the methodology chapter. This is assessed based on 
the opinions the PPP experts gave through the face to face interview which was 
done from the 6
th November to the 21
st November 2010.  
 
7.4.1 Service quality 
 
Passenger rail needs much more services such as an accessibility to station, 
comfortableness of cabin, frequency of train, etc. besides safety, travel time 
and cost which are common service factors seen in a road (Higton, 2005, Lee, 
2006). It means that the quality of service in rail is more complicated and 
important to attract end users than road. Especially, the Incheon Airport 
Railway competes with the bus service using the Incheon Airport Expressway 
(Namkung et al., 2010), so the quality of service seems decisive factor for the 
successful PPP. 
  
This project was conducted by the BTO with MRG model, and the level of MRG 
was 90% at first, so most interviewees agreed that the private sector was not 
expected to make an effort to improve the service quality (○ A in section 3.2 in 
APPENDIX 4). However, one expert argued that the BTO model, even if it had 
the MRG, could have several benefits in the service quality than in the BTL 
model in rail (○ B in section 3.2 in APPENDIX 4). The respondent said that an 
operation investor could creatively involve in the project from design and 
construction stage while, in the BTL model, it did not need to make an effort to 
induce the creative and competitive ideas to the service quality. The only thing 
they have to do might be to have an ability to fulfil the demand of the 
government. 
 
Consequently, it is not deniable that the BTO model can be better in the service 
quality wise than the BTL model. However, the government shared demand risk 
through the MRG condition in this project, so it made an advantage of the BTO 
model useless according to the level of MRG.  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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7.4.2 Contract and Management 
 
This issue is about the ability and experience of the public and private sectors 
for supervising and managing the PPP project. The rail system is more 
complicated not only in construction but also in operation than road (Lee, 
2006). Some rails are connected to other network and the fare system of 
railway is more complicated than road, so it is difficult to say that managing 
the BTO model is simpler than the BTL as seen in a road case. In the view of 
the public sector, the BTL model can have more advantages in managing the 
project to cope with the needs of public sector. However, one expert opposed 
this opinion, because there was no experience of performance assessment in 
operation not only in road but also in rail, so it could take much time for the 
public sector to make the criteria and standard of performance (○ C in section 
3.2 in APPENDIX 4). Also this might be worse in rail which is more complicated 
in operation than road.  
 
With regard to making a contract, most interviewees said that if the BTL model 
had been used instead of the BTO, the time spent on negotiation could have 
been reduced (○ D in section 3.2 in APPENDIX 4). One of the most controversial 
problems in transport PPP is sharing demand risk and the public sector has 
traffic demand risk in the BTL model. Both sectors do not have to discuss 
traffic forecast in the BTL model (KDI, 2009b). Considering that recent delays 
of the PPP projects were due to financing, the BTL model, where the demand 
risk was on the public sector, could be advantageous to reduce time in 
negotiation and to make a contract.  
 
7.4.3 Risk management 
 
This issue is about the incentivising good risk management through the 
payment mechanism and contract terms. All interviewees said that there was 
no incentive to good risk management of the private sector in the Incheon 
Airport Railway project which was done by the BTO model with the MRG (○ E in 
section 3.2 in APPENDIX 4). An interviewee said that if the BTL model had been 
used in this project, the private sector might have more burdens in operation 
(○ F in section 3.2 in APPENDIX 4). She pointed out that good risk management Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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was regularly checked in the BTL model through the performance assessment, 
but the public sector did not want to interfere with the risk management of the 
private sector beyond their responsibility in the BTO model. 
 
7.4.4 Operational flexibility 
 
The operational flexibility means how to let the private sector cope with the 
change of circumstances under the long term contract. An interviewee said 
that it was decided by the conditions of each project contract rather than by 
the PPP model (○ G in section 3.2 in APPENDIX 4). Thus, this section is discussed 
on the basis that the terms and conditions of a project are similar. 
 
Similarly with road cases, interviewees from the private sectors alleged that 
they became more sensitive to the change of circumstances or technology in 
the BTO model and a respondent from the public sector argued that the private 
sector was only interested in making a profit, so technology or innovative skill 
might be only adapted when it could make an additional profit in the BTO 
model. He said that the BTL model seemed to be more beneficial in the 
operational flexibility (○ H in section 3.2 in APPENDIX 4). 
 
Consequently, the VFM is assessed by the public sector and it basically reflects 
the interest of the public sector. Thus, the BTL seems better than the BTO in 
the operational flexibility in the view of the public sector. The government has 
few rights in the operation stage in the BTO model, but, in the BTL model, 
needs to monitor the operation stage to give the lease fee by the performance 
assessment. The government can discuss operational problems with the 
private sector whenever they pay, and they have more opportunities to change 
the operation condition according to the change of circumstances. However, 
for this kind of governmental role, it needs more administrative efforts like 
time and cost for PPP operation. According to the House of Commons of the 
UK, many PFI schools and hospitals were considered as they did not have 
enough staff to do a good job, though the management cost for operational 
PFI deals was over £6 million a year (House of Commons, 2008).  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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7.5 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Many factors of the quantitative VFM assessment such as construction cost, 
operation cost, and rate of profit are possible to change. The VFM assessed in 
previous section is based on the point estimation, so a review of sensitivity of 
important factors is needed. The MOCT (2007a) recommended analysing the 
sensitivity of the operation period, level of tariff, demand, construction cost, 
operation cost and subsidy from the public sector. Level of tariff and demand 
are related with each other, and it can be considered at the same time with 
revenue factor. However, the sensitivity was not analysed in real case, because 
there was no guideline in 2001 when the contract was made. The report of 
KOTI which is the source of data in this chapter does not consider sensitivity 
analysis either, because many factors are already known and fixed.  
 
This chapter compares the BTL with the BTO model in the Incheon Airport 
Railway, but construction cost, operation cost and profit rate is already fixed 
and the out-turn values were not much different with the original plan. 
 
Table 7.3 Out-turn value of construction and operation cost 
Unit: billion KRW 
  Contracted value (A)  Out-turn value (B)  (B-A)/A (%) 
Construction cost  3,138  3,272  4.3% 
Operation cost  3,631  3,623  -0.2% 
Source: KOTI (2009) 
 
The most differently forecasted factor with actual value was the number of 
passenger which was directly related with the revenue of the project. The level 
of tariff is difficult to change, so the sensitivity of VFM to the number of 
passengers can be analysed through the analysis of revenue. Thus, this chapter 
examines the sensitivity of revenue.  
 
7.5.1 Revenue 
 
During the operation of the Incheon airport railway for previous two years, the 
real passengers were below 7% of the expected. After linking the second stage 
from the Gimpo airport to the Seoul station, the passengers were estimated to Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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be only around 30% of the originally expected (KOTI, 2009a). However, the 
government guaranteed 90% of the contracted revenue, which is the most 
condemned point. Thus, two cases with and without MRG condition are 
analysed, and the range is from 10% to 100% of the expected revenue. 
 
Table 7.4 Sensitivity of the VFM to passenger without MRG 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Passenger 
BTO  BTL 
VFMlo  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.) 
Lease  Operation  Revenue 
100%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  6777.9     3,635.3  
90%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  6100.1     2,957.5  
80%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  5422.3     2,279.7  
70%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  4744.5     1,601.9  
60%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  4066.7        924.2  
50%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  3388.9        246.4  
46.4%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  3142.6  0.0    
40%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  2711.1  - 431.4  
30%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  2033.4  - 1,109.2  
20%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  1355.6  - 1,787.0  
10%  603.1  2369.8  1375.9  677.8  - 2,464.8  
 
Above table shows that if the number of passengers is over 46.4% of the 
contracted number then the BTL model has higher quantitative VFM than the 
BTO. It also means that if the number of passengers is below 46.4%, then the 
BTO is better. Demand risk is on the private sector in the BTO model, which 
can have higher profit rate because of high risk, so if the demand risk of the 
project is high then the BTO model can be beneficial to the government.  
 
However, the BTO model may not be suitable if the private sector makes a loss 
by low demand. Thus, this project, which was done by the BTO, has the MRG 
condition, and the difference with 90% of contracted revenue is compensated 
to the private sector by the government. Considering the minimum revenue 
guarantee, the quantitative VFM can be affected. Table 7.4 shows the 
sensitivity of the revenue to the VFM when there is the MRG condition. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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Table 7.5 Sensitivity of the VFM to passenger with MRG 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Passenger 
BTO   BTL 
VFMlo  Subsidy for 
construction 
Subsidy for 
operation  Lease  Operation  Revenue 
100%  603.1  -  2,369.8  1,375.9  6,777.9  3,635.3 
90%  603.1  -  2,369.8  1,375.9  6,100.1  2,957.5 
80%  603.1  677.8  2,369.8  1,375.9  5,422.3  2,957.5 
70%  603.1  1,355.6  2,369.8  1,375.9  4,744.5  2,957.5 
60%  603.1  2,033.4  2,369.8  1,375.9  4,066.7  2,957.5 
50%  603.1  2,711.2  2,369.8  1,375.9  3,388.9  2,957.5 
40%  603.1  3,389.0  2,369.8  1,375.9  2,711.1  2,957.5 
30%  603.1  4,066.7  2,369.8  1,375.9  2,033.4  2,957.5 
20%  603.1  4,744.5  2,369.8  1,375.9  1,355.6  2,957.5 
10%  603.1  5,422.3  2,369.8  1,375.9  677.8  2,957.5 
 
Because of the minimum revenue guarantee in the BTO model, the quantitative 
VFM of the BTL is always higher than the BTO in this case. The following graph 
shows the result of sensitivity analysis and the effect of the minimum revenue 
guarantee in short. 
 
Figure 7.2 Sensitivity analysis of the VFM to passenger 
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The Incheon Airport Railway was the first railway BTO project, and it followed 
the case of the Incheon Airport Expressway, which was the first case of the 
current BTO model. The level of MRG provided by the government for this 
project was 90%, the same as the Incheon Airport Expressway. There was no 
rational reason or data to decide the MRG as the 90% of expected revenue. 
According to an interviewee from the MLTM, there was only one bidder in this 
project, so the government was difficult to use the competitions between the 
private sectors. He argued that it looked natural to follow the Incheon Airport 
Expressway case which was the only BTO case at that time. 
 
However, this sensitivity analysis shows that the level of minimum revenue 
guarantee of the Incheon Airport Railway BTO project was too high. The reason 
why the profit rate of the BTO was high was that the demand risk was on the 
private sector, but the government had the 90% of demand risk in this case. 
The Korean government suggested 9% as the real reference rate for the BTO 
project based on the economic circumstances, and advised to modify the rate 
by considering the characteristic of the project, risk transfer, financing 
condition, etc. (Lee et al., 2001). A railway was thought to be more risky than a 
road at that time because the size of project was bigger than a road, and there 
was a burden of operation which is directly related with end users. Thus, the 
real profit rate of the Incheon Airport Railway was decided at 10.43% which was 
higher than the profit rate of the Incheon Airport Expressway
24, but the private 
sector had little risk in operation or demand because of the minimum revenue 
guarantee from the government. The private sector did not have to try to 
improve serviceability or operation to draw customers. 
 
7.5.2 Stochastic analysis 
 
The most serious problem of quantitative VFM analysis is that uncertainty of 
input data is too big as seen in the Incheon Airport Railway case, so the fidelity 
of the result based on the point estimation analysis seems to be doubted. For 
this reason, the sensitivity to the VFM is analysed, but a demand factor in this 
rail project does not look enough to be covered with the sensitivity analysis. 
The MOCT explained that the sensitivity of level of tariff and demand had the 
                                           
24 The real profit rate of the Incheon Airport Expressway was 9.70% Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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same effect to the VFM as a revenue factor. It recommended analysing the 
sensitivity of level of tariff instead of demand within a range from -10% to 
+10%. In case that the level of tariff is constant, it is same with that the 
demand was analysed within the same range. However, the inaccuracy of the 
demand of Incheon Airport Railway was over -90%, so the guideline of the 
MOCT could not cover this range in a planning stage.  
 
Thus, this chapter examines a stochastic analysis on the VFM comparing the 
BTL with the BTO model based on the comparison data of demand forecast and 
actual passenger in South Korea. Figure 7.3 shows the probability of inaccuracy 
of rail in South Korea based on 19 projects which has been operated since 
2000 (see APPENDIX 4). Inaccuracy was calculated by the following equation. 
 
(%) 100   


 

 

Tf
Tf Ta
I  
 
Here, I is the inaccuracy of traffic forecast 
  Ta is an actual traffic 
  Tf  is a forecasted traffic 
 
Figure 7.3 Inaccuracy of traffic forecast in rail of South Korea  
 
Source: MLTM (2010) 
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This probability may not be enough to use as a PPP decision tool right now, but 
this can be a good example of using stochastic analysis. In near future, this 
analysis based on accumulated data or experiences of other countries can be 
practically helpful to choose the optimal PPP model. Especially, comparing with 
the research of Flyvbjerg et al (2005), the inaccuracy of rail projects in Korea 
shows many similarities and the result looks effective to stochastic analysis. 
 
Figure 7.4 Inaccuracies of traffic forecasts in 27 rail projects, 1969-1998 
 
Cited from Flyvbjerg et al (2005) 
 
For the stochastic analysis, the Monte Carlo simulation is undertaken 10,000 
times based on the discrete probability of the inaccuracy of traffic forecasts in 
rail in South Korea with the Excel of Microsoft. Quantitative VFM is the 
definitely different by the MRG condition, so the simulation is undertaken in 
the case with MRG and without MRG condition.  
 
In the case of the BTL option being compared with BTO with MRG option, the 
mean value of VFM is ₩3,223.1 billion. Because of MRG condition, the 
minimum possible VFM is ₩2,957.5 billion and the maximum is ₩4,343.1 
billion. The private sector has to repay an additional profit to the government 
when the traffic is over 110% instead of guaranteed revenue below 90% of Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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expected. Figure 7.5 shows the probability of the VFM of the BTO with MRG 
model and it says that the probability that the VFM is ₩2,957.5 billion which is 
the guaranteed level from the government is around 74%.  
 
Figure 7.5 VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO with MRG option 
 
 
This graph explains that if there is a MRG condition reaching 90% of the 
expected revenue then the BTL model is always better than the BTO model. 
Especially, the probability that revenue is compensated by the government 
through the MRG is 74%. MRG regulation is for sharing demand risk of the 
private sector with the public sector, but this stochastic analysis shows that the 
burden to the government seems too high.  
 
In the case being compared with BTO without MRG option, the mean value of 
VFM is ₩1,348.8 billion as shown in Figure 7.6. Considering average 
probability of traffic forecast in rail in South Korea, this project can have more 
VFM in the BTL model than the BTO model. However, the inaccuracy changing 
the better PPP model from the BTL to the BTO is -53.6%, which is 46.4% of the 
forecasted traffic (see Table7.3), and the probability that the optimal PPP 
becomes the BTO model is 43% (see Figure 7.6). Especially, the actual traffic of 
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this case is only 7% of the expected and the inaccuracy reached -93%, so it 
seems difficult to have a confidence that the BTL model is the optimal PPP in 
this project if there were no MRG condition, although it provides better VFM by 
more than three trillion KRW in the quantitative VFM assessment.  
 
Figure 7.6 VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO without MRG 
option 
 
 
The traffic forecast of a project cannot be corrected only by the probability of 
inaccuracy in rail traffic in South Korea, because the general inaccuracy cannot 
explain each case. The above result shows that the quantitative VFM being 
used as a decisive tool for the PPP can be inappropriate. The quantitative VFM 
shows that the BTL model is better, but the BTO model may be better 
regarding high traffic demand risk in rail. Though the probability that the BTL 
model is better is still high, but the extent is not big and the actual traffic 
shows the BTO model could be better only if there were no MRG condition. 
Therefore, it needs to deal with the qualitative VFM assessment, which can 
review this kind of characteristic, more importantly than suggested in the 
current VFM assessment guideline. 
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7.6 Findings 
 
Through the quantitative and qualitative VFM assessment and sensitivity 
analysis about the BTO and BTL model for this Incheon Airport Railway case, 
five characteristics were found. 
 
Firstly, the BTL model for railway can provide better quantitative VFM than the 
BTO model. In this case, the BTL model gives the quantitative VFM compared 
with the BTO of ₩3,635.3 billion. It is because the government can make a PPP 
contract with the private sector with lower rate of profit in the BTL model than 
in the BTO model where the demand risk is on the private sector. Demand in 
rail means passengers and the fare of passenger is the direct source of 
revenue. Like road cases, the government pays a lease fee to the private sector 
but can collect fares from end users, so the government can make a profit in 
the BTL model. Especially, this project has a MRG condition to guarantee 90% 
of expected revenue to the private sector, so the BTL model is always better 
than the BTO model regardless of traffic demand risk through the sensitivity 
analysis not only by the deterministic method but by the stochastic method.  
 
Secondly, the BTO model can be better option than the BTL model to improve 
the quality of service of rail. Rail competes with the express bus service for the 
Incheon International Airport, so the BTO model which collects fees from the 
end user who can choose the alternative is more sensitive to improve the 
quality of service. However, the excessive MRG reaching 90% of expected 
revenue can make this kind of strength of the BTO model useless. 
 
Thirdly, the BTL model seems to be better than the BTO model in operational 
flexibility for the government to cope with the change of future circumstances. 
In the BTL model, the government plays a role of connecting the private sector 
with the end users. Considering the qualitative VFM is also assessed in the view 
of the public sector, the government can have more flexible rights in the BTL 
model during the operation period through the payment mechanism, but it 
cost more administrative expense and time.  
 
Fourthly, the BTO model without the MRG can provide better VFM than the BTL 
model when the real passengers are lower than forecasted, because the Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Incheon Airport Railway 
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demand risk is on the private sector in the BTO model. Even if actual 
passengers are lower than expected, the government does not have to pay 
anything to the private sector in the BTO model without MRG. However, in the 
BTL model, the revenue from the end user is decreased in case actual 
passengers do not reach an aim level, so the net financial burden of the 
government is increased. Thus, the BTO model can be beneficial to the 
government if the actual passengers are lower by certain level than expected 
and there is no MRG condition in a contract. Considering probability of traffic 
forecast in rail of South Korea, the probability that BTO model is better is 
around 41% when there is no MRG condition. It means that if the project has 
high traffic demand risk, then the BTO model in which the private sector is 
responsible to the traffic demand risk can be better to the public sector. 
 
Lastly, the level of MRG in this rail case is too high. One of the most important 
characteristics of the BTO model is the private sector has a demand risk. The 
MRG regulation is for sharing demand risk of the private sector with the public 
sector in the BTO model to prevent excessive traffic demand risk burdens to 
the private sector. However, the results of the Monte Carlo simulation on traffic 
demand risk show the probability that revenue is compensated by the 
government through the MRG reached 74%. Though the MRG is the policy tool 
for sharing demand risk, but majority of risks are on the public sector 
regardless of high rate of profit provided to the public sector. The government 
guaranteed 90% of forecasted revenue in this case, but if the BTL model had 
been chosen, the government could pay only 35.0% of expected revenue in the 
form of lease fee. Even considering the actual passengers, which are only 
around 7% of forecasted, the BTL model provides better VFM than the BTO with 
MRG model by ₩2,957.5 billion. 
 
Consequently, the BTO model for the Incheon Airport Railway looks 
inappropriate. This project seems a bad case of the BTO model in transport 
infrastructures because of excessive MRG. Basically, the government prefers 
the BTO model without MRG condition, but if the MRG is necessary because of 
a high traffic demand risk, the maximum MRG should not exceed to the level 
that makes VFM of the BTL compared with the BTO model zero. If MRG exceeds 
this level, than the BTL model can be better to the public sector in the 
quantitative wise. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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CHAPTER 8   
Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
As seen not only in the Incheon Airport Expressway and the Incheon Airport 
Railway but also other BTO projects, excessive revenue subsidy by the MRG 
condition evoked many criticisms on the BTO model itself (Choi, 2007, Gil, 
2008). In case of rail which needs more construction and operation cost with 
limited income from end users as a public transport than road, it was thought 
to be disadvantageous for the private sector to make a profit with only 
charging a tariff (Higton, 2005). Especially, the demand of rail in South Korea is 
generally known as overestimated (Oh, 2005). This means that a railway BTO 
project, where a profit of the private sector depends on the traffic demand, is 
less attractive to the private sector if there is no MRG condition. Thus, the BTL 
model was considered to a railway construction project as the alternative of the 
BTO model. 
 
The Daegok-Sosa railway was designed as a government direct investment 
project in 2005, but considering the increasing public demand for rail service 
in the western Seoul Metropolitan area, the MLTM decided to use the PPP to 
this project in 2007. At first, it was planned as the BTL project without 
operation, but the MLTM changed to include the operation and the project is in 
negotiation with the private sector.  
 
This chapter explores how the BTL model including the operation was 
introduced to the rail transport in South Korea for the first time and examines 
whether the BTL model is an appropriate decision to the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
project compared with the BTO model through the quantitative VFM 
assessment, the qualitative VFM assessment and the sensitivity analysis.  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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8.2 Summary of the project 
 
8.2.1 Details of the project 
 
The Daegok-Sosa Railway is a part of national rail network to link the West 
coast line and Gyeongui line
25 which connects Seoul with Shinuijoo of North 
Korea. The Daegok-Sosa line is planned to provide a rail service to the western 
of Seoul Metropolitan area. Also, this is aiming to fulfil a western arterial rail 
network to prepare to connect with North Korea area (Choi, 2009).  
 
Total length of this project is 19.4km, and it has one train base and five 
stations where three stations are underground. The construction period is 5 
years and the designed building cost is ₩1,625 billion which is the price in 
2008 (PIMAC, 2009). In the PPP option, the actual building cost can be reduced 
by bidding, so PIMAC assumed the building cost as ₩1,526.2 billion by 
considering bidding rate in other PPP cases. Thus, the assumed building cost in 
the PIMAC report is used in this chapter. The project was planned to launch the 
construction in 2011 and to be operated from 2016.  
 
Figure 8.1 The Daegok-Sosa railway line map 
 
Source: MLTM 
                                           
25 The Geyongui line has been blocked since 1945 by the separation between South 
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8.2.2 History of the project as a PPP 
 
The first railway BTL cases were the Gyeongjeon line and the Jeolla line. 
However, the BTL was only for the part of construction and the train operation 
was still on the public sector, KORAIL, which is the only public train operator of 
national rail network in South Korea. These BTL railway cases were part of a 
national rail network, so it was thought to be difficult to transfer an operation 
right to the private sector. However, the BTL model without operation made 
people doubt the necessity of the PPP for rail as there was little possibility for 
the private sector to be creative or effective in construction stage under the 
circumstance that the private sector follows the master plan and regulations on 
railway (NABO, 2007). The BTL model without operation was thought as 
another bidding way for the railway construction (Cheong, 2006).   
 
From 2006 to 2007, a feasibility test for the Daegok-Sosa Railway project was 
done and the master plan was made. The basic design was executed by the 
Korea Rail Network Authority from 2008 to 2009. Through the VFM assessment 
of the PIMAC of the KDI (2009), the project was decided to be done by the BTL 
model. The BTL was analysed to give better VFM than the PSC by ₩101.8 
billion (NPV in 2009) when the rate of profit was 5.31% and the operation 
period was 20 years after construction. In the BTL model assessed by the 
PIMAC, it was assumed that the private sector constructs the facility and 
maintains the facility without the operation of train and station.  
 
However, considering sceptical opinions on the BTL model without train 
operation for rail as mentioned above, the MLTM decided to include train 
operation to the PPP. According to an interviewee from the MLTM in 2010, the 
positive appraisal on the performance of the Seoul Metro line 9, where the 
private sector operates train and station independently with the public 
operator in other urban rails, became one of the important reasons to change 
the policy. The MLTM aimed to introduce the competitiveness of the private 
sector to the national rail service and to upgrade the service quality and the 
efficiency of the rail industry. Especially, including train operation could be a 
big advantage to the BTL project, because the demand and opinions of the 
train operator became to be included to construction from the design stage by 
that the private sector controls construction and operation together.  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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8.3 Quantitative VFM assessment 
 
8.3.1 Basic assumption for case study 
 
The project seems to be postponed because of delayed negotiation, but this 
study is for comparing the BTL with the BTO option in the stage of project 
planning. Thus, it is analysed in the assumption that the design is completed 
in 2010 and the construction starts from 2011 to 2015. The operation begins 
in 2016 and it is operated by the private sector for 20 years which is common 
in the BTL projects in Korea.  
 
The date for calculating life cycle cost is June 2009 when the VFM assessment 
for the BTL was done by the PIMAC. The price is assumed to rise by 3.88% per 
year during construction period, which is the GDP deflator for construction 
investment, and by 3.14% per year during operation period.   
 
Data such as forecasted passengers in the quantitative VFM assessment are 
collected from the report of the KOTI (Choi, 2009).  
 
8.3.2 Lease fee 
 
The lease fee is calculated by the following formula; 
 
  k n PVIFA
incomes additional the of value present the investment Total
fee lease Aunnal
,

  
 
The total investment of the private sector presented by the report of PIMAC is 
₩1,526.2 billion for construction and ₩24.3 billion for buying trains. The 
assumed nominal rate of profit in this report was 5.31%, which was calculated 
by the average interest rate (4.59%) of a five-year national bond of Korea for a 
year before assessment and the additional interest rate (0.72%) for a long term 
investment. The additional incomes from the incidental facility were not 
considered in this project. The operation period is 20 years, so the PVIFA (20, 
5.31%) = 12.141 and the annual lease fee is ₩127.7 billion.  
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8.3.3 Operating cost 
 
Operating cost can be divided into the cost for facility operation such as rail or 
station maintenance and the cost for train operation. The BTL report of the 
PIMAC (2009) does not consider the cost for train operation, because this 
project was planed as the PPP only for the facility except the train operation. It 
needs to assume the operating cost when the PPP covers whole services 
including operating train as currently discussed between the government and 
the private sector. It is assumed that the operating cost is the same in the BTL 
and the BTO model. Though there seems to be the possibility that the 
operating cost of the BTO model, in which the private sector can make an 
additional profit through saving cost in operation, is lower than the BTL model, 
it is difficult to deal with this factor quantitatively, because the private sector 
does not open the data to the public even if they saved the cost in operation. 
Operating cost of the BTL model for facility operation can be found at the 
Daegok-Sosa VFM assessment report (PIMAC, 2009). It was expected to be 
₩403.9 billion in total for 20 years when an inflation rate is assumed as 3.14% 
which is an average value for previous three years from 2005 in Korea.  
 
The cost for train operation needs to be assumed in this study. The feasibility 
test for the project, which was done for the government direct investment by 
the KOTI (Choi, 2009), shows the train operation cost is anticipated to be 
₩36.4 billion in real prices and it is ₩61.3 billion in nominal prices when the 
inflation is 3.14%. Though this cost was derived based on the assumption that 
the public sector operates the train, but this value can be used in comparing 
the PPP model with each other because this cost is not big when it compared 
with the facility operation cost and the same values are used in both PPP 
models. Also, the sensitivity of the VFM to the operation cost will be analysed, 
so the effect of the operation cost can be tested. Consequently, the operation 
cost for the BTL and the BTO options are same and the nominal cost is ₩465.2 
billion.  
 
8.3.4 Revenue 
 
Like other cases, the revenue is assumed as the same in both PPP models. Choi 
(2009) anticipated that the revenue of the Daegok-Sosa rail project is ₩992.5 Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
  162   
billion (nominal price) by 2036 when it is operated by the public sector like 
other national rails. This value is used in this case study. 
 
8.3.5 Subsidy 
 
This project is planned as the BTL model, so subsidy for the BTO option should 
be assumed. The appropriate subsidy for the project depends on how much 
the public sector approves a profit rate for the private sector. The rate of profit 
is determined by the negotiation between the public and the private sector. For 
this negotiation and the VFM assessment, the MOSF recommends considering 
an average loan rate, risk sharing by the government, the size and kind of 
project, a risk premium and the level of profit rate of other PPP projects. Based 
on this guideline, the MLTM (2007a) suggests to use an average of profit rates 
in previous BTO projects, as seen in Table 8.1, with some consideration of the 
current bank interest, as an appropriate rate of profit in the BTO model.  
 
Table 8.1 Rate of profit of BTO road project in South Korea 
Project 
Rate of profit 
(nominal) 
Project 
Rate of profit 
(nominal) 
Incheon Airport Ex.  15.19%  Gwangju ringroad (2
nd)  14.30% 
Daegu-Busan  14.85%  Cheolmasan tunnel  13.99% 
Seoul belt way  15.00%  Manwoelsan tunnel  14.30% 
Daegu ring road(4
th)  16.00%  Misiryeong tunnel  15.00% 
Cheonan-Nonsan  14.70%  Average  14.81% 
* Annual inflation is assumed as 5%.               Source: MLTM 
 
Table 8.2 Rate of profit of BTO rail project in South Korea 
Project 
Rate of profit 
(nominal) 
Project 
Rate of profit 
(nominal) 
Choep light rail  16.00%  Incheon Airport rail  15.95%
26 
Seoul-Hanam  16.00%  Seoul Metro no. 9  14.35% 
Busan-Kimhae  15.75%  Average  15.61% 
* Annual inflation is assumed as 5%.               Source: MLTM 
                                           
26 In chapter 7, the nominal rate of profit of the Incheon Airport Railway was 13.85%, 
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However, considering recent financial market it looks too high to use the 
average rate of profit. Above shown cases were mostly launched around 2000 
when the bank interest was quite high since the East Asia financial crisis in 
1997. In the case of 5 year national bond of Korea, it was 8.66% in 2000 but it 
was 5.28% in 2009 which is the basis year of this case study (KOFIA, 2011). On 
the other hand, after the abolition of the MRG regulation in 2009 and global 
financial crisis, many PPP road projects have failed to finance regardless of low 
bank interest. The possibility of inducing the private investment to a rail 
project is even harder than road in the BTO model. Thus, the nominal profit 
rate of BTO case uses the same rate of profit of the most recent rail BTO case. 
It is the Seoul Metro no. 9 and the nominal profit rate is 14.35% when the 
inflation is 5%. In this case, the inflation is 3.14%, so the nominal profit rate is 
assumed as 12.32%. Especially, in 2005, the PIMAC of the KDI (2005) analysed 
that the profit rate of the project phase 2 for the Seoul Metro 9 was 
appropriate to use the same profit rate with the phase 1. Considering many 
BTO projects signed after 2007 have a difficulty in financing because of the 
high risk in demand and uncertainty of long term investment, this rate does 
not look too high to use, although the basis year of this project is 2009.  
 
The rate of profit of the BTO option is determined by the FIRR (Financial 
Internal Rate of Return) which is based on the discounted cash flow of the 
project (KEC, 2007). The FIRR is the discount rate making the NPV of revenue 
equal to the NPV of cost as shown in the following formula. 
 
     
  


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0 0 1 1
 
* Here, R is the revenue (cash income), C is the cost (cash outcome), and r is the FIRR 
 
Details of revenue, building cost and operating cost are collected from the VFM 
report of KOTI (Choi, 2009). The Korean government provides the construction 
subsidy with a proportional rate on the construction cost. The subsidy for 
construction in the BTO option can be calculated by analysing the cash flow 
with assumed profit rate above mentioned. In this case, the government 
subsidy rate making the discounted cash flow with the profit rate zero is 
92.19% and Table 8.4 shows the result to analyse the appropriate construction 
subsidy based on the above equation.Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
  164   
Table 8.3 Construction subsidy from the government 
Unit: billion KRW (nominal price) 
Year 
Annual cost during construction 
Construction  Subsidy  Train  Cash flow (out)  DCF* 
SUM  1,526.2  1,407.0  24.3  119.2  88.4 
2009                
2010  45.9  42.3     3.6  3.2 
2011  136.9  126.2     10.7  8.5 
2012  276.4  254.8     21.6  15.2 
2013  390.6  360.0  8.1  30.5  24.3 
2014  499.4  460.4  8.1  39.0  26.3 
2015  177.0  163.2  8.1  13.8  10.9 
  
Annual revenue and cost during operation 
Revenue  Operation  Cash flow (in)  DCF 
SUM  992.5  465.2  527.3  88.4 
2016  38.2  17.1  21.1  9.4 
2017  39.2  17.6  21.6  8.5 
2018  40.2  18.2  22.1  7.8 
2019  41.3  18.7  22.5  7.1 
2020  42.4  19.3  23.0  6.4 
2021  43.5  19.9  23.5  5.8 
2022  44.6  20.5  24.0  5.3 
2023  45.8  21.2  24.6  4.8 
2024  47.0  21.9  25.1  4.4 
2025  48.2  22.5  25.6  4.0 
2026  49.4  23.3  26.2  3.6 
2027  50.8  24.0  26.9  3.3 
2028  52.3  24.7  27.5  3.0 
2029  53.8  25.5  28.2  2.8 
2030  55.3  26.3  29.0  2.5 
2031  56.8  27.1  29.7  2.3 
2032  58.5  28.0  30.5  2.1 
2033  60.1  28.9  31.2  1.9 
2034  61.8  29.8  32.0  1.8 
2035  63.6  30.7  32.9  1.6 
* DCF: Discounted Cash Flow, the FIRR (here, discount rate) is 12.32% (nominal) 
 
8.3.6 Summary of the analysis factors 
 
Input factors used in this case study are as follows (Value written in this 
section is a nominal price);  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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  Building cost: ₩1,526.2 billion  
 
  Operating cost: ₩465.2 billion 
Facility maintenance and operation: ₩403.9 billion 
Train operation: ₩61.3 billion 
 
  Operation period: 20 years 
 
  Construction subsidy: ₩1,407.0 billion 
Government expenditure based on 5-year Korea national bond: 
₩1,739.1 billion 
 
  Annual lease fee: ₩127.7 billion per year for 20 years 
 
  Nominal rate of profit: 5.31% in the BTL, 12.32%
27 in the BTO 
 
  Financial discount rate: real 5.5%, nominal 8.81% 
 
  Inflation which is used in an operation stage: 3.14% 
GDP deflator for construction which is used in a construction stage: 
3.88% 
 
  Revenue: ₩992.5 billion 
 
8.3.7 Result 
 
The quantitative VFM of the BTL model compared with the BTO model in the 
Daegok-Sosa railway project is ₩266.3 billion. It means that the BTL model, 
which is currently chosen PPP model, provides more value for money than the 
BTO model. Real financial discount rate used here is 5.5% which was 
recommended by the KDI in 2008 and nominal rate is 8.81% when the inflation 
is 3.14% 
 
                                           
27 Rate of profit in the BTO model means the FIRR (Financial Internal Rate of Return). Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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Table 8.4 Quantitative VFM assessment in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
          Unit: billion KRW (nominal prices) 
Year 
BTO  BTL  VFM 
Gov. 
subsidy 
Gov. 
Expenditure 
Lease 
fee 
Operating 
cost  Revenue  Nominal  NPV 
SUM  1,407.0  1,739.1  2,554.2  465.2  992.5  -287.8  266.3 
2009                 0.0  0.0 
2010  42.3  0.0           0.0  0.0 
2011  126.2  2.0           2.0  1.7 
2012  254.8  8.0           8.0  6.2 
2013  360.0  20.0           20.0  14.3 
2014  460.4  37.0           37.0  24.2 
2015  163.2  101.0           101.0  60.9 
2016     190.6  127.7  17.1  38.2  84.1  46.5 
2017     313.3  127.7  17.6  39.2  207.2  105.4 
2018     406.5  127.7  18.2  40.2  300.8  140.7 
2019     489.8  127.7  18.7  41.3  384.6  165.3 
2020     170.9  127.7  19.3  42.4  66.2  26.2 
2021        127.7  19.9  43.5  -104.2  -37.8 
2022        127.7  20.5  44.6  -103.7  -34.6 
2023        127.7  21.2  45.8  -103.1  -31.6 
2024        127.7  21.9  47.0  -102.6  -28.9 
2025        127.7  22.5  48.2  -102.1  -26.4 
2026        127.7  23.3  49.4  -101.5  -24.2 
2027        127.7  24.0  50.8  -100.9  -22.1 
2028        127.7  24.7  52.3  -100.2  -20.1 
2029        127.7  25.5  53.8  -99.5  -18.4 
2030        127.7  26.3  55.3  -98.7  -16.8 
2031        127.7  27.1  56.8  -98.0  -15.3 
2032        127.7  28.0  58.5  -97.2  -13.9 
2033        127.7  28.9  60.1  -96.5  -12.7 
2034        127.7  29.8  61.8  -95.7  -11.6 
2035        127.7  30.7  63.6  -94.9  -10.6 Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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8.4 Qualitative VFM assessment 
 
This chapter examines the following four issues of the qualitative VFM 
assessment suggested in the methodology chapter.  
 
8.4.1 Service quality 
 
Many researchers explain that the big advantage of the PPP is improving the 
quality in the public service (HM Treasury, 2008, Szejnfeld, 2009, Herpen, 
2002). This seems possible through the creativity and competition of the 
private sector. KDI (2009a) says that the service quality of the PPP option is 
expected to be higher than the PSC when the competition between the private 
sectors to bid is as high as possible. In general, the private sector seems to be 
more sensitive to the end users in the BTO model (see section 3.4.4). An 
interviewee from the private rail operation company argued that the Seoul 
Metro no. 9 constructed by the BTO model could be a good example of 
improving the service quality through the PPP (○ B in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). 
Passengers of rail are relatively sensitive to service quality such as frequency, 
on time and comfortableness to choose the transport mode, so the private 
sector is expected to try to meet the demand of passengers (Park et al., 2007). 
 
On the other hand, an interviewee from KORAIL said that the creativity of the 
private sector beyond the performance demand from the public sector was not 
clear to improve the service quality timely (○ A in section 3.4 in APPENDIX 4). He 
argued that the service quality might be affected by who operated it rather 
than by which PPP model was used. Especially, the Daegok-Sosa line is a part of 
national rail network and it can be operated with other public operating rail. 
Thus, he said that the BTL model can be advantageous in the service quality 
such as connecting or transferring to other trains and lowering the tariff 
through sharing common facilities or equipments with the public operator.  
 
Consequently, though there is a possibility that the private sector make more 
efforts to improve the service quality in the BTO model, it seems difficult to say 
that the BTO model is beneficial to improve the service quality in this case. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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8.4.2 Contract and Management 
 
In recent years, the biggest problem in making a successful contract for the 
PPP is financing. The global financial crisis negatively impacted on the PPP 
market not only in South Korea but also in many other countries (European PPP 
Expertise Centre, 2009). In regard to financing, the BTL model in which the 
public sector guarantees the revenue looks easier than the BTO model in which 
the private sector has a risk if there is no risk sharing such as MRG. Especially, 
the unsolicited BTO projects became more difficult to finance after the 
abolition of the MRG regulation in 2006 as can be seen in the status of BTO 
projects decided to proceed in Figure 8.2  
 
Figure 8.2 Status of BTO projects decided to proceed in Korea after 2006 
 
Most interviewees agreed that the BTL model would be easy to finance, so it 
could make a contract easy (○ B in section 3.4 in APPENDIX 4). It means that the 
BTL model can be better than the BTO model in making a contract.  
Management factor is assessed into two sides; one is the ability of the private 
sector to manage the project and the other is the supervision of the public 
sector. Actually, this is the first rail BTL project including the train operation, 
so there is no experience about a performance assessment in operation. In this 
view, the BTO model which has more experiences including a failed case can 
be advantageous. However, an interviewee from the MLTM said that the private 
sector has already experiences in train operation, so it did not seem to have 
difficulty in operation even in the BTL model (○ C in section 3.4 in APPENDIX 4). Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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Thus, the difference between the BTL and the BTO model in the management 
of the private sector is not big enough to say a specific model is better.  
 
In the view of the public sector, many interviewees pointed out that there 
might be little difference in construction stage in both PPP models, but agreed 
that the BTL model looks easier to be supervised in operation stage than the 
BTO model by the public sector (○ D in section 3.4 in APPENDIX 4).  
  
8.4.3 Risk management 
 
An interviewee in charge of this BTL project said that the private sector did not 
make an effort to improve the service quality or to suggest a creative idea for 
better VFM (○ E in section 3.4 in APPENDIX 4). They just followed the guideline of 
the government and seemed passive in the BTL model. In the case of the BTO 
model, most interviewees consented that this project is a part of national rail 
network, so it might be limited to incentivise good risk management even in 
the BTO model (○ F in section 3.4 in APPENDIX 4). Consequently, it seems 
difficult to find the better PPP model in risk management.  
 
8.4.4 Operational flexibility 
 
In previous cases, the private sector and the public sector had opposite 
opinions on the better PPP model in an operational flexibility (see section 5.4.4, 
6.4.4 and 7.4.4). The private sector preferred the BTO model for this issue, but 
the public sector argued that the BTL model is better to cope with the change 
of circumstances or technologies in operation stage. However, unlike other PPP 
cases, interviewees from the private sector agreed that the operational 
flexibility in the BTO model would be very restricted, because this project was 
a part of national rail network (○ G in section 3.4 in APPENDIX 4). Respondents of 
the public sector argued that the need for an operational change such as train 
time and equipment by the public sector was expected to be high (○ H in section 
3.4 in APPENDIX 4). Thus, for this project, the BTL model looks better in an 
operational flexibility 
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8.5 Sensitivity analysis 
 
This case is in negotiation and it has not been started yet, so main factors of 
VFM assessment such as construction cost, operation cost, rate of profit are 
possible to change. The VFM assessed in previous sections is based on the 
point estimation, so a review of the sensitivity of important factors is needed.  
 
The MOCT (2007a) recommended analysing the sensitivity of operation period, 
level of tariff, demand, construction cost, operation cost and subsidy from the 
public sector. Level of tariff and demand are related with each other, and it can 
be considered at the same time with the revenue factor. In this BTL project, the 
KDI analysed the sensitivity of profit rate, construction cost and operation cost, 
because the BTL does not need to analyse the revenue which is decided by the 
construction and operation cost. There is no subsidy in the BTL model, so it 
does not need to be considered.  
 
However, this case study is for comparing the BTL with the BTO model, so 
more factors need to be analysed. Thus, the sensitivity of revenue, 
construction cost, operation cost and profit rate
28 to the VFM is analysed.  
 
8.5.1 Revenue 
 
The MOCT (2007a) suggests that the range of sensitivity analysis in the level of 
tariff is 10% of expected value. The guidance of the MOCT also says that 
demand, which is expected passenger in this case, does not need to analyse in 
the case of analysing the tariff because the change of tariff can affect the same 
with the change of passengers (ibid). In other words, in the VFM assessment of 
PPP model, tariff and demand can be analysed with revenue, so the sensitivity 
analysis of the revenue to the VFM can cover the tariff and demand factor at 
the same time. However, the range of sensitivity analysis is likely to be 
changed, because the number of passengers was quite different with 
forecasted. In recent, there are few rail cases that the real passengers are more 
                                           
28 In case of BTO model, profit rate is directly related with the subsidy, and 
there is no subsidy in the BTL model, so the sensitivity of subsidy does not 
need to be analysed separately.  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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than expected, and in the Incheon Airport Railway case, the real passengers 
were only 7% of anticipated. Thus, this case study analyses from 10% to 100% 
for the range of sensitivity analysis of revenue. 
 
Table 8.5 Sensitivity to revenue       
Unit: billion KRW 
Actual 
passenger 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
100%  840.4  712.1  119.2  257.2  266.3 
90%  840.4  712.1  119.2  231.5  240.6 
80%  840.4  712.1  119.2  205.8  214.9 
70%  840.4  712.1  119.2  180.0  189.1 
60%  840.4  712.1  119.2  154.3  163.4 
50%  840.4  712.1  119.2  128.6  137.7 
40%  840.4  712.1  119.2  102.9  112.0 
30%  840.4  712.1  119.2  77.2  86.3 
20%  840.4  712.1  119.2  51.4  60.5 
10%  840.4  712.1  119.2  25.7  34.8 
 
The result shows that the VFM of the BTL is always positive and it means that 
the BTL model gives better VFM than the BTO model regardless of how many 
passengers will be in real. The reason looks that the subsidy from the public 
sector, which is more than 90% of total construction cost, is too high. It is to 
guarantee the profit to the private sector in the BTO model, but 92.19% of 
building cost seems to be unacceptable to the government. This high subsidy 
is due to the high construction cost and low revenue, and it is much related 
with the construction and operation circumstance of this rail. This project 
passes Seoul metropolitan area, so the construction cost is much higher than 
any other region for over pass or underground facilities. Operation wise, the 
tariff is not easy to be raised as main role of this rail is commuting in the 
western Seoul metropolitan area.  
 
Consequently, this analysis shows that this project seems much better to do 
with the BTL model regardless of traffic forecast. This result quantitatively 
shows that the current rail BTL policy is right and why the BTO model is 
difficult to choose under the current rail circumstance that the profitability is 
low because of high construction cost and low revenue.  
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8.5.2 Construction cost 
 
This project is in negotiation, so the construction cost can be changed 
afterwards. Thus, it needs to analyse the sensitivity of construction cost. The 
MOCT recommends doing the sensitivity analysis of construction cost with the 
range from 5% to 15%. Construction cost also affects other costs such as 
design cost, financial cost, etc., so building cost including these costs is 
analysed in this case study. The following table shows the NPVs of each VFM 
factors.  
 
Table 8.6 Sensitivity to construction cost 
Unit: billion KRW 
Construction 
cost 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
-15%  703.6  605.2  119.2  257.2  236.4 
-10%  749.2  640.8  119.2  257.2  246.4 
-5%  794.8  676.4  119.2  257.2  256.4 
0%  840.4  712.1  119.2  257.2  266.3 
5%  886.0  747.7  119.2  257.2  276.3 
10%  931.5  783.3  119.2  257.2  286.3 
15%  977.1  818.9  119.2  257.2  296.3 
 
Lower construction cost benefits the BTO model and higher construction cost 
benefits the BTL model. It is because that the government subsidy in the BTO 
model, where the profit rate is higher, is more sensitive to the construction 
cost than the lease fee in the BTL model. More construction cost can burden 
more expenditure of the government in the BTO model and less construction 
cost can also save more expenditure of the government in the BTO model.  
 
8.5.3 Operating cost 
 
The MOCT recommends analysing the operating cost from 10% to 20%. 
Following table shows the result and the operating cost seems not affective to 
the VFM in this case. Operating cost is compensated in the BTL model by the 
public sector, so higher operating cost burdens more cost to the public sector. 
However, the public sector does not cover the variation of operating cost in the Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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BTO model. Operating cost is one of factors to decide a profit rate in the BTO 
model, but the risk of operating cost is on the private sector in the actual 
operation stage. 
 
Table 8.7 Sensitivity to operating cost   
Unit: billion KRW 
Actual 
Operating 
cost 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
-20%  840.4  712.1  95.3  257.2  290.2 
-10%  840.4  712.1  107.3  257.2  278.2 
0%  840.4  712.1  119.2  257.2  266.3 
10%  840.4  712.1  131.1  257.2  254.4 
20%  840.4  712.1  143.0  257.2  242.5 
 
8.5.4 Rate of profit  
 
Rate of profit is very important factor to induce the private sector to the PPP 
project, so the sensitivity of the profit rate needs to be considered before 
negotiation with the private sector. In the BTO model, the rate of profit is 
directly related with subsidy, and it is related with the lease fee in the BTL 
model. Profit rate of each model is different, so the sensitivity is analysed 
separately.  
 
Following result shows that the rate of profit is a decisive factor affecting much 
to the VFM in the BTL model. Lease fee is calculated by the rate of profit, so the 
VFM seems very sensitive to the rate of profit.  
 
Table 8.8 Sensitivity to the rate of profit  (BTL)    
Unit: billion KRW 
Profit rate 
(BTL) 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
5.3%  840.4  712.1  119.2  257.2  266.3 
6.3%  840.4  772.8  119.2  257.2  205.6 
7.3%  840.4  835.8  119.2  257.2  142.6 
8.3%  840.4  900.9  119.2  257.2  77.5 
9.3%  840.4  968.0  119.2  257.2  10.4 Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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Table 8.9 Sensitivity to the rate of profit (BTO)      
Unit: billion KRW 
Profit rate 
(BTO) 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue 
9.3%  813.6  712.1  119.2  257.2  239.5 
10.3%  823.7  712.1  119.2  257.2  249.6 
11.3%  832.6  712.1  119.2  257.2  258.5 
12.3%  840.4  712.1  119.2  257.2  266.3 
 
A rate of profit of the BTO case is much less sensitive to the VFM than the BTL 
case. A rate of profit is calculated based on the investment of the private 
sector and the construction subsidy is over 90% in this case. The investment 
from the private sector in the BTO model is only ₩119.2 billion while it is 
₩1,550.5 billion for the BTL model. Therefore even if the profit rate of the BTO 
case is much higher than that of the BTL case, the influence on the VFM is not 
big by the profit rate of the BTO case. 
 
Consequently, this result shows that the BTL model in this case is better than 
the BTO model regardless of profit rate because an amount of subsidy in the 
BTO model is too much. 
 
8.5.5 Stochastic analysis 
 
The most serious problem of VFM analysis is that uncertainty of input data is 
too big, so the fidelity of the result based on the point estimation is likely easy 
to be doubted. In the case of the construction cost, operation cost and rate of 
profit which are main factors to analyse the VFM, the private and public sectors 
have enough experiences and uncertainty is relatively low. However, 
uncertainty of traffic forecast is a big issue in South Korea.  
 
Differently with road cases, there are not enough data in rail so this analysis 
cannot be used for PPP decision tool right now, but this try can be a good 
example of using stochastic analysis. In near future, this analysis based on 
accumulated data or other countries’ experience data can be helpful to choose Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Daegok-Sosa Railway 
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the optimal PPP model. Probability of rail traffic forecast was presented in 
Chapter 7 based on the actual traffic data of 19 rail projects. This chapter uses 
the same data for the stochastic analysis of traffic forecast.  
 
In fact, this case does not need to analyse the stochastic analysis only to find 
an optimal PPP, because it is found through the sensitivity analysis of revenue 
that the BTL model is always better than the BTO model regardless of traffic 
demand risk. However, the reliability of VFM can be shown through the 
stochastic result.  
 
Following graph shows the result of Monte Carlo simulation for the probability 
of the VFM by the traffic demand risk. The iteration was undertaken 10,000 
times and the mean value of VFM is ₩179.0 billion and standard deviation is 
₩121.5 billion. The mean value is lower than the VFM presented in the point 
estimation by ₩87.3 billion. It means that the BTL model does not perform as 
well as expected though it looks better than the BTO model. 
 
Figure 8.3 VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO without MRG 
option 
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8.6 Findings 
 
Through the quantitative and qualitative VFM assessment and sensitivity 
analysis for the Daegok-Sosa Railway case, four results were found. 
 
Firstly, the BTL option for the Daegok-Sosa railway provides better quantitative 
VFM than the BTO option. In this case, the BTL option gives higher VFM 
compared with the BTO by ₩266.3 billion. The reason seems due to the 
government subsidy reaching 92% of total building cost in the BTO option. The 
subsidy was decided in the level compensating for the profit rate of the private 
sector under the circumstances of high construction cost and low revenue.  
 
Secondly, it is disputable which PPP model is better in the service quality. The 
private sector can be more sensitive to the service quality in the BTO option, 
because the investment and profit is recouped through charging passengers. 
However, in this case as a part of national rail, several service attributes such 
as train frequencies, level of tariff is related with other networks, so the BTL 
option which is easy to be controlled by the public sector may have advantages.  
 
Thirdly, the BTL option seems to be better to the public sector than the BTO 
option in the operational flexibility to cope with the change of circumstances. 
In the BTL option, the public sector pays lease fee based on the performance 
assessment, so the public sector can have more flexible rights in operation. 
 
Fourthly, the sensitivity analysis including stochastic method shows that the 
BTL option always gives better VFM to the public sector in this case. Forecasted 
passengers (which were tested through the revenue analysis), construction cost, 
operation cost and even rate of profit could not change the positive VFM result 
negatively. It means that the main idea for the BTO was not available in the 
national rail network of which construction cost was high and the level of tariff 
and passengers were expected to low was right.  
 
Consequently, the BTL option for the Daegok-Sosa Railway looks appropriate. 
This case study shows quantitatively why the BTL model could be better to 
national rail network than the BTO model which has been the most prevalent 
PPP model for transport infrastructures.  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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CHAPTER 9   
Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The Seoul Metro 9 is a solicited BTO project operated for 30 years from 2009 
with MRG condition and it is the first PPP case for a subway in South Korea. 
Subway is a typical form of public transport in Seoul and rail including subway 
carried around 34.5% of total passenger transport in Seoul in 2008 (KOTI, 
2009b). As the dominant part of public transport, the level of tariff is regulated 
by the local government. It means that revenue is strictly restricted by the 
government and the private sector can find it difficult to have an appropriate 
profit only through charging a toll to end users in the BTO model. Thus, this 
project was divided into two parts to reduce the excessive burden of the 
private sector. The first part is the lower structure for the tunnel and track bed 
which was done by the local government and the second part is the upper 
structure for the station, track and equipment. The PPP was done only for the 
construction of upper structure and operation.   
 
This project has been known as a successful BTO case in the rail field, because 
actual passengers were up to around 83% of the forecasted in 2010 and several 
operation systems which look innovative appealed to people who were 
sceptical about the PPP. However, the appraisal of the project is still 
controversial because the public sector provided the MRG up to 90% of the 
expected revenue and the public sector was burdened by the construction of 
the lower structure which was around 70% of total construction cost. 
 
This chapter examines whether the BTL could be the better PPP option than the 
BTO model through the quantitative VFM assessment, the qualitative VFM 
assessment and the sensitivity analysis. In addition, it is examined whether the 
level of MRG was appropriate.  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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9.2 Summary of the project 
 
9.2.1 Details of the project 
 
The Seoul Metro 9 is a subway to connect Gimpo Airport with Gangnam area 
which is the centre of business in southern Seoul. Seoul is one of the most 
populated cities in the World, so the subway is the most important public 
transport in Seoul metropolitan area under the restriction of land use.  
 
Table 9.1 Population density of major cities in OECD countries 
City  Seoul  London  Tokyo  Berlin  Paris  New York 
Population 
density 
(person/km
2) 
16,700  5,100  4,750  3,750  3,550  2,050 
Source: (Kim and Kim, 2009) 
 
The construction of subway network of Seoul has been led by the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government (SMG) and there are three construction phases. The 
first phase was from subway line number 1 to 4 and they were constructed 
from 1971 to 1985. It has a total length of 131.6km and cost ₩2,958 billion 
and the subway line 3 and 4 was intended to induce the private investment but 
it failed because of no bidders. The second phase was from line number 5 to 8 
and they were constructed from 1989 to 1998. It has a total length of 173.2km 
and cost ₩8,830 billion. The Seoul Metro 9 is the first project of the third 
phase (Lee et al., 1996).  
 
The Seoul Metro 9 consists of two stages: the first stage is from the Gimpo 
Airport station to the Shinnonhyun station and the second stage is from the 
Shinnonhyun to Bohun hospital. The first stage has a total length of 25.5km 
and has 25 stations and one depot. The second stage which is in construction 
has a total length of 13.6km and has 13 stations (Seoul Metro Line 9 Co.Ltd, 
2010). This chapter studies the first stage which was constructed from 2005 to 
2009, and is already in operation. The first stage project was divided into the 
lower structure part such as construction of bedding and tunnel and the upper 
structure part such as setting up train system, construction of stations and 
operation. The PPP was used only for the upper structure and the building cost Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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was ₩1,056 billion in ₩3,464 billion of total project cost in nominal prices 
(Kim, 2010b). 
 
Figure 9.1 The Seoul Metro route map 
 
    Source: (Kim, 2010b) 
 
9.2.2 History of the project as the PPP 
 
According to Lee et al (1996), the reason for introducing the PPP to the subway 
was to lessen the financial burden of the SMG. Some 90% of the debt of the 
SMG in 1996 was due to the construction of subway phase 1 and 2. The PPP 
was attractive to cope with the lack of budget problem of the public sector, but 
the PPP for whole projects in phase 3 was analysed to be inappropriate because 
of low rate of return in the view of the private sector and high pressure on 
increasing tariff level in the view of the public sector. It was recommended that 
a few sections or lines in phase 3 projects had feasibility with the PPP. 
 
In 1997, the SMG made a plan to construct 25.5km of a section of subway line 
no.9 from Gimpo to Gangnam through the PPP with central and local 
government subsidies. The master plan was ratified by the MOCT in 2000, and 
the SMG started negotiation with the preferred bidder, ULTRA CONSTRUCTION 
Ltd., to launch the construction from 2001. However, the negotiation was 
ruptured and the construction was delayed because of the discrepancy 
between construction cost and financing plan between the SMG and the 
preferred bidder. The SMG reopened bidding and got an agreement in 2005 
with the second preferred bidder, the ROTEM, a train company of Korea.  
Gimpo 
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The level of tariff for the subway was difficult to be freely decided by the 
private sector and it made the private sector be unsure about the profitability. 
Thus, the public sector had to do many parts of the project by its own direct 
investment to induce the private investment successfully. According to Seoul 
Development Institute (SDI, 2001), fully privately funded PPP was not 
recommended because the size of project was too big to ensure competition. 
Considering the possibility of PPP failure, it could be also too risky to the 
public sector who wanted on-time construction. Instead, SDI suggested three 
options of partly privately funded PPP by what functions would be transferred 
to the private sector. The first option was to transfer the operation function 
including the purchase and maintenance of trains to the private sector. The 
second option was to add building the electrified train power system to the 
first option. The third option was to add construction of station, incidental 
business to the second option. Basically, the reason of inducing the private 
sector was to lessen the financial burden of local government and to introduce 
the competitiveness of the private sector to subway operation. Thus, the third 
option which had the biggest private investment and was expected to have 
enough competitions among private sectors was chosen. The third option was 
designed for the private sector to invest ₩493.8 billion for the upper structure. 
Table 9.2 shows details of project cost and construction subsidy.  
 
Table 9.2 Project cost and construction subsidy for the Seoul Metro 9 PPP 
Unit: billion KRW (prices in 2000) 
Project cost  2,416.2 
Project division  Lower structure  Upper structure (722.7) 
Project participant  Public sector  Private sector 
Investment  1,693.5 
Public subsidy 
228.9 
Private investment 
493.8 
Source: SDI (2001)  
 
The contract was made in May 2005 based on the above third option. The 
construction was started by the BTO model from May 2005 and it opened in 
July 2009. There was no BTL model at that time in South Korea, so other PPP 
models were not regarded. The operation period was 30 years and 90% of the 
revenue was guaranteed for the first five years, along with 80 % for the next 
five years and 70% for the five years after that. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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9.2.3 The appraisal of the project as a PPP 
 
Unlike other BTO with MRG projects, this project was appraised as the first 
successful BTO project by the private sector and procurement authority. Actual 
passengers reached more than 80% of the anticipated and different services 
with public subway operator were shown. Most other BTO projects with the 
MRG in South Korea were criticised because of excessive guaranteed revenue 
and exaggeration in traffic forecast. The PPP case of the Seoul Metro 9 is 
affecting other public subway companies. According to Kim (2010b), 
operational employees of the VEOLIA RAPT, which is the private operator of the 
Seoul Metro 9, are only 44% of the public operating subway and operation cost 
is around 45% of the public operator. Innovative systems such as one-man 
stations and on board monitor systems could minimise employees in operation. 
 
Table 9.3 Comparison of operational employees and cost in the Seoul Metro 9 
  Seoul 
Metro 9 
Public Companies 
Mean  Seoul 
(1~4) 
Seoul 
(4~8) 
In 
cheon 
Dae 
jeon  Daegu  Busan  Gwang 
Ju 
Employees 
/km  21  48  73  44  35  28  38  36  27 
Operation 
cost/km 
2.4 
bn KRW  5.4  8.0  4.9  4.4  3.8  4.7  4.3  3.2 
Source: Kim (2010) 
 
In addition, various facility and services such as express train system, 
convenience store for ticketing, free wireless internet, LCD monitor for 
advertisement in station and train, etc. looked the positive results of the PPP.  
 
Figure 9.2 Upgraded facility and service of the Seoul Metro 9 
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However, several controversies about tariff and revenue subsidy are existent 
despite a positive appraisal from the private and public sector. The contracted 
standard tariff level was ₩1,264 in 2009 (2003 price), but the SMG requested 
to reduce to ₩900 which is the common tariff level of public operators. Instead 
the SMG provided revenue subsidy to compensate for the loss of the private 
sector. As a result, the number of actual passenger was around 80% of the 
forecasted but the actual revenue was only 50.3% of that expected, so the SMG 
had to pay ₩14.3 billion to the private sector as a revenue subsidy in 2009 
(Lee, 2010a). Criticism on the public sector which made a contract with high 
tariff level was inevitable. Especially, the SMG invested around 80% of total 
project cost and the private sector was in charge of only 20% of total 
investment. Considering the most important reason of the PPP was to cope 
with the lack of budget, it looked that the public sector’s investment was too 
big. This problem looks to be recognised to the public sector, because the 
second stage of subway line no.9 is being constructed by the direct investment 
of the public sector though the SMG argues that the PPP for the Seoul Metro 9 
is successful. 
 
Problems also are shown in the view of the end users. The private sector is 
operating four-cabin trains regardless of high demand from the commuter 
passengers. The capacity of facility is designed for an eight-cabin train, but 
train can be operated flexibly. Thus, it is doubted that the private sector wants 
to maximise the profitability and does not regard comfortableness of customer 
seriously. Complaints about late response from the private sector to the end 
users are rising though newly upgraded services and facilities (Lee, 2010b).  
 
Consequently, direct share holders of the project want the Seoul Metro 9 to be 
appraised as a successful BTO project because of high traffic demand and 
upgraded services. However, there are still controversies about its appraisal 
because of the appropriateness of guaranteed revenue and much more 
investment from the public sector than the private sector. Opponents are 
arguing that the guaranteed revenue and much investment from the public 
sector might make the purpose of the BTO project meaningless. Thus, it seems 
too early to tell its success in this study, but the issues mentioned above needs 
to be examined when the BTL model is analysed as an alternative PPP model 
instead of the BTO with MRG model. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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9.3 Quantitative VFM assessment 
 
9.3.1 Basic assumption 
 
The date for calculating life cycle cost is 2000 which was the base year in SDI 
report for the feasibility and VFM assessment of the BTO case. The quantitative 
VFM is assessed through the analysis of the discounted cash flow of the project, 
and it needs a financial discount rate to calculate this. Korean VFM guidance 
for the BTO model (KDI, 2007a) recommends using 6% (real) based on the 
WACC (Weighted Average Capital Cost) method. This project was assessed in 
Jan 2001, and bank interest of that time was much higher than now. SDI used 
8.9% as real financial discount rate in its report on the VFM of this project and 
it is similar with the financial discount rate of the Incheon Airport Expressway 
which used the same base year in the VFM assessment. Thus, the same value 
with SDI report is used for the real financial discount rate in this case study.   
 
Rate of profit of the BTL, the MLTM recommends it should be the five-year 
Korea national bond, which can be a standard interest, plus an appropriate 
mark-up rate for the long term investment. The MLTM suggested 0.77% as an 
appropriate mark-up rate in a recent railway BTL project (MOCT, 2007c). In 
addition, there are two more BTL cases of rail in Korea, and mark-up rates are 
suggested as 0.76% and 0.70%, so the highest 0.77 will be used in the BTL 
model of Incheon Airport Railway project as a common mark-up rate under 
Korean financial and construction circumstances (MOCT, 2007c). In 2000, 
when the VFM was assessed, the mean value of interest of five-year Korea 
national bond was 8.66%, so the appropriate rate of profit in this case analysis 
is used as 9.43% in nominal. Inflation is assumed as 5.0% by SDI report, so the 
real rate of profit of the BTL is 4.22%.  
 
9.3.2 Construction subsidy 
 
This project was partly done by the PPP and the lower structure constructed by 
the public sector was definitely divided with the upper structure done by the 
private sector. Thus, the PPP project is only analysed within the upper structure 
and operation. Though the public sector was in charge of lower structure, the 
public sector also provided the construction subsidy to the private sector for Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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the upper structure to induce the private investment. As can be seen in Table 
9.3 in section 9.2.2, it was recommended for the SMG to burden 31.7% of 
upper structure building cost by SDI and it was accepted. The building cost for 
the upper structure is ₩722.7 billion and the construction subsidy is ₩228.9 
billion. Consequently, the public sector invested 79.6% of total project cost by 
its own resource. 
 
This chapter basically follows the accepted recommendation of SDI VFM 
assessment, so ₩228.9 billion is used for construction subsidy in the BTO 
model. The life cycle cost (LCC) of the BTO case is measured by the 
expenditure of the government for subsidy. The financial resources of 
government expenditure mostly come from tax or debt. In the quantitative 
VFM assessment for the BTO model, KDI (2007a) recommends that the 
resource is assumed to come from debt acquired by selling 5-year national 
bond which is the most common financing way of Korean government. Thus, 
this study assumes that construction subsidy from the government is financed 
through the 5-year national bond of Korea and the LCC is calculated based on 
the government expenditure for repaying debt. 
 
In this case, the interest of 5-year national bond of Korea is assumed as 8.66% 
which is the average value in 2000. Thus, the government expenditure is 
₩408.5 billion in nominal and ₩278.4 billion in real price  
 
9.3.3 Lease fee 
 
Lease fee is calculated by the following formula; 
 
  k n PVIFA
incomes additional the of value present the t Building
fee lease Aunnal
,
cos 
  
 
Here, n is 30 years. The k means the rate of profit in the BTL model, so the k 
value in this case is 9.43%. Consequently, the PVIFA(30, 9.43%) is 9.8942. 
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Lease fee is calculated based on the building cost of the private sector in the 
BTL model. There is no construction subsidy in the BTL model, so the private 
sector should cover whole building cost for the project. This project is divided 
into lower structure and upper structure, and the PPP is only for the upper 
structure. Thus, building cost is ₩722.7 billion in real price and ₩900.0 billion 
in nominal price. Lease fee is calculated based on a nominal price to assess the 
impact on the financial burden of the government in the future. However, this 
case was done by the BTO using real price so the lease fee is used in the VFM 
assessment in real prices which are calculated from the nominal prices.  
 
There are incidental incomes in this case by linking commercial complexes 
with the stations, and it is expected to have revenue by ₩269.0 billion for 30 
years in real price. Base year of the present value of the incidental incomes is 
2007 when the construction completed, so the present value of the incidental 
income in 2007 is ₩84.8 billion. Thus, the annual lease fee from 2008 to 2037 
for 30 years is ₩82.4 billion per year (nominal). Total lease fee is ₩2,472.0 
billion in nominal prices and it is ₩900.2 billion in real prices.  
 
9.3.4 Operating cost 
 
Operating cost was assumed as the same in the BTO and the BTL case. 
According to the SDI report (2001), the operation period is 30 years from 2008 
to 2037 and the operation cost is ₩1,342.5 billion in real prices for 30 years.  
 
9.3.5 Revenue 
 
The revenue which is collected by charging a tariff to the end users is assumed 
the same in both PPP models. In fact, the private sector can make more efforts 
to increase the incomes from passengers, but this factor is difficult to be 
quantified, so it is dealt with in the qualitative assessment. According to SDI 
report (ibid), the forecasted revenue of the BTO model is ₩4,374.7 billion in 
real price for 30 years.  
 
9.3.6 Summary of the analysis factors 
 
  Building cost: ₩722.7 billion (real), ₩900.0 billion (nominal) Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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  Operating cost: ₩1,342.5 billion (real) 
  Operation period: 30 years (2008~2037) 
  Construction subsidy (BTO model only): ₩228.9 billion (real) 
Government expenditure: ₩278.4 (real) 
  Annual lease fee: ₩824 billion (nominal) 
  Rate of profit 
Nominal: 9.43% in the BTL, 14.35% in the BTO 
Real: 4.22% in the BTL, 8.86% in the BTO 
  Real financial discount rate: 8.9% 
  Inflation: 5.0% 
  Revenue: ₩4,374.7 billion (real) 
 
9.3.7 Result 
 
The quantitative VFM of the BTL model compared with the BTO model in the 
Seoul Metro 9 project is ₩252.2 billion. It means that the BTL model provides 
more value for money than the BTO model in this project. It looks a natural 
result like other cases, because the profit rate of the BTL model is much lower 
than the BTO model. As seen in the following table, revenue collected from 
passengers is ₩4,374.7 billion and it is over the sum of lease fee and 
operating cost. It means that the government can make a profit through 
revenue collected from the end users after providing lease fee and operating 
cost in the BTL model.  
 
Table 9.4 Quantitative VFM assessment in the Seoul Metro 9 
Unit: billion KRW (in real prices) 
Year 
BTO  BTL  VFM 
Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.)
29  Lease fee  Operating 
cost  Revenue  Real price  NPV 
SUM  278.4  900.2  1460.2  4374.7  2292.8  252.2 
2000  0.4        0.4  0.4 
2001  1.1        1.1  1.0 
2002  3.6        3.6  3.0 
2003  6.2        6.2  4.8 
                                           
29 Gov. Exp. means the Government expenditure for construction subsidy. Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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2004  13.4        13.4  9.5 
2005  18.0        18.0  11.8 
2006  38.4        38.4  23.0 
2007  41.8        41.8  23.0 
2008  42.4  55.8  36.1  23.6  -25.9  -13.1 
2009  41.1  53.1  39.5  34.3  -17.2  -8.0 
2010  40.9  50.6  40.2  45.0  -4.9  -2.1 
2011  31.2  48.2  40.9  55.7  -2.2  -0.9 
2012    45.9  41.6  66.4  -21.1  -7.6 
2013    43.7  42.2  77.0  -8.9  -2.9 
2014    41.6  42.9  87.7  3.2  1.0 
2015    39.6  43.6  98.4  15.2  4.2 
2016    37.7  44.3  105.0  23.0  5.9 
2017    36.0  44.9  111.7  30.8  7.2 
2018    34.2  45.6  118.3  38.5  8.3 
2019    32.6  46.2  124.9  46.1  9.1 
2020    31.1  46.9  131.6  53.6  9.7 
2021    29.6  47.6  138.2  61.0  10.2 
2022    28.2  48.2  144.8  68.4  10.5 
2023    26.8  48.9  151.4  75.7  10.7 
2024    25.5  49.5  158.1  83.0  10.7 
2025    24.3  50.2  164.7  90.2  10.7 
2026    23.2  51.0  171.9  97.8  10.7 
2027    22.1  51.7  179.1  105.3  10.5 
2028    21.0  52.5  186.3  112.8  10.4 
2029    20.0  53.2  193.5  120.3  10.1 
2030    19.1  54.0  200.7  127.7  9.9 
2031    18.2  54.7  207.9  135.0  9.6 
2032    17.3  55.5  215.1  142.4  9.3 
2033    16.5  56.2  222.3  149.6  9.0 
2034    15.7  57.0  229.5  156.9  8.6 
2035    14.9  57.7  236.7  164.1  8.3 
2036    14.2  58.5  243.9  171.2  8.0 
2037    13.5  59.2  251.1  178.4  7.6 Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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9.4 Qualitative VFM assessment 
 
This section examines four issues based on the interviews of the PPP experts in 
South Korea; service quality, contract & management, risk management, and 
operational flexibility. 
 
9.4.1 Service quality 
 
Like other rail PPP cases, most interviewees agreed that the private sector 
seems to be more sensitive to the end users in the BTO model (○ A in section 3.5 
in APPENDIX 4). However, several respondents pointed out that the advantage 
of the BTO model in service quality could be realised only when there was no 
MRG condition (○ B in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). They argued that if a BTO 
project had a MRG condition, the revenue would be guaranteed to the private 
sector and efforts to improve service quality could be decreased. As can be 
seen in the complaints of the passengers mentioned in the section 9.2.3, the 
private sector can be passive when their revenue is guaranteed regardless of 
demand.  
 
Also, an interviewee said that the service quality of the Seoul Metro 9 could be 
upgraded because there were enough competitions among subway operators 
(○ C in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). The operator of the Seoul Metro 9 had to 
show the effectiveness of the private sector compared with two other public 
subway operators in Seoul for sustaining PPP in rail. As can be seen in the 
Incheon Airport Railway which did not have a competitor in rail, the service 
such as introducing an express train was upgraded by the public operator after 
they bought most equities of the private sectors. The interviewee pointed out 
that there were more competitors in the Seoul Metro 9 than other railways (○ D in 
section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). In urban area, the subway has to compete not only 
with cars but also local buses and the BRT (Bus Rapid Transit) in Seoul.  Thus, 
the BTO model is expected to have strength in improvement of the service 
quality and have more benefits in urban subway than national arterial rail 
because of enough competitions. However, like other BTO cases, the MRG can 
affect the advantage of the BTO model negatively. 
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Service quality should be discussed with a tariff for assessing the value for 
money. Regardless of improved service quality, there are some complaints on 
subsidy from the SMG and high tariff level in the BTO option (Lee, 2010b). The 
rate of profit of the BTL option is lower than the BTO, so tariff level could be 
lowered in the BTL option. This possibility is a big advantage of the BTL model.  
 
Consequently, the BTO model can be better to improve the quality of subway 
service, but the MRG condition may diminish this strength by the extent of the 
guarantee. The tariff level is also an important factor to assess the VFM of the 
service quality, and the BTL model is more advantageous than the BTO because 
the tariff level can be reduced by the low profit rate of the BTL option.   
 
9.4.2 Contract and Management 
 
With regard to contract, many interviewees said that financing was a key issue 
to make a contract and the BTL model looked easier to induce the private 
investment because there was no demand risk on the private sector (○ E in 
section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). However, the BTO option of the Seoul Metro 9 had 
the MRG condition, so financing did not look difficult at that time. At first, the 
Seoul Metro was supposed to be operated from 2007, but it was delayed 
because negotiation, which was started from 2002 with the first preferred 
bidder, was ruptured in 2003. The SMG announced that the main reason was 
the ambiguous financing plan of the preferred bidder (Mun, 2003). Another 
preferred bidder was chosen soon and the contract was made in 2005. It 
shows that there was enough competition between the private sectors. An 
interviewee of the investment bank said that a financial investor could prefer 
the BTO with the MRG model than the BTL model (○ F in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 
4).  
 
With regard to the project management, the experience about the BTL model is 
not accumulated as much as the BTO model. It can cost more in the BTL model, 
but it does not seem to last for a long time. Except for the experience factor, 
many interviewees agreed that the difference between the BTL and the BTO in 
project management would be little (○ G in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). Instead, 
some of them pointed out that the ability of the private and public sector was Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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more important than a kind of PPP model (○ H in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). 
According to the study on the critical success factors for the PPP in the UK(Li et 
al., 2005b), a strong private consortium was also the first factor for the 
success of the PPP. Consequently, the project management looks to be decided 
by the ability of each sector rather than the PPP model. 
 
9.4.3 Risk management 
 
Like other cases in this thesis, interviewees said that the appropriate risk 
management is variable by terms and conditions (○ I in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 
4). However, the BTL model seems to need more cooperation between the 
private and public sector. The BTO model has a simple incentive scheme for 
the good risk management. The private sector is compensated for by the end 
user, and its risk management is assessed by the traffic demand. On the other 
hand, the BTL model needs a relatively complicated scheme to measure its 
performance of risk management of the private sector. This complexity wants 
a good relationship between the private and the public sector. NAO (National 
Audit Office) of the UK also pointed out the complexity of the deal as a 
problem and one of reasons resulted from the innovative output-based 
contracts which are used in the BTL model (NAO, 2004). The recent failed 
London Underground PPP case of the UK shows that the main reason was due 
to its poor corporate governance and leadership (NAO, 2009).  
 
Several respondents said that the simplicity of risk management in the BTO 
model is a very strong advantage (○ J in section 3.5 in APPENDIX 4). Especially, 
the experiences in the BTL model for transport are not accumulated enough in 
South Korea, so the governance or sustained relationship for the BTL model in 
transport between the private and public sector does not look existent.  
 
Consequently, it cannot be said that a specific PPP model is better in risk 
management, because risk management is based on the agreed contract of 
each PPP model. However, the BTL model needs much more relationship 
between the private and public sector for risk management while it assessment 
of good risk management is very simple in the BTO model. Thus, the BTL 
model might be disadvantageous in the circumstance that does not have a 
strong governance or relationship between the private and public sector.   Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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9.4.4 Operational flexibility 
 
The private sector has to discuss with the public sector when the operational 
circumstances get changed in the BTL model while the private sector has 
relatively high discretion in the BTO model even with the MRG condition. 
Interviewees from the private sector alleged that they were more sensitive to 
the change of circumstances or technology in the BTO model (○ K in section 3.5 
in APPENDIX 4). A respondent from the public sector said that the private 
sector was only interested in making a profit, so the technology or innovative 
skill might be only adapted when it could make an additional profit in the BTO 
model. Even though the private sector could save operating cost or increase 
revenue, its profit might be included to the private sector as an incentive in the 
BTO model, so there would be little to increase the VFM in the view of the 
public sector. 
 
Respondents from the public sector argued that it was easy to request 
operational change in the BTL model through performance assessment. Even 
the in case of affecting the profit of the private sector, the public sector can 
have more options to be involved in the operation stage than in the BTO model 
(○ L in section 2.3.5 in APPENDIX 4).  
 
Consequently, the BTL seems better than the BTO in operational flexibility in 
the view of the public sector, but it costs more money and time. The 
government has few rights in the operation stage in the BTO model, but the 
government needs to monitor the operation stage to give the lease fee 
correctly according to the conditions of payment in the BTL model. The 
government can discuss operational problem with the private sector whenever 
they pay, and they have more opportunities to change the operation condition 
according to the change of circumstances. However, for this kind of 
governmental role, it needs more administrative efforts like time and cost for 
experts.  Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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9.5 Sensitivity analysis 
 
This project was done by the BTO model and it is in operation from 2009, so 
many input factors such as construction cost, subsidy and operation cost in 
the VFM assessment are already fixed. On the other hand, the BTL case for this 
project was analysed based on several assumptions. It means the better PPP 
model can be changed by the uncertainty of these assumed factors. Especially, 
the most decisive difference between the BTO and the BTL model is who is in 
charge of demand risk, so the uncertainty of revenue which is decided by the 
traffic demand and tariff level needs to be examined. The difference in demand 
risk makes a gap of profit rate between the BTO and the BTL model. Thus, this 
section examines the sensitivity of revenue. After, the stochastic analysis 
based on the inaccuracy of traffic forecast in South Korea will be done. 
 
9.5.1 Revenue 
 
Revenue which is decided by the traffic demand and tariff level is the most 
disputable issue in the BTO projects, especially in case with a MRG condition.  
Though the MRG can be a rational policy tool in the BTO model to share 
demand risk, but opinions that the MRG is excessive in this project also are 
rising. In the BTO case for the Seoul Metro 9, it has the MRG condition which 
covers 90% of revenue for the first 5 years, 80% from the sixth year to the 
tenth year and 70% from the eleventh year to the fifteenth year. If the actual 
traffic is below 50% of expected, there is no MRG to avoid the intentional 
exaggeration in traffic forecast by the private sector. Thus, analysing the 
sensitivity of revenue is very important to examine the optimal PPP model in 
the view of VFM.    
 
Revenue does not affect the LCC of the BTO without MRG case. Here, the LCC is 
calculated in the view of the public sector, so the only factor in the LCC 
calculation of the BTO case is the construction subsidy. An appropriate 
government construction subsidy is calculated based on the revenue and profit 
rate, but it is negotiated by the private and public sectors. If only the 
construction subsidy is agreed in the BTO model, the public sector does not 
provide additional construction subsidy by the actual revenue. In this case, the 
construction was completed and the final construction subsidy was not much Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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changed with the data used in this chapter. Thus, the revenue only affects the 
LCC of the BTL case.  
 
Table 9.5 Sensitivity to revenue in case without MRG 
Unit : billion KRW (NPV) 
Actual 
traffic 
BTO  BTL 
VFMlo  Con. subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.) 
Lease  Operation  Revenue 
100%  146.7  220.7  254.0  580.3  252.3 
90%  146.7  220.7  254.0  522.3  194.3 
80%  146.7  220.7  254.0  464.2  136.2 
70%  146.7  220.7  254.0  406.2  78.2 
60%  146.7  220.7  254.0  348.2  20.2 
56.5%  146.7  220.7  254.0  328.0  0.0 
50%  146.7  220.7  254.0  290.2  -37.9 
 
Table 9.7 shows that if actual revenue is over 56.5% of the expected, the BTL 
model has higher VFM than the BTO. On the contrary, the BTO model is better 
when actual revenue is lower than 56.5% of the expected. The Demand risk is 
on the private sector in the BTO model, which can have higher profit rate 
because of high risk in traffic demand, so if the actual demand is lower than 
the anticipated then the BTO model can be beneficial to the government. 
However, lower actual revenue than expected negatively affects the profit rate 
of the private sector. This risk makes the BTO project less attractive to the 
private sector, and the PPP could be failed because of the difficulty in financing 
from the private sector. Thus, the BTO projects before 2006 had a MRG 
condition to share the traffic demand risk with the public sector.  
 
The Seoul Metro 9 also has the MRG condition and the revenue affects the LCC 
of the BTO case. The subsidy is offered in the operation stage to compensate 
for the lack of guaranteed revenue. According to the MRG condition of this 
project, there is no MRG when actual traffic is below 50% of the contracted, so 
the BTL model provides better VFM than the BTO even in case with MRG when 
the actual traffic is more than 50% of the expected. Table 9.8 shows the 
change of VFM by an actual revenue level in case with the MRG condition. 
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Table 9.6 Sensitivity to revenue in case with MRG 
Unit : billion KRW (NPV) 
Actual 
traffic 
BTO  BTL 
VFM  Con. Subsidy 
(Gov. Exp.) 
Operation 
subsidy  Lease  Operation  Revenue 
100%  146.7  0  220.7  254.0  580.3  252.3 
90%  146.7  0  220.7  254.0  522.3  194.3 
80%  146.7  9.3  220.7  254.0  464.2  145.5 
70%  146.7  31.8  220.7  254.0  406.2  110.0 
60%  146.7  66.2  220.7  254.0  348.2  86.4 
50%  146.7  100.7  220.7  254.0  290.2  62.9 
40%  146.7  0  220.7  254.0  232.1  -95.9 
30%  146.7  0  220.7  254.0  174.1  -153.9 
 
Interestingly, though actual traffic was around 80% in 2009, actual revenue was 
only 50.5% (Lee, 2010a). The SMG cut the tariff level by 25% of the contracted 
(₩1,200  ₩900) instead of providing additional subsidy to compensate for 
the lack of expected revenue. It looked politically hard for The SMG to accept 
much higher tariff level than the public operated subway. However, it does not 
affect the VFM of the BTL compared with the BTO, because reduced tariff level 
also raises LCC of the BTO case through providing operational subsidy while it 
raises LCC of the BTL case through decreasing revenue. Considering that actual 
traffic is around 80% of the contracted, the BTL seems better PPP model than 
the BTO regardless of MRG condition.  
 
Figure 9.3 shows the LCC of BTO, BTO with MRG and BTL case. The VFM is 
measured by the difference of the LCC which means the government 
expenditure on the PPP project in this study.  The LCC of the BTO model is 
constant regardless of traffic demand risk, because the private sector has 
whole demand risk in the BTO model and there is no additional burden to the 
public sector. The LCC of the BTO and the BTL are same when actual traffic is 
56.5% of the forecasted, so if the level of MRG in the BTO case had been below 
56.5%, it could be thought as an appropriate level. Even though the public 
sector guarantees 56.6% of the expected revenue, the expenditure of the 
public sector is not over the LCC of the BTL case. 
 Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
  195   
Figure 9.3 Life cycle cost of each PPP option by actual traffic 
 
 
In this case, the MRG covers 90% of the expected revenue for the first five 
years and it gets decreased by 10% point in every five year for 15 years. The 
MRG condition is not applied if actual traffic is below 50% of the expected to 
prevent the private sector from intentional exaggeration of traffic forecast. The 
appropriateness of this condition is unclear in the sensitivity analysis, so it is 
dealt with in the section 9.5.2 stochastic analysis based on the probability of 
traffic forecast in rail in South Korea. 
 
9.5.2 Stochastic analysis 
 
This section examines a stochastic analysis on the VFM comparing the BTL with 
the BTO model based on the comparison data of forecast and actual number of 
passengers in rail in South Korea (See Chapter 7). Unlike other case studies in 
the thesis, contracted tariff in the Seoul Metro 9 BTO case was cut politically, 
so the accuracy of traffic forecast does not match the accuracy of the expected 
revenue. However, politically reduced tariff does not affect the VFM assessment 
for comparing the BTO and the BTL as mentioned in the section 9.5.1. Thus, it 
is assumed that the tariff in this section is the contracted value, so the 
uncertainty of revenue is assumed the same with the uncertainty of traffic 
forecast.  
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Like other cases, based on the inaccuracy of the passenger forecast in rail in 
South Korea, Monte Carlo simulation was undertaken to find out the 
probability of VFM of the BTL compared with the BTO. Figure 9.4 shows the 
mean value of VFM is ₩56.6 billion and the probability that the BTL model is 
better than the BTO model is 57.0%. This value is slightly over 50%, and it does 
not look that the BTL is clearly advantageous because of uncertainty of other 
factors such as a rate of profit in the BTL case. Especially, the mean value of 
inaccuracy of traffic forecast in 10 subways opened after 2000 including the 
Seoul Metro 9 in South Korea is -53.4%. It is much higher than -32.4%, an 
average of inaccuracy of 19 rail projects which are analysed in Chapter 7. 
Inaccuracy of -53.4% means that the actual traffic is 46.6% of the expected, so 
the BTO could provide better VFM in comparison with the BTO without MRG 
case. Though the number of subway projects is not enough to make a 
statistically effective result, but the possibility that the BTO model could be 
better is shown in this analysis. 
 
Figure 9.4 Frequency of VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO 
without MRG model 
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In the BTO case with MRG condition, the possibility that the BTL model is better 
than the BTO is slightly high, as in the case without MRG. The probability that 
the BTL gives higher VFM than the BTO model is 57.0%. It is same with the case 
without MRG condition, because the SMG does not cover revenue when the 
actual traffic is below 50% of the forecasted. Figure 9.5 shows that the MRG 
decreased the distribution of the VFM and increased the mean value of VFM. 
 
Figure 9.5 Frequency of VFM by the probability of traffic forecast in the BTO 
with MRG model 
 
 
With regard to the appropriateness of the MRG, the LCCs of the BTO cases with 
different MRG conditions need to be compared. As explained in the section 
9.5.1, an appropriate level of MRG can be thought as 56.5% of the expected 
revenue which is same as the cost paid by the public sector in the BTL case. In 
case of the BTO with the MRG of 56.5%, the expected value of the LCC is 
₩205.3 billion when the inaccuracy of traffic forecast in rail in South Korea is 
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Figure 9.6 Frequency of LCC of the BTO case with the current MRG condition 
and the MRG of 56.5% condition 
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9.6 Findings 
 
Through the quantitative and qualitative VFM assessment and sensitivity 
analysis about the BTO and BTL model for the Seoul Metro 9 case, seven 
characteristics were found. 
 
Firstly, the BTL case can provide better quantitative VFM than the BTO case. 
The BTL model gives the quantitative VFM compared with the BTO by ₩252.2 
billion. It is because the demand risk is on the public sector in the BTL model 
of Korea, so the SMG can make a PPP contract with the private sector with 
lower rate of profit than the BTO model in which private sector has to be in 
charge of demand risk. Demand in subway means passengers and the fare of 
passenger is the direct source of revenue. As seen in the other cases, the 
public sector pays a lease fee to the private sector but can collect fares from 
end users, so the public sector can make a profit in the BTL case 
 
Secondly, the BTO case can be a better option than the BTL case to improve the 
quality of service of subway. Subway competes with the bus service, so the BTO 
model which collects tariff from the end user may be more sensitive to 
improvements in the quality of service. However, the MRG in the BTO model 
can lessen the strength of the BTO model in the service quality by the extent.  
 
Thirdly, the BTO case seems advantageous in risk management though it can 
be varied by a contract (e.g. MRG). Complexity of risk management in the BTL 
case is very high, so the BTL model can be appropriate under the 
circumstances that there are many experiences in the PPP or governance is 
strong enough to handle unexpected risk. In case of the BTO model, 
relationship between the private and the public sector is simple. 
 
Fourthly, the BTL case has an advantage in financing under the current 
unstable financial circumstance. However, the BTO case can be more preferred 
by the financial investor if the MRG condition is applied.  
 
Fifthly, the BTL case seems to be better than the BTO case in operational 
flexibility for the public sector to cope with the change of future circumstances. 
Considering the qualitative VFM is also assessed in the view of the public Byungwoo Gil    Case study in the Seoul Metro 9 
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sector, the SMG can have more discretion in the BTL model during operation 
period through the payment mechanism. However, it can be realised when the 
relationship or governance between the private and the public sector is strong 
enough to handle this.  
 
Sixthly, considering the uncertainty of traffic forecast in rail in South Korea, the 
probability that the BTL case is better than the BTO case is around 57% 
regardless of the MRG condition. If the actual passengers are below 56.5% of 
the forecasted, the BTO without MRG case can provide better VFM than the BTL 
case. In case of the BTO with MRG case, it can be better to the government 
than the BTL when the actual traffic is below 50% of the forecasted. Though the 
BTL case is still advantageous even when traffic forecast risk is considered, but 
the probability is slightly over 50% and there are many other uncertain factors 
affecting the VFM, so it seems difficult to say the BTL case is clearly better.  
 
Lastly, the MRG in the Seoul Metro 9 case does not look a bad deal though 
there are many criticisms on the level of MRG up to 90% for the first five years. 
The contracted MRG is decreased by 10% point in every 5 year, and there is no 
revenue subsidy after 15 years. Also, the revenue is not covered for avoiding 
intentional traffic exaggeration when the actual traffic is below 50% of the 
forecasted. Considering the traffic forecast risk in rail in South Korea, the 
expected LCC of BTO case with the current MRG condition is analysed as lower 
than the appropriate level which covers LCC as much as the BTL case by ₩46.9 
billion. Also, the current MRG condition does not affect the probability of the 
quantitatively better PPP model. 
 
Consequently, the BTO for the Seoul Metro 9 looks a good alternative PPP 
model though the BTL model provides slightly better quantitative VFM. 
Regarding uncertainty of traffic forecast, BTO is better for the public sector to 
transfer traffic demand risk to the private sector and this makes the BTO model 
better in service quality and risk management. Recently, the biggest problem 
of the BTO seems a difficulty in financing, but this case could be more 
attractive than the BTL model through MRG. Differently with many criticisms, 
MRG condition which covers 70% to 90% of the expected revenue for first 15 
years seems to be appropriate.  
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CHAPTER 10  
The Analysis of Case Studies 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
Five case studies were undertaken to explore the characteristics of the BTO and 
the BTL models, which were derived from literature reviews as the two best PPP 
options for Korea, and to examine the optimal PPP model providing better VFM 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Two cases were for road and three cases were 
for rail. Road was expressway with toll. One of the three rail cases was for an 
urban subway and others were for national arterial rails. Four cases used the 
BTO model and three of them used the MRG condition. Only one BTL case is for 
rail which is in negotiation between the private and the public sector. This 
reflects that the use of BTL for transport projects is in its infancy in Korea. The 
change of VFM by variable input factors was also examined through the 
sensitivity analysis including a stochastic approach to traffic demand risk. In 
addition to high traffic demand risk, the MRG condition  invited serious issues. 
Thus, the appropriateness of the MRG which is a policy tool for demand risk 
sharing in South Korea was also tested.   
 
This chapter attempts to derive key findings on three of the four research 
objectives from five case studies and literature reviews.  
 
  Main features of PPP models in road and rail in South Korea 
  Optimal PPP model providing better VFM for road and rail in South Korea 
  Appropriate traffic demand risk sharing in road and rail in South Korea 
 
Based on these findings, several suggestions on transport PPP policy are 
provided to enhance the PPP in transport in South Korea.  
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10.2 The main features of the PPP models in road and rail 
in South Korea 
 
This thesis compares the BTL with the BTO model in road and rail in South 
Korea. The BTO is a “financially free standing” model which is one of the most 
prevalent PPP models for transport infrastructure not only in South Korea but 
also in the world
30 . The BTL model was introduced for the school, military 
accommodation, sewage facility, etc. with little or no income from the end user, 
but recently the BTL model has been tried for rail and it is argued that the BTL 
could be the alternative to the BTO model for road. The BTL model is the 
“service sold to the public sector” model like the DBFO model in the PFI of the 
UK. The service sold to the public sector model was rarely used for transport 
infrastructures in South Korea, but it was very common for transport in the UK 
(Partnerships UK, 2011).  
  
The main characteristics of the BTO and the BTL models for land transport like 
road and rail in South Korea were found through the literature review and case 
studies. General characteristics of each PPP model were also set out by the 
interviews of 23 PPP experts in South Korea in November 2010. The PPP project 
could be successful when three stakeholders were satisfied: the public sector, 
the private sector and the end users. Mostly, the interest of the end user 
should be covered by the public sector, but the complaints of end users in 
many PPP cases showed that their interest was not considered enough or even 
sometimes ignored (Lee, 2005).  The appraisals of the PPP projects was 
different from the view of each stakeholder, so the main features of the PPP 
model in road and rail were analysed from such three different viewpoints. 
 
Each sector had different interests in the PPP. It was found that the main 
interest of the public sector was to minimise the government financial burden 
through saving budget on a project (see section 3.4.4 and 9.2.2). In the Seoul 
Metro 9 case and the Daegok-Sosa railway case, the creativity and 
competitiveness of the private sectors were also important interests (see 
section 8.2.2 and 9.2.2). Considering the public sector should be in final 
                                           
30 The BTO model of South Korea is very similar with the BOT model which is very 
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charge of public service, an appropriate supervision letting the private sector 
provide the service effectively and efficiently was also a key interest. In the 
view of the private sector, several literatures and interviews showed that main 
interests were in making a profit (ADB, 2008, European Commission, 2003). 
The rate of profit was the most important factor for the private sector. In the 
current circumstances of South Korea, interviews of the PPP experts showed 
that the most difficult problem to the private sector was financing, as could be 
seen in the five case studies (see section 5.4.2, 6.4.2, 7.4.2, 8.4.2 and 9.4.2). 
The project management of the private sector was also an issue in comparing 
the BTL with the BTO model, because the private sector has to lead the project 
in every stage from design, build and finance to operation. The interest of end 
users should be considered enough by the public sector, because the end user 
cannot join in negotiation directly. However, the view of the end user has not 
been regarded important, so this study separated this view from that of the 
public sector. Literature reviews and several interviews showed that the focus 
of the end user was on how the service was improved with lower cost and how 
the operator paid attention to them as customers (HM Treasury, 2000, ADB, 
2008). Thus, the main interests were summarised as the improvement of 
service quality, the communication with the end users and the user fee. 
 
The main interests of the three different views can be summarised in the Table 
10.1 and the features of the BTL and the BTO models are discussed by these 
categories. 
 
Table 10.1 Main interests of three stakeholders of the PPP in South Korea 
Stakeholder  Main interests 
Public sector 
  Government financial burden 
  Creativity and competitiveness of the private sectors 
  Project supervision  
Private sector 
  Rate of profit 
  Financing 
  Project management 
End user 
  Improvement of service quality 
  Communications with the end users 
  User fee Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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10.2.1 The features of the PPP models in the view of the public sector 
 
Government financial burden 
 
A common thought on the BTO model was that it did not need the government 
investment as it was a “financially free standing” model, so the BTO model was 
thought to be better to lessen the financial burden of the public sector (Allen, 
2001, Song, 2005, KEC, 2007). It was thought that the financial burden of the 
public sector was higher in the BTL model than that in the BTO model, because 
the public sector regularly pays contracted lease fee to cover whole building 
cost, operating cost and even the profit of the private sector. However, five 
case studies showed that the BTL for transport PPP with income from the end 
users could be beneficial to save the expenditure of the public sector, because 
toll road and rail could charge user fee and the revenue could cover whole cost 
of the public sector in the BTL model (see section 10.2.1 and 10.3.1).  
 
According to the sensitivity analysis of the case studies, the financial burden of 
the government in the BTO model was less than that in the BTL model only 
when the accuracy of the anticipated revenue was high enough to cover the 
LCC of the BTL model (see section 5.5.1, 6.5.1, 7.5.1 and 9.5.1). In a transport 
PPP charging user fee, revenue for a given fee is decided by the resultant traffic, 
so a better PPP model for lessening the financial burden of the public sector is 
affected by the traffic demand risk. The financial burden in the BTL model 
increased when the actual traffic was lower than expected.  
 
Consequently, the BTL model is better to reduce the financial burden of the 
government for transport PPP with incomes, but the BTO model can be 
desirable for the project with high traffic demand risk.  
 
Creativity and competitiveness of the private sectors 
 
The competition between the private sectors was relatively low in the BTO 
model for transport because the traffic demand risk was on the private sector 
(see Table 3.5). Interviews for the qualitative VFM assessments of case studies 
showed that the private sector was sensitive to the demand risk in the BTO 
model and the creativity and competition could be acquired by the effort of the Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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private sector to maximise traffic demand (○ A in section 2.1.2 in APPENDIX 4). 
Thus, the BTO model seems better for the transport facility where the elasticity 
of demand with respect to service levels is high. 
 
The competition between the private sectors was relatively high to bid in the 
BTL model because the private sector did not have to manage traffic demand 
risk (see Table 3.6). Basically, the level of service is decided by the 
performance agreement between the private and the public sector. According 
to several sources in the literature, the public sector can encourage the private 
sector to make more efforts for creativity and competitiveness when many 
private sector consortia compete with each other in the bidding process (Shin, 
2006, Grout, 2008, KDI, 2009a, Kim et al., 2008a). 
 
In summary, the creativity of the private sector can come out by the effort of 
the private sector to increase traffic demand in the BTO model and it can come 
out by the competition among bidders in the BTL model. 
 
Project supervision  
 
Some literature shows that, in a pre-construction stage, the early or on-time 
procurement of the transport infrastructure is an important motive for the 
public sector to use the PPP (Estache, 1999, NAO, 2009b, Chen, 2010). 
However, the problem was that much time and cost is needed in negotiation to 
get an agreement between the private and the public sectors and to sign a 
contract (Lee, 2008a). Especially, the Korean government has abolished the 
MRG condition in the BTO model since 2009 (since 2006 for unsolicited 
projects). Thus, many BTO projects failed in financing and many of them are 
pending. Many interviewees agreed that the BTL model was better to finance 
and to reduce the negotiation time (○ B in section 2.1.2 in APPENDIX 4). 
 
In the post-construction stage, the government needs to control several factors 
such as toll level, frequency of train, charging system, etc. as a part of the 
transport network. In the BTL model, the government could discuss the 
performance of the private sector regularly through the payment mechanism 
based on the performance assessment. However, in the BTO model, the private 
sector has most rights in operation in return for having the traffic demand risk. Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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Transport infrastructures are much related with each other and the 
government may make and activate transport policy affecting the PPP projects. 
However, the BTO model could be difficult for the public sector to control.  
 
The BTL model needs much more detailed performance assessment and 
experienced supervision to ensure that the private sector is not chiselling on 
service quality and quantity (NABO, 2009). In South Korea, there are many 
experiences in the operation of road and rail by the public operator. KHC 
(Korea Highway Corporation) and KORAIL (Korea Rail Corporation) are the 
public owned companies for the operation of road and rail. They have enough 
ability to supervise the project in road and rail.   
 
Consequently, the BTL model has more advantages in project supervision not 
only in the pre-construction stage but also in the post-construction stage. 
  
10.2.2 The features of the PPP model in the view of the private sector 
 
Rate of profit 
 
The rate of profit is decided by the negotiation between the private and the 
public sectors. In the BTO model, the traffic demand risk was on the private 
sector, so the higher rate of profit was provided to the private sector. Actually 
other risks such as construction risk and operation and maintenance risks 
except demand risks did not look much different between the BTO and the BTL 
models (see section 6.5.2, 6.5.3, 8.5.2 and 8.5.3). Traffic demand was much 
affected by the government policy or regional development which the private 
sector could not control. Park (2008) suggested the appropriate rate of profit 
should be 6.68~7.09% for the BTL model and 8.53%~9.3% for the BTO model in 
South Korea in his thesis using the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model). 
Consequently, the BTO model is high risk - high return while the BTL model is a 
low risk - low return model.  
 
Financing 
 
According to the interviews, financing was a big issue to the private sector 
under recent unstable economic circumstances (○ C in section 2.2.1 in APPENDIX Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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4). Many cases of the PPP for road and rail in South Korea were mega projects 
of which costs were over $1 billion, so the private sector found it difficult to 
finance under the current difficult economic times. Especially, the BTO model 
where the demand risk is on the private sector is more seriously affected by 
the change of financial circumstances (see section 8.4.2). Relatively, the BTL 
model is better to finance because the traffic demand risk is on the public 
sector. 
 
Project management  
 
The five case studies show that the private sector is more independent in the 
project management in the BTO model. The private sector was more active to 
manage the project from the construction stage as can be seen in the case 
study for the Seoul Metro 9.  
 
However, in the cases of road, the role of the private sector in the project 
management does not look as critical in rail. The process and standard of 
construction of road are quite regulated, so there is not much room for the 
private sector to encourage creativity or innovation. Rail is much more 
complicated and various in its system, equipment and operation than road. 
Thus, the strengths of the private sector in the BTO model that give more 
autonomy to the private sector can be easier to come out in rail.  
 
10.2.3 The features of the PPP model in the view of the end user 
 
Improvement of service quality 
 
The private sector was expected to be more competitive and creative to 
improve the service quality (ADB, 2008, HM Treasury, 2000, KDI, 2006a, 
Yescombe, 2007). Especially, as seen in the Seoul Metro 9, the service quality 
was improved more in the BTO model, because the private sector directly 
charged end users.  
 
However, in the case related to other transport networks, the quality of service 
can be improved in the BTL model where the public sector can control other 
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it was linked to Korea Train Express (KTX) network after the private sector sold 
their whole equities to the public operator, KORAIL.  
 
Thus, the BTO model can be better to improve the quality of service in the case 
that road or rail can be operated independently from the rest of the network. In 
the case that road or rail is strongly connected with other roads or rail routes, 
the BTL model can be better because the public sector can lead to manage 
other networks. 
 
Communication with the end users 
 
It was expected the private sector would communicate better with end users 
than the public sector in the BTO model, because the private sector make a 
profit by collecting tolls from end users directly. However, operating transport 
PPP cases in South Korea had MRG conditions and actual demand was lower 
than expected in most cases (see Table 3.8). Thus, it was difficult for the 
private sector to get additional revenue over the guaranteed level by the effort 
of the private sector to increase demand. As seen in the case of the Incheon 
Airport Expressway and the Incheon Airport Railway, the moral hazard of the 
private sector due to the excessive MRG could weaken incentives to enhance 
the concentration on their customers.  
 
In the BTL model, the customer of the private sector in the BTL model is the 
procurement authority paying a lease fee to them, so the private sector is likely 
to communicate with end users based on the contracted performance 
condition only. According to the interviews, it is difficult to say that the BTL 
model is always worse in communication with the end users because it is 
decided by the contract condition. However, usually the private sector is likely 
to be passive to communicate with end users in the BTL model (○ D in section 
2.2.1 in APPENDIX 4).    
 
User fee 
 
Mostly, user fee is expected to be higher in the BTO model than the BTL model 
(see Table 3.9). The private sector has a demand risk in the BTO model, so the 
rate of profit is higher. Considering that the reason to use the BTO model, Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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which is the “financially free standing” model, is to save the budget of the 
public sector, the burden to compensate for higher profit is transferred to the 
end users.  
 
However, in the BTL model, the public sector pays a lease fee regardless of the 
toll level, so it seems difficult for the government to ignore the complaint of 
the end users. Most interviewees agreed that the BTL model looked better for 
the end users to be provided with the service with a lower cost, though it could 
be an additional burden to the government (○ B in section 2.2.1 in APPENDIX 4).  
 
10.2 Optimal PPP model for road in South Korea 
 
10.2.1 Quantitative features of PPP models in road cases 
 
For finding the PPP model giving better VFM, the LCCs of the BTO and the BTL 
cases were calculated in the Incheon Airport Expressway and the Oksan-
Ochang Expressway. The results were summarised in the Table 10.2. The LCC 
in this table means the government expenditure, so the expected LCC of BTO 
option in Incheon Airport Expressway was zero, because the private sector paid 
the whole cost for construction and operation. The LCC of BTL option was 
expected to be (-) 693.4 billion KRW. The negative value means the public 
sector can recover its investment in construction and make a profit through 
charging tolls as well. The LCC of the BTL option in the Oksan-Ochang 
Expressway is also smaller than that of the BTO option. It shows that the BTL 
model had higher quantitative VFM because the LCC was lower in the BTL 
option.  
 
Table 10.2 VFM of case studies in road 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Project  LCC(BTO option)  LCC(BTL option)  VFM
lo 
Incheon Airport Expressway  0  - 693.4  693.4 
Oksan-Ochang Expressway  60.9  4.3  56.6 
Source: Chapter 5 and 6 
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Though this result came from the two case studies, the same results are 
expected to come out in other road PPP cases with the following reasons:  
 
  The rate of profit is higher in the BTO model than the BTL model. 
 
The rate of profit has a big gap between the BTL and the BTO models. Traffic 
demand risk is on the public sector in the BTL model and it is on the private 
sector in the BTO model. This difference was anticipated to be 5.82% in the 
Incheon Airport Expressway and 8.65% in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway (see 
section 5.3.6 and 6.3.6). The Korean government adds a mark-up interest to 
the interest of the 5-year national bond for the PPP. Mark-up interest of the 
BTO projects in South Korea was from 4.84 up to 9.41 (Shin, 2009). However, 
the government suggests a mark-up rate of the BTL model should be around 
0.77% in rail case and it did not exceed 1.0% in other BTL cases such as school 
and military accommodation (see section 5.3.1).   
 
  There can be additional building cost in the case of the BTO project 
needed to be separated from other transport network.  
 
As seen in the Oksan-Ochang Expressway case, additional toll collecting 
system and facility may be needed in the BTO model, because it needs to be 
operated separately from other road networks (see Figure 6.2). However, in the 
BTL model, the public sector pays a lease fee and the project can be operated 
in the same way as other linked roads.  
 
  There can be additional operating cost in the case of the BTO project 
needed to be separated from other transport network. 
 
In the BTO case, a road needs to be independently operated from other road 
networks and it can increase the operation cost. It needs more facility and 
employees for operating increased toll gates. The Incheon Airport Expressway 
is an exclusive road to the Incheon Airport, so it does not need an additional 
facility to be operated independently. On the other hand, the Oksan-Ochang 
Expressway needs additional toll gates on the main road.  
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Table 10.3 Details of input factors in road case studies 
Unit: billion KRW (nominal) 
Project  Factor  BTO option  BTL option 
Incheon Airport 
Expressway 
Rate of profit (Nominal)  15.19%  9.70% 
Building cost  1,460.2  1,460.2 
Operating cost  5,938.8  5,938.8 
Oksan-Ochang 
Expressway 
Rate of profit (Nominal)  14.70%  6.05% 
Building cost  213.8  206.8 
Operating cost  502.6  399.6 
Source: Chapter 5 and 6 
 
However, the quantitative VFM was done by the point estimation and many 
input factors were variable, so the sensitivity of VFM to several input factors 
was analysed. Many input factors such as construction cost, operation cost, 
and the rate of profit did not change the optimal PPP model giving the better 
VFM within the range suggested by the government. The main problem was the 
traffic volume which was the most criticised factor in South Korea. Considering 
the probability of the inaccuracy of traffic forecast in road in South Korea, the 
BTL model was still advantageous in the two expressway cases. Basically, the 
accuracy of traffic forecast depends on each project, but the stochastic analysis 
on the two cases showed that the probability was that the BTL model would be 
better than the BTO model would. In the Figure 10.1, the results of probability 
of VFM by traffic forecast risk in Incheon Airport Expressway and Oksan-
Ochang Expressway are shown from the stochastic analysis in the Chapter 5 
and 6. Probability that the BTL model was better in the Incheon Airport 
Expressway was 56.6% even if there was no MRG condition. In the case with the 
MRG condition, the BTL model was always better (see section 5.5.2). In the case 
of the Oksan-Ochang Expressway, the probability that the BTL model would be 
better was 79.4% (see section 6.5.6). The results of stochastic analysis show 
that the traffic forecast risk is not high enough to give higher profit rate to the 
private sector through the BTO model. Thus, considering the traffic demand 
was the most decisive risk in the transport PPP, the BTO model is not the best 
choice for road in South Korea.  
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Figure 10.1 Probability of VFM by the traffic forecasting risk in South Korea 
 
Source: see Figure 5.6 and Figure 6.4 
 
Consequently, the quantitatively optimal PPP model for road in South Korea is 
thought to be the BTL model. The BTL model gives higher quantitative VFM 
than the BTO model because of the lower rate of profit reflecting on the low 
demand risk. Considering the inaccuracy of road traffic forecast, the 
probability that the BTL model is better is high. 
 
10.2.2 Qualitative features of PPP models in road 
 
In Chapter 5 and 6, qualitative features of PPP models were examined by 
following four factors; service quality, contract and management, risk 
management, operational flexibility.  
 
Service quality 
 
Basically, the service quality was affected by the traffic demand in the BTO 
model and the performance assessment in the BTL model. The service quality 
in road is assessed by the traffic density affecting speed and congestion and 
56.6% 
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geometric structure of road (Hostovsky et al., 2004, Washburn et al., 2004). 
These factors were mainly decided by the route or technical standard of road 
rather than the effort of the private sector (see section 5.4.1). Thus, it was 
difficult to find a big difference in service quality between the BTO and the BTL 
model for road. However, if the price for the same service quality is considered, 
the BTL model in which the price could be lowered seemed to be better. Also, 
in the case of the BTO model with the MRG condition, interviews showed that 
the motive to upgrade the service quality could be decreased (see section 
5.4.3). Therefore, the BTL model is thought to have an advantage in the service 
quality of road. 
 
Contract and management 
 
With regard to the management of the project, any difference between both 
PPP models was not found in the two case studies. However, the BTL model 
was thought to be better in finance, because fixed revenue is paid by the 
public sector (see section 5.4.2 and 6.4.2). Considering the most serious 
problem in making a contract in recent years is the difficulty in financing 
because of high risk, the BTL model, where demand risk is on the public sector, 
has an advantage in making a contract. 
 
Risk management 
 
This factor is about incentivising on the good risk management of the private 
sector. The difference between the BTO and the BTL model was not big in risk 
management except traffic demand, because risk was managed by the content 
of contract rather than by the PPP model (see section 5.4.3 and 6.4.3). However, 
the BTL model could have more advantages for the public sector to incentivise 
its performance. The public sector could assess the appropriateness of the risk 
management of the private sector and could incentivise this regularly by 
performance assessment (see 5.4.3 and 6.4.3). On the other hand, the private 
sector is responsible for its demand in the BTO model, so the public sector had 
few roles in the risk management of the private sector.  
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Operational flexibility 
 
With regard to the operational flexibility, it was explored how the public service 
could be provided flexibly under varying circumstances or technologies during 
operation period. In this issue, there were opposite viewpoints. Interviewees 
from the private sector alleged that the BTO model was better to cope with the 
change of circumstances, but interviewees from the public sector responded 
that the reaction of the private sector was available only when the private 
sector has a benefit (see section 5.4.4 and 6.4.4). Generally roles and 
responsibilities in an operation stage are decided by a contract on a case-by-
case basis (ADB, 2012), but it looks natural that the private sector can be 
quicker than the public sector to change the operation when it is related with 
the profit of the private sector (Lee, 2005). In regard to road, the change of 
operational circumstances is not as fast as other PPP fields such as telecoms 
and it is affected by network linkages rather than by technology. Thus, the BTL 
model where the public sector controls and manages the project with other 
road network seems better than the BTO model. 
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10.3.3 Optimal PPP model for road in South Korea 
 
In comparison with the BTO and the BTL model for road, the BTL model can be 
recommended with following reasons; 
 
First, the BTL model gives higher quantitative VFM. The private sector has 
traffic demand risk in the BTO model, so they can have higher rate of profit. In 
the BTL model, the public sector has traffic demand risk and revenue is 
provided to the private sector by the performance assessment. In most BTO 
cases, it was emphasised that the public sector could pay nothing or a small 
amount of subsidy to the private sector. However, the public sector can make a 
profit with the same revenue in the BTL model providing lower rate profit to 
the private sector. In the BTL model, the profit of the public sector can be used 
to reduce the toll level or upgrade service. 
 
Second, considering the inaccuracy of traffic forecasting in expressways in 
South Korea, it does not need to transfer the traffic demand risk to the private 
sector by using the BTO model. Mean value of inaccuracy of traffic forecasting 
in 86 expressways in South Korea was only -5.32%. It means that it may not 
need to transfer the traffic demand risk to the private sector with much higher 
rate of profit.  
 
Third, traffic demand in road is difficult to be affected by the private sector, so 
the BTO model cannot be expected to have advantages in upgrading service 
quality, making a contract, managing risk and operating flexibly. Though the 
mean value of traffic forecasting was not bad, the variance was big, so it 
cannot be said that the traffic forecasting is accurate. However, traffic demand 
in road is much affected by the route and the government policy such as 
regional development. It shows the BTO model is very limited in controlling 
traffic demand by its own effort though the private sector is in charge of traffic 
demand. Thus, the BTO model does not have strength in upgrading service and 
managing risk by payment mechanism. The high demand risk of the private 
sector in the BTO model does not look manageable, so it makes it difficult to 
finance and it is a big obstacle in making a contract.    
 
Consequently, the BTL model looks better for a road PPP project in South Korea. Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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10.4 Optimal PPP model for rail in South Korea 
 
10.4.1 Quantitative features of PPP models in rail 
 
For finding the PPP model giving higher VFM, the LCCs of the BTL cases were 
compared with those of the BTO cases in the Incheon Airport Railway, the 
Daegok-Sosa Railway and the Seoul Metro 9. The results were that the BTL 
model had higher quantitative VFM if the actual passengers were as many as 
anticipated. The VFM assessment is done in the planning stage and the traffic 
forecast is assumed as accurate. Thus, the quantitatively optimal PPP model for 
rail was the BTL model. 
 
Table 10.4 VFM of case studies in rail 
Unit: billion KRW (NPV) 
Project  LCC(BTO option)  LCC(BTL option)  VFM
lo 
Incheon Airport Railway  603.1  -3,032.2  3,635.3 
Daegok-Sosa Railway  840.4  574.1  266.3 
Seoul Metro 9  146.7  -105.6  252.3 
Source: Chapter 7, 8 and 9 
 
Though this result came from three case studies, but the same results are 
expected to come out in other rail PPP cases because the rate of profit is 
higher in the BTO model than the BTL model like road cases. The difference of 
rate of profit between the BTO and the BTL model was anticipated to be 6.68% 
in the Incheon Airport Railway, 7.01% in the Daegok-Sosa Railway and 4.92% in 
the Seoul Metro 9.  
 
Table 10.5 Rate of profit in rail cases 
Project  BTO (A)  BTL (B)  A-B 
Incheon Airport Railway  13.85%  7.17%  6.68% 
Daegok-Sosa Railway  12.32%  5.31%  7.01% 
Seoul Metro 9  14.35%  9.43%  4.92% 
Source: Chapter 7, 8 and 9 Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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However, the more important factor in rail cases is the construction subsidy in 
the BTO option. Two railway cases (excluding the Incheon Airport Railway, 
which was expected to have enough incomes from the end user, but after all, it 
was revealed that traffic demand was overestimated) did not have enough 
revenues from anticipated passengers to be financially free standing (see 
section 8.3.4 and 9.3.5). The public sector had to provide construction subsidy 
and the private sector could save its investment in the project. The rate of 
profit is only related with the investment of the private sector. Even if the rate 
of profit of the BTO option might be lower than that of the BTL option, the LCC 
of the BTO, which was measured by the capital expenditure of the public sector, 
could be affected little as could be seen in the sensitivity analysis of VFM to the 
rate of profit of the Daegok-Sosa Railway case (see section 8.5.4). The 
construction subsidy in the BTO option of the Daegok-Sosa Railway reached 
92% of total building cost, because of limited revenue as a part of national rail 
network.  
 
Table 10.6 The private investment in rail cases 
Unit: billion KRW  
Project 
Building cost 
(A) 
Private investment in construction stage 
BTL  BTO (B)  B/A (%) 
Incheon Airport Railway  3,949  3,949  3,186  80.7% 
Daegok-Sosa Railway  1,526  1,526  119  7.8% 
Seoul Metro 9  722.7  722.7  493.8  68.3% 
Source: Chapter 7, 8 and 9 
 
However, quantitative VFM was done by the point estimation and many input 
factors were variable, so it was needed to check the sensitivity of VFM to 
several main input factors. Like road cases, forecasted traffic was the most 
criticised factor. Many BTO cases had less traffic than contracted, so the public 
sector had to pay revenue subsidy by the MRG condition. 
 
Considering the inaccuracy of traffic forecast in rail in South Korea, the BTL 
model was still advantageous in the three rail cases. Mean value of inaccuracy 
of traffic forecast in 19 railway projects in South Korea was -32.4% (see Figure 
7.3). Basically, the accuracy of traffic forecast depends on each project, but the 
stochastic analysis on the three cases showed that the probability that the BTL Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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model would be better was higher than the BTO model would. As seen in the 
Figure 10.2, the probability that the BTL model was better in the Incheon 
Airport Railway was around 57% in the case without MRG condition. In the case 
with a MRG condition, the BTL model was always better. In fact, the actual 
passengers of the Incheon Airport Railway were around 7% of the expected, so 
the BTO model, in which the private sector had a traffic demand risk, could be 
better to the public sector. However, the MRG condition made the strength of 
the BTO model be faded away. 
 
Figure 10.2 Probability of VFM by traffic forecast risk in the Incheon Airport 
Railway 
(See details in section 7.5.2) 
 
In the case of the Daegok-Sosa Railway, the BTL model was always better 
regardless of the inaccuracy of traffic forecast. It has a small amount of 
revenue compared with the construction cost, so the result shows that the BTL 
model chosen in this case was appropriate (see section 8.5.5). As seen in 
Figure 10.3, the probability that the BTL model was better in the Seoul Metro 9 
which was also around 57% in case with no MRG condition. Interestingly, even 
in the case with a MRG condition, the probability that BTL model would be 
better was not changed. It means that the MRG condition did not affect to 
choose the optimal PPP model and it was not excessive unlike other cases.  
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Figure 10.3 Probability of VFM by the traffic forecast risk in the Seoul Metro 9 
(See details in section 9.5.2) 
 
Consequently, the quantitatively optimal PPP model for rail in South Korea is 
thought to be the BTL model. The BTL model gives higher quantitative VFM 
than the BTO model because of lower rate of profit. Especially, rail construction 
and operation need much cost and the revenue was politically limited in usual, 
so it could be difficult to be done by the “financially free standing” model. 
Since traffic forecast risk in rail was higher than in road, the BTO model in 
which the private sector had traffic demand risk, could be beneficial to the 
public sector in rail. However, the structure of rail project with high cost and 
low revenue decreases this kind of strength of the BTO model. 
 
10.4.2 Qualitative features of PPP models in rail 
 
Service quality 
 
Like road cases, the important motive to upgrade the service quality is based 
on the traffic demand in the BTO model and on the performance assessment in 
the BTL model. Also, the MRG condition could be also an important obstacle to 
57% 
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the private sector in improving the service quality. The service quality in rail is 
assessed by the frequency of train operation, on time operation, 
comfortableness of cabin, etc (Higton, 2005, Lee, 2006). These services were 
affected not only by route but by an operator in rail cases. In the case of the 
national arterial rail network, the service quality was mainly related to the 
operation of other connected rail (see section 8.4.1). Thus, the BTL model in 
which the public sector could control general services related to the rest of the 
rail network could be better. In addition, if the service quality is the same, the 
price for that service should be considered importantly. Considering the price 
for the service, the BTL model seemed to be better, because the price would be 
strictly limited by the public sector in the BTL model. Also, in the case of the 
BTO model with a MRG condition, it can diminish the motive for the private 
sector to upgrade the service quality (see section 7.4.1). 
 
Unlike the two other rail cases, the Seoul Metro 9 was connected with different 
subway lines and had more competitors such as a BRT (Bus Rapid Transit), 
local buses, bikes and cars, so the private sector could be more active to 
upgrade the service quality in the BTO model than the BTL (see section 9.4.1). 
It means that for the urban subway it could be more beneficial to use the BTO 
model than for the national arterial railway.  
 
Contract and management 
 
The BTL model was thought to be better in finance, because fixed revenue is 
paid by the public sector. Considering the most serious problem in making a 
contract has been the financing since the global financial crisis, the BTL model 
has an advantage in signing a contract. With regard to the project management, 
it looks to be decided by the ability of each sector rather than the PPP model. 
 
Risk management 
 
Risk management was based on the agreed contract of each PPP case rather 
than the PPP model (ADB, 2012). However, the BTL model needed much closer 
relationship between the private and public sectors for risk management while 
the structure of risk management was very simple in the BTO model. The 
public sector had to assess the risk management of the private sector through Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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the performance regularly in the BTL model. Thus, the BTL model might be 
disadvantageous in the circumstances without a strong governance or 
relationship between the private and the public sector. In South Korea, there 
are many experiences in construction and operation of rail, but it is still 
disputable whether strong governance and strong relationships could be 
forged between the private and the public sectors. However, regarding the 
interviews from the public sector, it was though the private sector still 
preferred the BTO model in risk management, because of its simplicity of risk 
sharing and management in the operation stage of rail (see section 9.4.3).  
 
Operational flexibility 
 
In regard to the operational flexibility, there was the same dispute as with road 
case. The private sector alleged that the BTO model was better to cope with the 
change of circumstances, but the public sector said that the private sector 
would react to the change of circumstances only when they had a profit 
through changing the operation (see section 7.4.4, 8.4.4 and 9.4.4). However, 
operational circumstances of rail are related to other rail networks and many of 
them are needed to be dealt with as a general rail policy or standardisation 
regulated by the public sector. Thus, the BTL model in which the public sector 
controls and manages the PPP project with the rest of the rail network seems 
better than the BTO model in railway. 
 
10.4.3 Optimal PPP model for rail in South Korea 
 
Based on the result of the case studies on the Incheon Airport Railway and the 
Daegok-Sosa Railway, the BTL model looks better for the national arterial rail 
though the BTO model has several strengths in service quality and risk 
management with the following reasons:  
 
First, the BTL model gives better quantitative VFM. Like the road PPP, the 
private sector has traffic demand risk in the BTO model, so they can have much 
higher rate of profit. In the BTL model, the public sector has traffic demand 
risk and revenue is provided to the private sector by the performance 
assessment. In most BTO cases, it was emphasised that the public sector could 
pay nothing or small amount of subsidy to the private sector. However, the Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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public sector can make a profit with the same revenue in the BTL model 
providing lower rate profit to the private sector. In the BTL model, the profit of 
the public sector can be used to reduce tariff level or to upgrade the quality of 
service; 
 
Second, the financially free standing construction and operation is difficult for 
the rail PPP because of high construction cost and very limited and low revenue. 
Considering of high cost in rail construction and operation, the BTO model 
does not have enough revenue which is collected from passengers to return 
the investment of the private sector. Mean inaccuracy of traffic forecast in rail 
in South Korea was -32.4% and it is much higher than – 5.32% of road. It means 
that rail has higher traffic demand risk than road and the BTO model is benefit 
to the public sector because the demand risk is on the private sector. However, 
rail seems difficult to be constructed and operated through the BTO model 
without large amount of subsidy from the public sector. This is well seen in the 
Daegok-Sosa Railway case which will be done by the BTL model including 
operation for the first time in South Korea. Sensitivity analysis shows that the 
BTL model was better for the Daegok-Sosa Railway regardless of traffic demand 
risk, and if the BTO model were used then the public sector should subsidise 
around 92% of building cost; and 
 
Third, the BTL model has an advantage in concluding a contract, project 
management and operational flexibility in the view of the public sector. The 
BTL model also looks better to upgrade the service quality in an arterial rail 
project which is closely related with the service in other national arterial rail 
network. The incentive does not look enough for the private sector to upgrade 
the service quality in the BTO model for a project as a part of national arterial 
rail network, because the incentive in the BTO model is only increased 
passengers, but the demand in national arterial network is difficult to be 
increased by the effort of rail operator of small section. Though the BTL model 
needs strong governance or relationship for risk management between the 
private and the public sectors, it seems not to be an obstacle to the national 
arterial rail network which has many experiences. 
 
On the other hand, the urban subway seems quite different from national 
arterial rail in choosing the optimal PPP model. Though the BTL model was also Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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quantitatively better in the Seoul Metro 9 case, the quality of service seems to 
be much affected by the ability of the operator as can be seen in the Seoul 
Metro 9 case. Also, the complexity of subway PPP project makes the BTO model 
better in risk management. In the case of the Seoul Metro 9, the public sector 
preferred the BTO model because of the simplicity of risk management. The 
complexity of the BTL deal can be a reason to evoke the poor relationship 
between the private and the public sector (NAO, 2009). Also, it is expected for 
the private sector to maximise the creativity and to improve the service quality 
under the complex and competitive situations like the urban subway. 
 
Consequently, the BTL model generally looks better for rail in South Korea, but 
the BTO model has strengths in service quality and risk management for urban 
subway. Thus, if the objective of the PPP is more focused on the improving of 
the service quality or on the effective risk management, the BTO model can be 
an alternative to the BTL model.  
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10.5 Appropriate traffic demand risk sharing  
 
10.5.1 Role of traffic demand risk sharing in transport PPP 
 
Demand or revenue risk is globally regarded as more difficult problem than 
construction and project management risk (Perkins, 2013). Traffic demand risk 
is the most disputable issue in the transport PPP in South Korea as well(Lee, 
2005). Early PPP projects in transport in South Korea used the BTO model with 
a MRG condition, but much lower actual traffic than the forecasted made the 
public sector provide a large amount of subsidy by the MRG condition up to 
90% of the expected revenue (see section 3.4.5 and 3.5). Thus, the Korean 
government abolished the MRG regulation in the case of unsolicited PPPs in 
2006 and in the case of solicited projects in 2009 to strength the responsibility 
of the private sector in the BTO model which is the “financially freestanding” 
PPP model (see Table 3.2).  
 
However, recently the BTO projects without the MRG condition have difficulties 
in finance. Even in cases where the contract was signed, the private sector 
which consists of construction companies has failed to entice sufficient 
financial investors (Lee, 2008a, Park, 2009). According to the round table 
report of the international transport forum (Perkins, 2013), the ability of the 
private sector to respond to traffic demand risk is limited than government. 
Some researchers argue that transferring traffic demand risk to the private 
sector is inappropriate because it depends on economic circumstances, fuel 
prices and regional development, so it is not easy to be managed by the 
private sector (Mackie and Smith, 2004).   
 
Thus, many countries introduced revenue risk sharing, which is easily affected 
by traffic demand risk, to the transport PPP. Shadow toll (Britain and Portugal), 
annuity or availability payment (India and central Europe), debt guarantees 
(Poland, A2 motorway), and exchange rate guarantee (Chile, Colombia) are well 
known revenue risk sharing methods (Irwin, 2005). In the case of South Korea, 
minimum revenue was guaranteed to the private sector in the BTO model 
based on the traffic volume.  
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Though the traffic demand risk sharing is criticised in South Korea, it has 
several important roles in the PPP. First, traffic demand risk sharing makes the 
PPP more attractive to financial investors. As seen in the case studies, the 
financial investor wanted to avoid the high risk in the BTO model, but they 
were not fully satisfied about the low rate of profit in the BTL model. They 
wanted minimum revenue and more chance to make an additional profit. 
Second, traffic demand risk can be better managed by allocating the role of 
each sector appropriately. Traffic volume is affected by both sectors. Traffic 
demand risk can vary not only by the government policy such as regional 
development or toll policies but also by the effort of the private sector such as 
the improvement of service quality as seen in the urban rail case. Lastly, 
private financial market for the PPP can be developed. For traffic demand risk 
sharing, it needs to analyse the ability of each sector, rational traffic forecast, 
financial product for the PPP, etc.  
 
10.5.2 Appropriate traffic demand risk sharing in the BTO model 
 
The MRG, which is abolished in 2009, is strongly requested again by the 
private sectors for the BTO model, but it is still opposed by the National 
Assembly, BAI and NGOs. The MRG can be an effective tool to develop the PPP 
and also rational policy to deal with the traffic demand risk. However, the 
criticisms on the MRG pointed out that the excessive burden was on the public 
sector and it could make the private sector exaggerate the traffic forecast (Lee, 
2005). Thus, it needs to suggest an appropriate traffic demand risk sharing.  
 
In South Korea, the BTO and the BTL models are the most common PPP models.  
In the BTO model, traffic demand risk is fully on the private sector in the BTO 
model if there is no MRG and it is fully on the public sector in the BTL model. 
Through the three case studies (Incheon Airport Expressway, Incheon Airport 
Railway, Seoul Metro 9) of the BTO model with MRG condition, it was found 
that revenue was flexible by actual traffic in the BTO model instead giving high 
rate of profit, but the revenue was fixed in the BTL model instead of providing 
low rate of profit to the private sector. In the Incheon Airport Expressway and 
Railway cases, the minimum revenue was guaranteed up to 90% for more than 
20 years and it meant that most of traffic demand risk was on the public sector, 
but the rate of profit was as high as the BTO model without the MRG condition.  Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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These two case studies showed that the maximum guaranteed revenue (point 
A in Figure 10.4) should not exceed the actual revenue (point B in Figure 10.4) 
when the LCC of the BTL option became the same as that of the BTO option 
without a MRG condition. The Figure 10.4 shows the change of the LCC of the 
BTO and the BTL option by actual revenue based on traffic demand risk. Here, 
the LCC is the capital expenditure of the public sector. 
 
Figure 10.4 Change of the LCC of the BTO and the BTL option by actual 
revenue 
 
 
In the case of the Incheon Airport Expressway, the MRG was 90% (point A in 
Figure 10.4) of the expected revenue and it exceeded the revenue when the 
LCCs of BTL option and the BTO option were equal (point B in Figure 10.4, here 
67.2%). As a result, the VFM of the BTL option was always higher than the BTO Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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with a MRG option regardless of traffic demand risk (see details in section 
5.5.1). It means that the public sector had to pay more in the BTO option than 
in the BTL option in which the full traffic demand risk was on the public sector. 
In the BTO model, the profit rate is higher than in the BTL model, because the 
traffic demand risk is on the private sector. However, the traffic demand risk 
was excessively transferred to the public sector in the Incheon Airport 
Expressway case by the MRG condition without reducing the profit rate. The 
same problem could be seen in the Incheon Airport Railway case. The level of 
MRG was 90% (point A in Figure 10.4), but the point B was only 46.4% (see the 
Figure 7.2). 
 
If the level of MRG is lower than the point B in the Figure 10.4, then it can be 
beneficial to the public sector. However, it financially burdens the private 
sector and can be unattractive to the private sector. Thus, the appropriate MRG 
level in the BTO model can be suggested by analysing the change of LCC of the 
BTO and the BTL options by actual revenue (which is based on the traffic 
demand). 
 
The Figure 10.5 shows the above mentioned new concept of appropriate traffic 
demand risk sharing simply. 
 
Figure 10.5 Concept of appropriate MRG 
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10.6 Policy recommendation for South Korea government 
 
10.6.1 Introduction of the BTL model for road 
 
The BTL can be a better PPP model than the BTO for road, so the government 
needs to think over the introduction of the BTL model for road in South Korea. 
If the private sector collects revenue directly from the toll in the BTL model, 
then the private sector can pay the lease fee within the income from the 
operation. Moreover, the BTL model gives a chance for the public sector to 
make a profit and this profit can be used to upgrade service quality or 
decrease toll level. 
 
Considering the quality of service in road was decided by the route of road 
rather than by the effort of the private sector, the benefit of the BTO model in 
the quality of service does not look significant. Especially, after abolishing the 
MRG regulation for the unsolicited project in 2006, only one BTO project 
started construction and 10 projects were delayed because of financing after 
starting negotiation or being signed (MLTM, 2011c). It means that the private 
sector, especially the financial investor, does not want to manage the traffic 
demand risk with its own responsibility. Though traffic demand risk is on the 
public sector in the BTL model, the inaccuracy of traffic forecast in expressway 
in South Korea seems not big enough to change the optimal PPP model as seen 
in the case studies of this thesis. 
 
10.6.2 New approach to the BTO model for urban rail 
 
The BTL model seems optimal for the national arterial rail like the Daegok-Sosa 
railway, but the BTO model can be better for urban rail which has a high traffic 
demand risk and a complexity of operation. Thus, the government needs to 
consider the BTO model as the alternative of the BTL model for urban rail, only 
if an appropriate demand risk is shared with the private sector.  
 
The BTL model provides better VFM in rail in South Korea. Construction and 
operation costs were very high but tariff, which was the main source of 
revenue, was strictly restricted by the public sector with a political reason. Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
  229   
Thus, the BTO model was very difficult to be successful for rail if there was no 
MRG condition.  
However, the BTO model can be effective to urban rail. It had many 
competitors in operation and much more complicated. Quality of service is very 
important factor to compete with other transport mode in urban area and the 
BTO model had a big advantage in upgrading service quality as seen in the 
Seoul Metro 9 case. Inaccuracy of traffic forecast was also higher in urban rail 
than other rail. The complexity of construction and operation of urban rail 
could make relationship between the private and the public sector difficult, and 
this may result in the failure of the BTL model like the case of the London 
Underground PPP. Problem is that the BTO model is too risky for the private 
sector to participate in. Though there are still many criticisms over the MRG, 
but an appropriate traffic risk sharing, which does not exceed the expenditure 
of the public sector in the BTL model as suggested in this thesis, can make the 
BTO model executed successfully.  
 
10.6.3 Recommendation for an appropriate traffic demand risk sharing  
 
Though there are many criticisms on MRG regulation in South Korea, but 
appropriate risk sharing seems essential in the PPP. The BTL model, in which 
the public sector has demand risk, can be better where the traffic demand is 
possible to be accurately forecasted. However, recent studies show that the 
uncertainty of economy is increasing and the deficit problem of the 
Government is the big issue not only in South Korea but also in the World 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). Thus, the BTO model looks quite attractive to the 
public sector, though unstable economy is also risky to the private sector. 
Especially, traffic demand is basically not controlled by the private sector and 
is much more affected by the economy, transport policy, regional development, 
etc.  
 
Most critics about the MRG in South Korea focused on the regulation itself, but 
the real problem about the MRG was the excessively high guaranteed level of 
MRG. In this study, appropriate traffic risk sharing level does not exceed the 
expenditure of the BTL model, so the BTO does not financially burden the 
public sector if the MRG condition is less than the level suggested in this study.  Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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10.6 Conclusion 
 
Through the five case studies, interviews and literature reviews, the main 
features of the PPP model in road and rail in South Korea were explored. In the 
view of the public sector, the BTL model was better to lessen the financial 
burden of the public sector, but if traffic demand risk is high then the BTO 
model could be better. The strength of the private sector was activated by the 
traffic demand in the BTO model but also by the competition between the 
private sector bidders in the BTL model (see Table 3.5 and 3.6). With regard to 
the project supervision, the BTL model was advantageous because of regular 
performance assessment. In the view of the private sector, the BTO was a high 
risk and high return model and the BTL was a low risk and low return model. 
Recently, the BTL where the public sector had traffic demand risk was easier to 
finance than the BTO model, but the BTO with MRG model was more preferable 
to the private sector. In the view of the end user, the service quality could be 
expected to be more improved in the BTO model when the project was 
separated from the rest of the transport network. However, if the project was a 
part of network, the BTL could be better. In the BTL model, the level of tariff 
could be reduced lower than the BTO model.  
 
Through the case studies, an optimal PPP model for road in South Korea 
seemed the BTL model. The public sector could save expenditure and have a 
chance to make a profit by revenue in the BTL model. Quantitatively optimal 
PPP model for rail in South Korea was also the BTL model having a low rate of 
profit, but the BTO with MRG model could be better to the complicated and 
high risk project such as urban rail. The MRG regulation is much criticised in 
South Korea, but considering traffic forecast is difficult to be managed by the 
public sector, appropriate traffic demand risk sharing can be effective for a 
successful PPP. In this study, an appropriate MRG was suggested as the level 
which was less than the expenditure of the public sector in the BTL model in 
which traffic demand risk is fully on the public sector.  
 
Based on the above results, the introduction of the BTL model for road, which 
has not been used yet, was suggested. The BTO with MRG model was 
recommended as an optimal PPP for urban rail South Korea. An appropriate 
traffic demand risk sharing was also presented for enhancing the transport PPP.Byungwoo Gil    The Analysis of Case Studies 
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CHAPTER 11  
Conclusions 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this study was to find the optimal PPP model, which is defined as 
the PPP model having higher VFM, for transport infrastructures. The most 
prevalent and standardised PPP models of South Korea are the BTO, which is a 
“financially free standing” model, and the BTL, which is a “service sold to the 
public sector” model. However, the BTO model has usually been used for 
transport infrastructures like road and rail while the BTL model was thought to 
be for those areas of public services without the prospect of profitability. In 
this thesis, it has been examined whether the BTL model could be the 
alternative to the BTO model for transport.  
 
For comparing the BTL with the BTO model, the five case studies were 
undertaken in South Korea: the Incheon Airport Expressway and the Oksan-
Ochang Expressway were for road; and the Incheon Airport Railway, the 
Daegok-Sosa Railway and the Seoul Metro 9 were for rail. Each case was 
assessed by the quantitative and the qualitative VFM tests. The quantitative 
VFM assessment followed the guidance of the Korean government and the 
qualitative VFM was assessed based on the interviews of the PPP experts in 
South Korea. Considering the uncertainty of input factors in the VFM 
assessment, the sensitivity of the VFM was also analysed. Especially, a traffic 
factor, which was the most disputable risk in transport PPP in South Korea, was 
studied through the stochastic analysis by the Monte Carlo Simulation method.  
 
This chapter summarises the main conclusions on the research objectives that 
were set out by the case studies. Next, the contribution of the thesis to the PPP 
in transport in South Korea is considered. Finally, the limitation of the research 
and the implication for further study for the transport PPP are discussed.  Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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11.2 Main conclusions on the research objectives 
 
This research has dealt with the following research objectives through the 
literature review, interview and five case studies in South Korea: the main 
features of PPP model in road and rail in South Korea; the methodology for 
comparing the BTO and the BTO model; the optimal PPP model providing better 
VFM in road and rail in South Korea; and appropriate traffic demand risk 
sharing in road and rail in South Korea.  
 
The main features of the PPP models in road and rail in South Korea 
 
The BTO and the BTL models were compared with each other from three 
perspectives: the public sector, the private sector and the end user. The public 
sector reflects on the interests of tax payers who do not use the service and 
tax payers as end users. However, these two interests are different from each 
other, so the interest of end users was discussed separately in the thesis. 
 
In the view of the public sector, the thesis found the financial burden of the 
public sector, the creativity and competitiveness of the private sector and the 
project supervision as decisive interests to choose the PPP. Thus, the features 
of the BTL and the BTO models were explored with the same categories. The 
BTL model was better to lessen the financial burden of the public sector for 
transport infrastructure with the income from the end user than the BTO model 
if traffic, which is the source of the income, was accurately forecasted. It was 
because the rate of profit in the BTL model, where the public sector had traffic 
demand risk, was lower than that in the BTO model. If the actual traffic was 
lower than anticipated, then the BTO model could be better. The private sector 
could be creative and competitive in the PPP regardless of PPP models. 
However, the thesis shows the creativity and competitiveness of the private 
sectors could be activated only when the private sector had the traffic demand 
risk in the BTO model and when there is enough competition among the 
private sector companies to bid in the BTL model. In supervising a project, 
there were few differences in the construction stage in the view of the public 
sector. However, the interviews of the PPP experts and literatures show that the 
public sector had more roles in the BTL model through the regular 
performance assessment to pay the lease fee, though the process of Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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supervision could be more complicated. The supervision scheme was simpler 
in the BTO model, but the public sector was anticipated to have few roles in the 
operation of the facility. This characteristic can be a disadvantage in transport 
which is importantly affected by the policy of the government and sometimes 
needs to be managed in connection with other transport modes or networks by 
the public sector. Thus, the BTL model could be thought to be better in the 
view point of the supervision of the public sector. 
 
In the view of the private sector, the most important factors for the PPP were 
the rate of profit, financing and the project management. It is difficult to say a 
specific PPP model is better in making a profit because the BTO was a high risk 
and high return model and the BTL was a low risk and low return model. 
Financing was pointed out as a big obstacle to the private sector, where the 
construction companies lead the project, particularly under the current difficult 
economic circumstances. However, it was discovered the BTL where the public 
sector had traffic demand risk was relatively easier to finance than the BTO 
model, so the private sector preferred the BTL model in the current unstable 
economic circumstances. Though the BTO with MRG model guaranteed stable 
revenue and offered a chance to make an additional profit to the private sector, 
there were opinions that the BTO with MRG model was the best to the private 
sector. Project management was also an important category to the private 
sector. The result of interviews shows the private sector was anticipated to be 
more active in the construction stage in the BTO model where the private 
sector had whole responsibility in operation.   
 
In the view of the end user, the literatures and interviews on PPPs show that 
the interest in PPPs was on the improvement service quality, the 
communication with end users, and the user fee. The service quality could be 
expected to be more improved in the BTO model when the project was 
separated from the rest of the transport network, but if the project was a part 
of network, the BTL could be better because the public sector could manage 
and balance the quality of service in an integrated transport network. In terms 
of the communication with the end user, the private sector was anticipated to 
be more active in the BTO model only if there was no MRG condition. The user 
fee was a severely criticised category. The BTL model could reduce the toll or 
tariff level lower than the BTO model, so it was a benefit to end users.  Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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The methodology for comparing the BTO and the BTL model 
 
An appropriate methodology should be suggested to compare the BTL with the 
BTO model. There were several methodologies such as the FNPV and the FIRR 
for assessing the feasibility of BTO model, but the VFM assessment was the 
only methodology to be commonly used in the BTO and the BTL models. 
Especially, the VFM assessment was the official methodology of the Korean 
government and it tested the PPP not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. 
 
For methodology for the quantitative assessment, the equation based on the 
LCC analysis suggested as follows: 
VFMlo = BTO (Subsidy) – BTL (Lease + Operating cost – Revenue) 
 
For methodology for the qualitative assessment, the semi-opened interview 
was selected and the topic guidance on four issues was suggested: service 
quality, contract and management, risk management, and operational 
flexibility.  
 
The optimal PPP model for road in South Korea 
 
It was found that the BTL model could be better for road in South Korea 
instead of the BTO with following three reasons: 
 
First, the BTL model gave better quantitative VFM. The private sector has traffic 
demand risk in the BTO model, so they can have much higher rate of profit. In 
the BTL model, the public sector has traffic demand risk and revenue is 
provided to the private sector by the performance assessment based on the 
availability. In most BTO cases, it was emphasised that the public sector could 
pay nothing or a small amount of subsidy to the private sector. However, the 
public sector can make a profit with the same revenue in the BTL model; 
 
Second, it is not necessary to transfer the traffic demand risk to the private 
sector by using the BTO model. If the actual traffic is much lower than 
forecasted, then the BTO model can be better. However, the mean value of 
inaccuracy of traffic forecast in the 86 expressways in South Korea was only -
5.32%. It meant that it might not be needed to transfer the traffic demand risk Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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to the private sector with much higher rate of profit. In cases with the MRG 
condition, the BTO model was not better to improve the service quality and to 
manage the revenue risk than the BTL model as it heavily diluted the private 
sector incentives; and 
   
Third, traffic demand in road was difficult to be affected by the private sector, 
so the BTO model cannot be expected to have advantages in upgrading service 
quality. Though the mean value of traffic forecast was relatively good, the 
variance was big. Therefore, it cannot be said that the traffic forecast is 
accurate. However, traffic demand in road is much affected by the route and 
the government policy such as regional development. It shows the BTO model 
is very limited in controlling traffic demand by its own effort though the private 
sector has the risk. Thus, the BTO model does not have strengths in upgrading 
service and managing revenue risks. The high demand risk borne by the 
private sector in the BTO model does not look manageable, so it makes 
financing difficult and it is a big obstacle in making a contract.    
 
The optimal PPP model for rail in South Korea 
 
The two case studies for the national arterial railway and one case study for the 
urban railway showed that the optimal PPP model could be different in the 
national arterial railway and the urban rail. The BTL model generally looked 
better for rail in South Korea, but the BTO model had strengths in service 
quality and risk management for urban subway. Thus, if the objective of the 
PPP was more focused on improving the service quality or on the effective risk 
management, the BTO model could be an alternative to the BTL model.  
 
In the case of national arterial railway, the BTL model gave better quantitative 
VFM like road. Especially, the BTO model was difficult to be used for rail 
because of high construction cost and low revenue. It meant that the BTO 
model did not have enough revenue which could be collected from passengers 
to compensate for the investment of the private sector. In addition, the BTL 
model had an advantage in making a contract, project management and 
operational flexibility in the view of the public sector. The BTL model also 
looked better to upgrade the service quality in an arterial rail project which was 
closely related to the service in another national arterial rail network. Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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On the other hand, the urban subway was quite different from the national 
arterial rail in choosing the optimal PPP model. Though the BTL model was also 
quantitatively better in the Seoul Metro 9 case, the quality of service was 
expected to be much affected by the ability of the operator as seen in the 
Seoul Metro 9 case. The high complexity of urban railway such as a subway 
project made the BTO model better in risk management. Thus, the BTO model 
was expected to be better for the private sector to maximise the creativity and 
to improve the service quality under the complex and competitive situations 
like the urban subway. 
 
Appropriate traffic demand risk sharing in South Korea 
 
Traffic demand risk was the most disputable issue in the transport PPP in South 
Korea. There were many criticisms on the BTO projects because of 
overestimated traffic forecast and the excessive MRG. The MRG regulation was 
abolished in 2009, but it became the important reason, along with the financial 
crisis, to depress the PPP in South Korea. Thus, the private sectors are 
requesting an appropriate demand risk sharing like the MRG. In fact, the traffic 
demand is very difficult to be managed by the private sector (Mackie and Smith, 
2004). Traffic is easily affected by the political decision of the government. 
Also it is much related to the rest of the transport network. Especially, in some 
cases like urban rail, the BTO model could be better to upgrade the quality of 
service and to manage the complex risk. Therefore, many countries have 
introduced demand risk sharing and this thesis discussed an appropriate 
traffic demand risk sharing in road and rail in South Korea.  
 
Traffic demand risk was fully on the private sector in the BTO model and it was 
on the public sector in the BTL model. The appropriate MRG level to share the 
traffic demand risk properly could be different in each case, but the maximum 
MRG level in the BTO model could be found by comparing with the BTL model. 
The thesis suggested the government expenditure including the subsidy by the 
MRG condition in the BTO model should not exceed that of the BTL model even 
in the case that actual traffic was less than expected. Comparisons of the BTL 
and the BTO options could be used to determine an appropriate MRG level in 
the view of the public sector.  Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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11.3 Contribution of the thesis 
 
This thesis is the first research to compare the BTL model with the BTO model 
in road and rail in South Korea through the quantitative and the qualitative 
VFM assessments. The following four contributions to the PPP policy of South 
Korea were found through the research.  
 
Firstly, this thesis shows that the BTL model can be the alternative to the BTO 
model best for transport infrastructures with incomes such as toll road in 
South Korea. In South Korea, it was commonly thought among policy makers 
that the BTO model was for the project with enough income such as transport 
infrastructure and the BTL model was for the project with little income such as 
a school or sewage facilities. However, the possibility was discovered that the 
BTL model could be better in transport infrastructures with revenue income. 
 
Secondly, this research suggested the methodology for comparing the BTL with 
the BTO model for the first time. Since the BTO and the BTL models were 
introduced to South Korea, both models have been thought to constitute 
different PPP areas. Some arguments were raised to use the BTL model instead 
of the BTO model for transport, but there was no way to examine the feasibility. 
This thesis presented the possibility and way to compare both models. 
 
Thirdly, it was found that the optimal PPP model could be different according 
to the kind of transport mode like road and urban rail. In South Korea, the PPP 
model for transport infrastructure was mainly the BTO model. However, this 
thesis suggests that the optimal PPP for road and national arterial rail could be 
the BTL model while the optimal PPP for urban rail could be the BTO model.  
 
Lastly, the adequacy level of MRG in the BTO cases was examined and the 
rational guideline for an appropriate MRG was suggested through the 
comparison of the BTO with the BTL model for the first time in South Korea. 
The MRG of the BTO cases in South Korea was widely regarded as excessive, 
but the thesis examined several BTO cases for the first time and it was found 
that the MRG level in the case of Seoul Metro 9 was not a bad deal for the 
public sector. Also, the appropriate MRG, which has been the most 
controversial issue in South Korea, was newly suggested. Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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11.4 Limitation of thesis and future research  
 
Through the literature reviews on the PPP models and five case studies in road 
and rail in South Korea, this thesis set out the main features of the BTO and the 
BTL models based on respective views of the public sector, the private sector 
and the end user. Considering the VFM, the optimal PPP model for road and rail 
in South Korea and the appropriate traffic demand risk sharing were suggested. 
Though the possibility of using the BTL model instead of the BTO model was 
shown, there are still several limitations for this to be used as the practical 
policy in transport in South Korea or in different countries.  
 
Firstly, more statistical data in traffic forecast is needed to increase the fidelity 
of stochastic analysis. The traffic demand risk is an important factor to choose 
the PPP for transport, but only a few data were found for rail in South Korea. 
Since the urban rail and national arterial rail show quite different 
characteristics, it also needs to assess them separately in stochastic analysis, 
but there were not enough data. In the case of road, the general possibility of 
the optimal PPP model considering the traffic demand risk was found, but it 
seems difficult to be used in a specific project. If the data is diversified by the 
region (e.g. urban area and suburb area), the stochastic analysis is expected to 
be more practically used in a specific project.  
 
Secondly, details of payment mechanism and performance assessment are 
needed to be studied more for introducing the BTL model to road in South 
Korea. This thesis only shows the possibility of the BTL model instead of the 
BTO model. For using the BTL model in road, specific payment mechanism 
such as incentives and standard performance assessment about the service 
quality, assessment measures, etc. should be prepared in advance. 
 
Thirdly, a concrete decision tool, usually called the MCDA (Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis), needs to integrate the results of the quantitative 
assessment and the qualitative assessment. This thesis shows the importance 
of the qualitative factors in the VFM, and it was assessed by the expert 
interviews. However, it does not suggest how to weigh on the quantitative 
assessment and the qualitative assessment. For practical purpose, rational 
MCDA method, like the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) which is common in Byungwoo Gil    Conclusions 
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the pre-feasibility test in infrastructure projects in South Korea (Park, 2001), 
needs to be studied more.   
 
Lastly, PPPs need to be studied more at different country levels. As can be seen 
in Chapter 2, many developing countries preferred the financially free standing 
PPP model like BTO or BOT. However, the UK preferred the service sold to the 
public sector model, usually used in the DBFO model. The basic difference 
between the DBFO and the BOT models lies in the fact that for the former, the 
government pays off the contractually defined “unique monthly payment” to 
the sponsors on a regular basis during the whole duration of contract (after the 
start of the exploitation period). On the other hand, the BOT contracts are 
most often funded by the user of the facility (Turina and Car-Pušić, 2006). This 
shows the similarity of comparison of the BTL and the BTO models in South 
Korea. Thus, if several social and economic factors are considered, the result 
of this thesis can be used in some other countries or can be expanded to the 
comparison among different countries.   Byungwoo Gil     
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APPENDIX 1 Transport PPP projects in the UK 
 
Project  Category  Sector  Capital 
Value £'m 
A249 Stockbury to Sheerness  PFI  Roads  100 
A1 Darrington to Dishforth  PFI  Roads  245 
A1(M) Alconbury to Peterborough DBFO  PFI  Roads  169.4 
A13 Thames Gateway  PFI  Roads  411 
A130 (A12-A127)(LA)  PFI  Roads  97.5 
A19 Dishforth to Tyne Tunnel DBFO  PFI  Roads  29.4 
A30/A35 Exeter to Bere Regis DBFO  PFI  Roads  75.7 
A419/A417 Swindon to Gloucester DBFO  PFI  Roads  49 
A50/A564 Stoke-Derby Link DBFO  PFI  Roads  20.6 
A69 Carlisle to Newcastle DBFO  PFI  Roads  9.4 
Birmingham Northern Relief Road (M6 Toll)  PFI  Roads  485 
Brent - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  8.5 
British Transport Police - New Police 
Stations  PFI 
Underground 
Rail  13 
London Underground - Connect  PFI 
Underground 
Rail  468 
Croydon Tramlink  PFI  Tram/Light Rail  205 
Dartford-Thurrock Crossing  PFI  Roads  180 
Deep Tube Lines - Bakerloo, Central & 
Victoria Lines (BCV)  PPP 
Underground 
Rail  5,381.00 
Deep Tube Lines - Jubilee, Northern & 
Piccadilly Lines (JNP)  PPP 
Underground 
Rail  5,526.00 
Docklands Light Railway (DLR) - Extension 
to City Airport  PFI  Tram/Light Rail  165 
Docklands Light Railway (DLR) - Extension 
to Lewisham  PFI  Tram/Light Rail  202 
Doncaster Interchange  PFI  Buses  26 
Islington - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  12.17 
Luton Airport Parkway  PFI  Railways|  20 
M1 - A1 Link Road (Lofthouse to Bramham)  PFI  Roads  214 
M40 Junctions 1 to 15  PFI  Roads  130 Byungwoo Gil     
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Manchester - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  35.2 
Manchester Metrolink Extension 1  PFI  Tram/Light Rail|  160 
Midland Metro Line One  PFI  Tram/Light Rail  145 
Newcastle & North Tyneside - Street 
Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  44.4 
Northern Line Trains  PFI 
Underground 
Rail  409 
Nottingham Express Transit Phase 1  PFI  Tram/Light Rail  200 
Portsmouth - Highway Maintenance  PFI  Roads  60 
London Underground - Power Supply  PFI 
Underground 
Rail  134 
London Underground - Prestige  PFI 
Underground 
Rail  192 
Second Severn Crossing  PFI  Roads  331 
Staffordshire - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  31.1 
Stoke - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  22.6 
Sub Surface Lines (SSL) - District, Circle, 
Metropolitan, East London & Hammersmith 
& City  PPP 
Underground 
Rail  6,687.00 
Sunderland - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  27.35 
Wakefield - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  19.5 
Walsall - Street Lighting  PFI  Street Lighting  18.6 
M77 Glasgow Southern Orbital DBFO 
Roads Project  PFI  Roads  135 
Inverness Airport Terminal  PFI  Airports  9.5 
M6 DBFO Project  PFI  Roads  96 
Skye Bridge 
Joint 
Venture  Roads  23.6 
A92 Dundee to Arbroath  PFI  Roads  61.5 
A55 Llandygai to Holyhead Trunk Road  PFI  Roads|  100 
Lloyd George Avenue and Callaghan 
Square  PFI  Roads  45 Byungwoo Gil     
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Newport Southern Distributor Road  PFI  Roads  57.1 
Sirhowy Enterprise Way Road Scheme  PFI  Roads  34.3 
Docklands Light Railway (DLR) - Extension 
to Woolwich  PFI  Tram/Light Rail  238.4 
London Borough of Ealing - Street Lighting 
Project  PFI  Street Lighting  34.3 
South Tyneside Borough Council - 
Streetlighting Project  PFI  Street Lighting  35.1 
Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council - 
Streetlighting Project  PFI  Street Lighting  20.3 
Lambeth - Street Lighting Project  PFI  Street Lighting  17.22 
Dorset Streetlighting Installations, 
Illuminated Traffic Signs and Bollards PFI  PFI  Street Lighting  29.3 
Norfolk County Council - Street Lighting PFI 
Project  PFI  Street Lighting  37.6 
Derby City Council - Street Lighting 
Installations & Illuminated Traffic Signs PFI  PFI  Street Lighting  38.4 
Leeds Street Lighting PFI Project  PFI  Street Lighting  104.9 
London Borough of Barnet - PFI Street 
Lighting Improvements  PFI  Street Lighting  28 
London Borough of Enfield - PFI Street 
Lighting Improvements  PFI  Street Lighting  24 
M25 DBFO (Design, Build, Finance and 
Operate) Project  PPP  Roads  1,316.00 
Northern Ireland Department for Regional 
Development - Roads Service DBFO - 
Package 1  PFI  Roads  139.2 
Carlisle Northern Development Route - 
A595  PFI  Roads  150 
Northern Ireland Department for Regional 
Development - Roads Service DBFO - 
Package 2  PFI  Roads  316 
MoD - Future Provision of Marine Services 
(FPMS)  PFI  Shipping  127.57 
M80 Stepps to Haggs DBFO  PFI  Roads  251.4 
South Coast Councils - Street Lighting & 
Illuminated Signs Maintenance Contract.  PFI  Street Lighting  225 
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APPENDIX 2 Korean PPP projects 
 
Korea BTO Projects 
      unit : billion KRW 
Road(33) 
Current Phase  Project Name 
Total  Project 
Cost 
Construction 
Commencement 
Construction 
Completion 
In  Operation 
(14) 
Incheon  Int ’ l 
Airport 
Expressway 
1,335  Nov-95  Nov-00 
Gwangju 
2
ndBeltway 
Section 1 
173  Jun-97  Nov-00 
Cheonan-
Nonsan 
Expressway 
995  Dec-97  Dec-02 
Woomyunsan 
Tunnel 
140  Aug-99  Jan-04 
New  Daegu-
Busan 
Expressway 
1,317  Feb-01  Jan-06 
Seoul Beltway  1,048  Jun-01  Jun-08 
Ilsan Bridge  149  Aug-03  Jun-08 
Machang Bridge  189  Apr-04  Jun-08 
Seoul-
Chuncheon 
Expressway * 
1,001  Aug-04  Aug-09 
Incheon Bridge *  524  Jul-05  Oct-09 
Yongin-Seoul 
Expressway * 
484  Oct-05  Jun-09 
Busan-Ulsan 
Expressway 
807  Aug-06  Dec-08 
West  Suwon-
Pyungtaek 
Expressway * 
608  Jun-05  Oct-09 
3rd  Gyeongin 
Connection 
(Shiheung-
Namdong) 
481  Feb-06  Nov-09 
Under 
Construction(5) 
Busan-Geojae 
Connection 
Road* 
1,000  Dec-04  Dec-10 
Myungji Bridge *  252  Jan-05  Jan-10 
Bukhang Bridge  230  Apr-07  Oct-11 
Gangnam 
Beltway 
568  Jul-07    
Daegu Highway  244  Dec-07    
Preparing  for 
Construction(4) 
Songhyun-Bulro 
Expressway * 
755       Byungwoo Gil     
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Gyungin(Anyang-
Sungnam)  2nd 
Expressway * 
465       
Pyungtaek-
Sihung 
Expressway * 
640       
Changwon-
Busan 
Expressway * 
286       
Under 
Negotiation(8) 
Busan  New  Port 
2nd  Rear 
Highway * 
278       
Youngcheon-
Sangju 
Expressway * 
1,098       
Youngdong  2nd 
Expressway * 
809       
Suwon-
Gwangmyung 
Expressway * 
634       
Seoul-Munsan 
Expressway * 
695       
Seoul-Pocheon 
Expressway * 
888       
Hwado-
Yangpyung 
Expressway * 
292       
Seoul-
Gwangmyung 
Expressway * 
731       
RFP 
Announced(2) 
West  Suwon-
Eiwang 
Expressway * 
251       
Ulsan Bridge *  239       
  
  1) The table above does not include PPP projects managed by local governments. 
  2) * indicates unsolicited projects. 
         
Rail(10) 
Current Phase  Project Name 
Total  Project 
Cost 
Construction 
Commencement 
Construction 
Completion 
In Operation (2) 
Incheon 
International 
Airport Railroad  2,282  Apr-01  Dec-09 
Seoul  Subway 
Line #9  480  Jun-06  Sep-09 
Under 
Construction(4) 
New  Bundang 
Subway  608  Jul-05  Jul-10 
Yongin LRT  397  Dec-05  Jul-10 
Busan  Gimhae 
LRT  482  Feb-06  Oct-10 
Uijungbu LRT  247  Aug-07    Byungwoo Gil     
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Under 
Negotiation(4) 
Seoul-Hanam 
LRT  247       
Gwangmyung 
LRT *  306       
Busan  Choeup 
LRT  131       
Ui Shinseul LRT *  396       
  
1) The table above does not include PPP projects managed by local governments. 
2) * indicates unsolicited projects. 
         
Ports(17) 
Current Phase  Project Name 
Total  Project 
Cost 
Construction 
Commencement 
Construction 
Completion 
In Operation(4) 
Mokpo  New  Port 
Phase 1-1  47  Jan-01  Jun-04 
Mokpo  New  Port 
Phase 1-2 *  13  Feb-02  Jun-04 
Incheon  North 
PortPhase 1-1  93  Mar-03  Jan-07 
Busan  New  Port 
Phase 1  1,149  May-01  May-09 
Under 
Construction(10) 
Gunsan  Biung 
Port *  51  Jul-03  Jun-07 
Incheon  North 
Multipurpose Port  132  Aug-03  Feb-08 
Ulsan  New  Port 
Phase 1-1  163  Jul-04  Jun-09 
Masan  Port 
Phase 1-1  136  Dec-05  Dec-11 
Phohang 
Youngilman  New 
Port Phase 1-1  145  Aug-05  Aug-09 
Incheon  North 
General Port  83  Nov-05  May-09 
Pyungtaek  East 
Port  106  Sep-06  Sep-09 
Pyungtaek  Port 
Quay for Grains  119  Jul-07    
Gunjang  Port 
Quay  for 
Merchandise  80  Aug-07    
Busan  New  Port 
Phase 2-3  512  Oct-07  Oct-11 
Preparing  for 
Construction (2) 
Gwangyang  Port 
Yeocheon Quay *  45       
Gwangyang  Port 
Phase  3-3  Quay 
for Container *  427       
Under 
Negotiation (1) 
Busan  New  Port 
Phase 2-4 *  421       
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1) The table above does not include PPP projects managed by local governments. 
2) * indicates unsolicited projects. 
         
Airports(7) 
Current Phase  Project Name 
Total  Project 
Cost 
Construction 
Commencement 
Construction 
Completion 
In Operation(7) 
Incheon  Airport 
Cargo Terminal  154  May-98    
Incheon  Airport 
Refuel System  10  Mar-98  Oct-02 
Incheon  Airport 
Cogeneration 
Plant  138  Apr-98  Oct-02 
Incheon  Airport 
Equipment 
Facilities  16  Jul-99  Oct-00 
Incheon  Airport 
Cargo 
Warehouse  18  Jan-99  Oct-00 
Incheon  Airport 
in-flight  Food 
Facility  74  May-99  Nov-00 
Incheon  Airport 
Flight 
Maintenance 
Facility  98  Mar-00  Jun-02 
  
1) The table above does not include PPP projects managed by local governments. 
         
Logistics Centers(5) 
Current Phase  Project Name 
Total  Project 
Cost 
Construction 
Commencement 
Construction 
Completion 
Under 
construction(1) 
Honam  Multi 
Freight Terminal  199  Dec-02  Dec-10 
Under 
Construction(2) 
Youngnam  Area 
Inland  Cargo 
Base  136  Mar-07  May-09 
Central Peninsula 
Cargo  Complex 
Terminal  111  Dec-06    
Preparing  for 
Construction (2) 
Extension  of 
Gunpo  Cargo 
Complex 
Terminal *  251       
Metropolitan Area 
Northern  Cargo 
Base *  152       
  
1) The table above does not include PPP projects managed by local governments. 
2) * indicates unsolicited projects. 
         
Environmental Facilities (7) Byungwoo Gil     
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Current Phase  Project Name 
Total  Project 
Cost 
Construction 
Commencement 
Construction 
Completion 
In Operation (1) 
Seoul 
Metropolitan Area 
Resource 
Facilities  for 
Reclaimed 
Landfill  and  Gas 
Reclamation  772  Mar-04  06.12/2006 
Under 
Construction(2) 
Yongin  Sewage 
Disposal 
Facilities *  518  Dec-05  Jun-08 
North  Jeolla 
Province 
Environmental 
Facilities*  589  Feb-05  Jun-08 
Preparing  for 
Construction (2) 
Anseong Sewage 
Disposal 
Facilities *  377       
Pohang 
Jangyang  Waste 
Disposal 
Facilities *  188       
Under 
Negotiation(2) 
Ulsan  City  Waste 
Treatment 
Facilities *  840       
Wang-gung 
livestock 
Wastewater 
Treatment 
Facilities*  89       
  
1) The table above does not include PPP projects managed by local governments. 
2) * indicates unsolicited projects. 
 
 
BTL Projects to be announced in 2008 
Source of Fund  Facility Type  Total Project Cost*  No. of Project 
Central Government 
Railway  7,716  12 
University Facility  268  1 
Sub-Total  7,984  13 
Local  Government 
(Subsidized  by 
central government) 
Sewage System  10,505  15 
Cultural Facility  1,038  3 
Welfare Facility  124  2 
Science Museum  137  1 
Sub-Total  11,804  21 
Local Government 
Elementary/Middle 
School  9,071  23 
Total     28,859  57 
       
BTL Projects to be announced in 2007 
Source of Fund  Facility Type  Total Project Cost*  No. of Project 
Central Government  National University  3,282  2 Byungwoo Gil     
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Railway  13,259  1 
IT Network  2,367  1 
Military Housing  4,985  8 
Vocational College  707  1 
Marine Museum  1,028  1 
Sub-Total  25,628  14 
Local  Government 
(Subsidized  by 
central government) 
Sewage System  11,732  15 
Cultural Facility  939  3 
Welfare Facility  669  2 
cience Museum  227  1 
Sub-Total  13,567  21 
Local Government 
Elementary/Middle 
School  16,294  42 
Total     55,489  77 
       
       
BTL Projects to be announced in 2006 
Source of Fund  Facility Type  Total Project Cost*  No. of Project 
Central Government 
National University  544  2 
Railway  10,523  2 
Military Housing  12,956  23 
Vocational College  592  1 
Sub-Total  24,615  28 
Local  Government 
(Subsidized  by 
central government) 
Sewage System  21,589  29 
Cultural Facility  1,568  9 
Welfare Facility  454  1 
Science Museum  450  2 
Sub-Total  24,061  41 
Local Government 
Elementary/Middle 
School  23,817  58 
Total     72,493  127 
       
       
BTL Projects to be announced in 2005 
Source of Fund  Facility Type  Total Project Cost*  No. of Project 
Central Government 
National University  5,427  10 
Military Housing  3,583  6 
Vocational College  398  1 
Sub-Total  9,408  17 
Local  Government 
(Subsidized  by 
central government) 
Sewage System  10,528  17 
Cultural Facility  3,986  12 
Welfare Facility  598  2 
Sub-Total  15,112  31 
Local Government 
Elementary/Middle 
School  13,404  38 
Total     37,924  86 
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APPENDIX 3 Summary of Interview on the PPP in South Korea 
 
1.  The purpose of an interview 
 
Not only in the UK but also in South Korea, the qualitative VFM in the process 
of the PPP procurement is assessed based on the opinions of experts on 
projects. The purpose of this interview is to assess the qualitative VFM of the 
five PPP cases in South Korea; Incheon Airport Expressway, Oksan-Ochang 
Expressway, Incheon Airport Railway, Daegok-Sosa Railway and Seoul Metro 9.  
 
The current VFM guidance has not enough evidence to affect the result of the 
VFM with qualitative assessment. This is the main reason that the qualitative 
VFM assessment is being used as only referential factor to choose the PPP. 
However, the quantitative assessment between PPP models can be less decisive 
than between the PPP and PSC, because the BTL and BTO options shares many 
more common factors in the quantitative assessment than the PPP and PSC 
options. It means that the role of the reasonable qualitative can be more 
important and more details should be backed up in qualitative assessment 
through the interview. 
 
2.  Main contents 
 
For the qualitative VFM assessment to compare the BTL with the BTO model, 
the interviews are divided into four parts; (1) General comparison between the 
BTL and BTO, (2) Finding qualitative factors which can be compared in different 
PPP models, (3) Assessment of qualitative characteristics based on the factors 
found in (2) in each PPP case and (4) Analysis of qualitative characteristics of 
the BTL and BTO model in road and rail.  
 
Mostly the qualitative VFM assessment follows the VFM guidance, but this 
guidance for comparing the PPP option with the PSC option. Especially, this 
qualitative VFM assessment is the first try to compare the different PPP models 
each other in different transport projects. Thus, it needs to analyse the general 
characteristics of the BTL and BTO model firstly through the interview of PPP 
experts beside the literature reviews. Byungwoo Gil     
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Secondly, the qualitative factors can be different in comparing the PPP with the 
PSC and in comparing the BTL with the BTO model. These factors need to be 
found based on the current qualitative VFM guidance and also more factors can 
be added through the interview. 
 
Third and fourth parts are about the concrete PPP cases. Based on the factors 
in the form of issues and questions found in the second part, each factor will 
be assessed.  
 
The characteristic of the BTO and BTL in road can be different when it used in 
rail, and it is difficult to find the difference through the quantitative VFM 
assessment in which most factors are same. Thus, the qualitative analysis is 
needed in road and rail lastly. 
 
3.  The way of interview 
 
There can be various methods such as survey, literature review, etc. to prove 
the result of qualitative assessment, but comparing the BTL with the BTO has 
not been done before. Thus, the face to face method seems more effective 
because the comparison concept and various possible contract conditions in 
different PPP models should be cleared and explained to the interviewee even 
though they are experts in the PPP field. 
 
The case for the Seoul Metro 9 was added to this research after the first 
interview, so telephone interview is done for the Seoul Metro 9.  
 
 
4.  The schedule for the interview 
 
4.1.  Date 
-  the first interview : 6 Nov. 2010 ~ 21 Nov. 2010 (2 weeks)  
-  the second interview : 13 May 2011~14 May 2011 (by phone) 
 
4.2.  Place : South Korea (face to face) 
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4.3.  Interviewee 
 
  Field  Interviewee 
○ 1  
General 
Director of Metropolitan road division, Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime affairs 
○ 2   Deputy Director of Project evaluation division, Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance 
○ 3   Chief of PPP policy unit, Korea Development Institute 
○ 4   Head of Road policy centre, Korea Research Institute for 
Human Settlements 
○ 5   Research fellow of Centre for transport and climate change, 
Korea Transport Institute 
○ 6   Head of office of construction management, SCMA (Seoul 
Regional Construction Management Administration) 
○ 7   Manager of BAI (The Board of Audit and Inspection) 
○ 8   Head of infrastructure division, KB (Kookmin Bank) Asset 
Management 
○ 9  
Incheon 
Airport 
Expressway 
Director of Airport policy division, Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime affairs 
○ 10  Head of construction planning office, Korea Highway 
Corporation 
○ 11  Head of Strategy team, New Airport Hiway. Ltd 
○ 12 
Incheon 
Airport 
Railway 
Deputy Director of Railway division, Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime affairs 
○ 13  Staff of Strategy and Planning team, AREX 
○ 14  Staff of KORAIL 
○ 15 
Oksan-
Ochang 
Expressway 
Deputy director of Urban road division, Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime affairs 
○ 16  Staff of GS construction Ltd. 
○ 17  Staff of Korea Highway Corporation 
○ 18 
Sosa-Wonsi 
Railway 
Director of Railway policy division, Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime affairs 
○ 19  Staff of DAEWOO construction Ltd. 
○ 20  Staff of Construction office, Korea Railway Network Authority 
○ 21 
Seoul Metro 
9 
Deputy director of SMG 
○ 22  Staff of VEOLIA RAPT. 
○ 23  Staff of MLTM 
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5.  Topic guidance for the interview of the PPP experts  
 
< General comparison between the BTL and BTO > 
 
1.1.  (General)What are the characteristics and differences of the BTL and BTO? 
1.2.  The PPP can have various conditions like a MRG in contract, so the BTL 
and BTO can become similar by the contracted condition when it makes a 
contract between the public and private sector. What do you think makes 
the BTL and the BTO different decisively? 
1.3.  What is the advantage and disadvantage of the BTL and BTO 
1.4.  In the UK which is the most advanced country in the PPP field, the most 
prevalent PPP is the “service sold to the public sector” model which is the 
BTL model in Korea. On the other hand, many developing countries prefer 
the financially free standing model like the BTO. What do you think of the 
reason of choosing different PPP model?  
1.5.  Do you think there is any difference between the BTL and BTO in the 
construction stage of a transport infrastructure project? If yes, what is the 
difference and which model is benefit to the public sector, private sector 
and the end users? 
1.6.  Do you think there is any difference between the BTL and BTO in the 
operation stage of a transport infrastructure project? If yes, what is the 
difference and which model is benefit to the public sector, private sector 
and the end users? 
1.7.  (BTL possibility)The BTL and BTO, both models are being used in rail 
projects in South Korea. Please, compare the advantage and disadvantage 
of both models in rail. 
1.8.  Do you think that the BTL model can be used instead of the BTO model in 
road? If say yes, what is the reason and if say no, what is the reason? 
 
< Finding qualitative factors which can be compared in different PPP models > 
 
1.9.  Do you know about the issues in the qualitative VFM guidance of Korea 
and do you think it is appropriate to assess the qualitative VFM of a PPP 
project? Byungwoo Gil     
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1.10.  Current qualitative VFM guidance seems not to be dealt seriously in the 
reason that experiences about the PPP are not enough in South Korea. Do 
you agree with this opinion? If no, what is the reason and solution? 
1.11.  The VFM guidance of the UK suggests 10 issues and 49 questions. Are 
there any issues or questions to be used in qualitative VFM assessment in 
South Korea? 
1.12.  Quantitative VFM seems difficult to deal with the interests of private 
sector and the end user, so their views look necessary to be considered in 
the qualitative VFM assessment. Do you agree with this opinion and if yes, 
how these interests can be included in the qualitative VFM assessment? 
1.13.  Do you think that current qualitative VFM guidance can be used to 
compare the BTL with the BTO? If no, how this guidance should be 
modified? 
1.14.  What issues and questions in current qualitative VFM guidance can be 
used to compare the BTL with BTO model in a transport project? Please, 
add or omit issues and questions to current guidance for comparing the 
PPP with the PSC. 
1.15.  Please comment on the modified issues and questions which are 
suggested in this study to compare the BTL with the BTO for the 
qualitative VFM assessment. 
 
< Analysis of qualitative characteristics of the BTL and BTO model in road and 
rail > 
 
1.16.  Do you think the appropriate PPP model can be different in road and rail? 
If yes, which PPP model is effective to road and rail in the view of the 
public sector, private sector and the end users? If no, why do you think 
the difference between the BTL and BTO is little to use the PPP in road 
and rail? 
1.17.  There are many risks such as construction risk, operation risk and 
demand risk to do the PPP project. In the view of the public sector, what 
risks exist to choose the BTL model instead of the BTO model and which 
PPP model is more risky in road and rail? 
1.18.  In the view of the private sector, what risks exist to choose the BTL model 
instead of the BTO model and which PPP model is more risky in road and 
rail? Byungwoo Gil     
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1.19.  In the view of the end users, what risks exist to choose the BTL model 
instead of the BTO model and which PPP model is more risky in road and 
rail? 
1.20.  The operation seems more complicated in rail than road. Do you think 
different PPP model can affect the operation and what is the reason? 
1.21.  Do you think the different PPP model can affect the service quality in road 
or rail. If yes, which PPP model is more sensitive to the service quality?  
 
< Assessment of qualitative characteristics in each PPP case > 
 
1.22.  What is the benefit of using the current PPP model in this project in the 
point of the service quality? Is it possible to improve the service quality 
including the level of toll or tariff if the different PPP model were used in 
this project? 
1.23.  What is the benefit of the current PPP model in making a contract with the 
private sector and managing the project? If the different PPP model were 
used, can be more effective in making a contract and managing the 
project? 
1.24.  Do you think that the risk management of this project was (is) 
appropriate through the payment mechanism or the contract? If you think 
so, what is the reason and if you don’t think so, what is the reason? 
1.25.  Most PPP projects last for more than 20 years, so it is not easy to 
renovate or upgrade new technology which is not developed yet and 
consider the change of circumstances. Do you think the current PPP 
model is appropriate to cope with this kind of operational change? If you 
do not think so, what is the reason? Byungwoo Gil     
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APPENDIX 4 Result of interview for the qualitative VFM assessment 
 
1  General comparison between the BTL and BTO 
 
1.1  The most decisive factor which makes the BTO and BTL different 
 
Commonly all interviewed experts agreed that the most important factor 
making the BTO and BTL different was the traffic demand risk. In the 
BTO  model,  the  private  sector  has  the  demand  risk  while  the  public 
sector has the demand risk in the BTL model. They recognised that the 
gap between the BTO and the BTL model could get closer if the level of 
the MRG in the BTO model is getting high. In the opposite way, the BTL 
model can be similar with the BTO model if the demand risk is shared 
with  the  private  sector  through  the  payment  mechanism  such  as  a 
shadow toll in the PFI of the UK. Thus, there was no discrepancy in the 
opinion that the most decisive point discriminating the BTL model with 
the BTO model is that who mainly has the traffic demand risk. 
 
Some  experts  pointed  out  that  the  BTO  model  could  be  used  in  the 
facility with the profitability through the revenue collecting from the end 
users only and the BTL model was usually used in the facility without the 
profitability.  This  seems  related  with  the  PPP  circumstances  of  South 
Korea. 
 
1.2  The possibility of using the BTL model instead of the BTO 
projects 
 
All interviewed PPP experts agreed that it was legally possible to use the 
BTL  model  instead  of  the  BTO  model  in  the  transport  PPP.  However, 
there were subtle differences in practical approach between the public 
sector  and  private  sector.  Researchers  and  experts  from  the  private 
sector said that the BTL model of which revenue paid by the Government 
could  be  an  alternative  to  the  BTO  project  which  fell  in  difficulties 
because of financing, but the Government officials including the MOSF 
were  reluctant  to  use  the  BTL  model  instead  of  the  BTO  model  in 
facilities expected to have enough profitability. The Government officials Byungwoo Gil     
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from the MLTM concerned that the Government had to have the whole 
demand risk if the BTL model was used instead of the BTO model. They 
said that the formal reason to use the BTL model in rail currently was to 
achieve the better VFM, but unveiled real feelings that it seemed to be 
very difficult to find the difference of the service quality between the BTL 
and  the  PSC.  A  Government  official  from  the  MOSF  worried  that  the 
Government debt could be increased when the BTL model was used in 
the current BTO projects. He said the MOSF was less interested in how 
much the Government could make a profit by adopting the BTL model, 
because  it  had  high  uncertainties  in  revenue  based  on  the  traffic 
forecasting.    
 
Also,  an  expert  said  that  the  Korean  Government  preferred  the  BTO 
model to the BTL model if the project had enough profitability, because 
the PPP policy of South Korea mainly focused on saving budget.  
  
1.3  The advantage and disadvantage of different PPP models in 
transport 
 
The Korean Government has introduced the BTL model to several railway 
projects since 2005, and comparing two different PPP models in rail can 
be easy to understand the characteristic of the BTL and the BTO. Thus 
many  interviews  of  this  part  were  basically  done  based  on  rail 
experience.  
 
An expert criticised to use the BTO model in transport such as road and 
rail, because the demand risk the private sector has in the BTO model is 
much  more  affected  by  the  Government  policy  or  planning  than  the 
private  sector’s  effort.  He  questioned  whether  the  BTO  model  in 
transport  was  right,  and  argued  that  the  BTL  model  was  more 
appropriate in transport PPP. However, he agreed that the BTO model 
could urge more creativity and efficiency to the private sector to make 
more  profit if there was  no  MRG  (Minimum  Revenue  Guarantee).  It is 
also  pointed  out  that  the  private  sector  did  more  active  try  to  be 
involved in from the design and construction stage in the BTO model.  
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Many experts said that the BTL model was easier to finance than the 
BTO model in which the private sector had more demand risk. This is 
the  big  advantage  of  the  BTL  model  in  the  current  tough  financial 
circumstances. However, an expert from the financial investor said they 
prefer  the  BTO  with  the  MRG  model  to  the  BTL  model,  because  the 
financial investor expects the opportunity to make more profit in the 
PPP investment. Of course they agreed to want to avoid high risk of the 
BTO model, but they also hoped to have more profit than that of the BTL 
model which is quite low compared with the other investment chance. 
The BTO with MRG was the best to the financial investor, because the 
minimum profit was guaranteed and an additional chance to make more 
profit could be provided.  
 
Opinions on some factors were different with each stake holders. In the 
wise of making a contract, the Government officials said that the BTL 
was more complicated in making a contract to regulate the standard of 
the service quality in the written form. The private sectors said that the 
BTO  model  was  harder  to  be  prepared  to  assess  the  risk  and  to 
negotiate the public sector. The views on the advantageous PPP model 
in  construction  stage  were  somewhat  different.  Most  interviewees 
thought  that  the  difference  between  the  BTL  and  the  BTO  model  in 
construction  stage  was  little.  However,  some  experts  argued  that  the 
BTO model needed more resources in the construction stage, because 
they  worried more things in operation stage after construction in the 
BTO model. The flexibility of the contract was also an important issue. 
The  Government  officials  said  that  the  BTL  model  would  be  more 
appropriate to cope with the change of operational circumstances such 
as regional development or advanced technology. The Government can 
request something to  change  in the  BTL  model through the  payment 
mechanism in which lease fee is regularly paid by the Government. On 
the contrary, the private sectors said that the BTO model would be more 
sensitive to that kind of change. If there is an important change in the 
operational circumstances, the private sector can not help dealing with 
that  change  in  the  BTO  model,  in  which  the  revenue  risk  is  on  the 
private sector. To this view, a researcher pointed out that the interest of 
the private sector was on the profit, so they would cope with only the Byungwoo Gil     
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operational change related with their profit in the BTO model. About the 
service  quality,  most  interviewees  consented  that  the  operation 
company might try harder to achieve higher service quality in the BTO 
model. However,  some  researchers  said that the  BTL  model  could  be 
better to the end user in the view of the level of tariff or toll.  
 
2  Qualitative characteristics of the PPP models in different transport 
mode 
 
2.1  The relation of the PPP model and transport mode in the contract 
stage 
 
Problems in a contract stage were pointed out that the transaction cost 
and unclearness in terms and conditions. Transaction cost is about the 
time cost such as time spending on negotiation and the direct cost such 
as a consulting or initial design cost of the private sector. With respect 
to time cost, many interviewees said that the most decisive problem was 
delay of the making a contract because of the discrepancy between the 
public  and  private  sector  in  an  appropriate  profit  under  the  current 
tough  global  financial  circumstances.  Some  projects  have  failed  to 
finance from the financial investor even after making a contract with the 
public  sector,  so  the  projects  were  delayed  without  a  specific  time 
schedule. Thus, the BTL model generally looked easier in contract stage 
than  the  BTO  model  and  many  experts  agreed  with  this  view.  A 
researcher pointed out that rail is more complicated in construction and 
operation than road, so it could take more time to get an agreement in 
performance  level  in  the  BTL  model  in  which  details  of  performance 
should be written on a contract. Of course, he agreed that the difference 
of complexity between road and rail was not too big and the difference 
depended  on  terms  and  conditions  of  each  PPP  project,  so  it  was 
difficult to say that the generally BTO model was better to rail.  
 
2.2  The relation of the PPP model and transport mode in the design 
and construction stage 
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Most  experts  said  that  the  difference  between  the  PPP  models  in  a 
construction stage could be neglected whether the project was road or 
rail.  These  views  looked  to  be  related  with  the  current  Korean  PPP 
market  in  which  the  private  sectors  mostly  consisted  of  major 
construction  companies.  Especially,  many  of  them  said  that  both  PPP 
models  in  road  case  had  to  follow  the  standard  road  specification 
regulated  by  the  Government,  so  it  was  not  easy  to  find  difference 
between  the  BTL  and  the  BTO  model.  Rail  was  more  complicated  in 
construction  than  road.  Experts  in  rail  showed  their  opinion  that 
bedding  construction  could  be  similar  with  road,  so  there  was  little 
difference  between two  PPP  models. However, they  argued that other 
facilities  and  equipments  such  as  electrified  structures,  operational 
facilities and a train were various and they were much related with the 
operation, so the BTO model could be expected to response actively to 
end users demand even in a design stage. A researcher said that the 
Seoul Metro subway no.9 which was newly opened in 2009 was a good 
example. The bedding construction of the Seoul Metro no.9 was done by 
the public sector, and the other facilities and equipments were procured 
through the BTO. The private sector newly introduced general and fast 
train system, workerless station, etc and this concept was adopted from 
the design stage. After all, the BTO model in Seoul Metro no. 9 could 
provide  the  possibility  of  introducing  more  effective  and  recent 
technology from a design and construction stage in rail.     
 
2.3  The  relation  of  the  PPP  model  and  transport  mode  in  the 
operation stage 
 
Some interviewees argued that the private sector had more strength on 
the  operation  of  transport  facilities  than  the  public  sector.  They  said 
that the difference in road and rail between the private and public sector 
was  not  easy  to  find  in  the  construction  stage,  because  it  was 
construction  companies  that  constructed  road  and  rail  whatever  the 
procurement model is. Their arguments were that the responsibility in 
operation stage made the competitiveness of private sector in the PPP 
high. Operational responsibility of the private sector in the BTL model is 
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private  sector.  While  the  responsibility  in  the  BTO  model  is  on  the 
private sector and their performance is indirectly assessed by the end 
users in the form of revenue. Thus, better PPP model in the operation 
stage seems to depend on which sector between the public sector and 
the end users is better to get higher service quality and to strengthen 
the operational responsibility of the private sector.  
 
Many experts said that the demand in transport was more affected by 
the route than the service quality, because the competition between the 
transport  infrastructures  is  quite  much  restricted  from  the  planning 
stage of the project. The Government prevents excessive investment to 
the  transport  infrastructures  through  the  feasibility  test  such  as  the 
benefit  cost  analysis.  However,  most  interviewees  agreed  that  the 
service  quality  in  rail  such  as  comfort,  train  schedule,  on  time  was 
relatively  more  important  than  it  was  compared  with  that  of  road. 
Generally, the private sector pays more attention to the service quality in 
the BTO model, in which they collect the revenue from the end users 
directly. Many researchers consented that the BTO model could be more 
appropriate to rail in the view of service quality.  
 
On the other hand, some other experts argued that the service quality 
should be considered with the level of tariff or toll. They said that the 
possibility of lowering the level of tariff or toll is higher in the BTL model.  
 
Several researchers said that the rail systems should be divided into the 
city  metro  rail  and  national  arterial  rail.  They  argued  that  the 
characteristics  of  the  metro  and  arterial  rail  quite  different.  In  South 
Korea, metro rail can be constructed and operated independently, but 
the arterial rail projects are mostly parts of the national rail networks 
and  the  operation  should  be  related  with  the  existing  rail  network. 
Considering two different characteristics of the metro and arterial rail, 
they said that the BTL model was better to the arterial rail and the BTO 
model was better to the metro rail in the view of operation. 
 
3  Qualitative assessment for each PPP cases in case of using different 
PPP model instead of current model Byungwoo Gil     
  262   
 
Basically a qualitative VFM assessment is done by the public sector and it is 
assessed  in  the  view  of  the  public  sector.  However,  it  should  include 
different views of the private sector and end users for a successful PPP deal. 
These  views  can  be  considered  in  the  achievability  and  serviceability. 
Following assessment was done through the PPP experts interviews based 
on the modified VFM guidance for comparing the BTO and BTL proposed in 
the transferring report.   
 
3.1  The Incheon Airport Expressway (BTO with MRG model) 
 
< Serviceability > 
 
With respect to the serviceability, 8 interviewees said that this project 
was done by the BTO with MRG model, and the level of MRG was 90% at 
first introduced, so it was difficult to expect for the private sector to 
make an effort to improve the service quality (○ A ). A Government officer 
who was in charge of this project argued that even if the BTL model had 
been used, there had been little difference with the BTO model in the 
serviceability wise (○ B ). He argued that most factors in service quality 
such as speed, physical condition, driving etiquette, etc. seemed to be 
decided not by the effort of the private sector but by the geographic 
route,  a  physical  standard  of  expressway,  and  transport  culture.  He 
pointed out that the service factor which can be managed by the private 
sector looked to affect little for the end users to choose the road even in 
the BTO case without MRG condition. An officer of BAI (Board of Audit 
and Inspection) said that when he collected issues on the PPP, people 
could  not  feel  any  strength  of  private  sector  in  this  project  and 
complained excessive toll price (○ C ). Others said that though there was 
little difference in the service quality, but the toll price could be lower in 
the BTL model, so the BTL model could be better in the wise of service 
quality.  
 
< Contract and management > 
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An interviewee argued that there was no the MRG condition when the 
BTO  contract  was  first  made,  so  it  lasted  for  two  years  to  reach  to 
agreement between the public and private sector. Thus, he said that if 
the BTL model had been used at that time, this time could have been 
reduced (○ D ). In the view of the Government, the BTL model had more 
benefit to cut the negotiation time and to manage the project by the 
public sector’s needs.  
 
< Incentivising good risk management > 
 
All  interviewees  said  that  there  was  no  incentive  to  the  good  risk 
management  of  the  private  sector  in  the  Incheon  Airport  Expressway 
project which was done by the BTO model with the MRG. They argued 
that it was difficult to say the BTL model was better to incentivise the 
good  risk  management,  but  it  had  more  opportunities  to  incentivise 
through  the  performance  assessment.  In  this  BTO  case,  risks  in 
construction  stage  were  hedged  by  the  general  insurance  for 
construction and there was no risk hedge in operation stage. The private 
sector has whole responsibility in operation and they are judged by only 
the revenue which was collected by the end users. However, the MRG 
regulation guaranteed 90% of expected revenue, so there was no reason 
for the private sector to make an effort to manage risk well. With regard 
to this view, a researcher said that this project looked better to choose 
the BTL model instead of the BTO with MRG model (○ E ).   
 
< Operational flexibility > 
 
With regard to the operational flexibility, opinions of the private sector 
and  the  public  sector  were  quite  different.  The  interviewee  from  the 
private sector said that the private sectors would react to the change of 
circumstances by the public sector’s request in the BTL model (○ F ). They 
argued that the public sector could not be more sensitive to this kind of 
change than the private sector. However, an interviewee from the public 
sector pointed out that the private sector had  whole  responsibility  in 
operation  in  this  project,  so  it  looked  to  take  longer  for  the  private 
sector  to  introduce  the  electronic  toll  charging  system  which  was Byungwoo Gil     
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already used to the other expressways (○ G ). The Government guaranteed 
the operation cost, but the contents of operation cost were not checked 
or reviewed at all. Thus, he criticised that the real traffic was much lower 
than the forecasted, so the private sector was difficult to expect to earn 
more revenue than the guaranteed level in this BTO  with MRG model 
even if they had made an effort to attract users or cut the operating cost 
through the introduction of new technology.   
 
3.2  The Incheon Airport Railway (BTO with MRG model) 
 
< Serviceability > 
 
This project was also done by the BTO with MRG model, and the level of 
MRG  was  90%  at  first,  so  most  interviewees  agreed  that  the  private 
sector was not expected to make an effort to improve the service quality 
(○ A ). Several experts argued that even if the BTL model had been used, 
there had  been  little difference  with the BTO  with  MRG  model in the 
serviceability. However, an expert argued that the BTO model, even if it 
had  the  MRG,  could  have  many  benefits  than  the  BTL  model  in  rail, 
because  an  operation  investor  could  creatively  involve  in  the  project 
from design and construction stage (○ B ). In the BTL model, an operator 
investor  did  not  need  to  make  an  effort  to  induce  the  creative  and 
competitive ideas to the service quality. The only thing they have to do 
might  be  to  have  an  ability  to  fulfil  the  demand  of  the  Government. 
Especially, many experts agreed that this project needed huge financial 
investment  and  the  competition  was  limited  to  a  few  construction 
companies. They made only one consortium to bid, so it was difficult to 
expect  for  them  to  be  creative  and  competitive  compared  with  the 
public sector when the BTL had been used.  
 
< Contract and management > 
 
Most interviewees agreed that if the BTL model had been used instead of 
the BTO with MRG model which was adapted to this project, the time 
spent on negotiation could have been reduced (○ D ). In the view of the Byungwoo Gil     
  265   
public  sector,  the  BTL  model  had  more  advantages  in  managing  the 
project  to  cope  with  the  needs  of  public  sector.  However,  an  expert 
opposed  to  this  opinion,  because  there  was  no  experience  of 
performance assessment in operation not only in road but also in rail, 
so it could take much time for the public sector to make the criteria and 
standard of performance (○ C ). Also this might be worse in rail which is 
more complicated in operation than road.  
 
< Incentivising good risk management > 
 
All  interviewees  said  that  there  was  no  incentive  to  the  good  risk 
management of the private sector in the Incheon Airport Railway project 
which was done by the BTO model with the MRG (○ E ). The private sector 
has  whole  responsibility  in  operation  like  the  Incheon  Airport 
Expressway.  Though  they  were  more  sensitive  to  the  end  users  than 
road, but their performance was not assessed at all by the public sector 
and  there  was  no  reason  for  the  private  sector  to  make  an  effort  to 
manage risk well because their revenue was guaranteed regardless of 
the result of risk management. An interviewee said that if the BTL model 
had  been  used  in  this  project,  the  private  sector  might  have  more 
burdens in operation (○ F ). She pointed out that good risk management 
regularly  was  checked  in  the  BTL  model  through  the  performance 
assessment, but the public sector did not want to interfere with the risk 
management of the private sector beyond their responsibility in the BTO 
model.   
 
< Operational flexibility > 
 
With regard to the operational flexibility, an interviewee said that it was 
decided by the conditions of each project contract rather than by the 
PPP model and many other experts agreed with this opinion (○ G ). In case 
of  considering  the  difference  of  PPP  models  of  which  the  terms  and 
conditions are similar, the private sector alleged that they were more 
sensitive  to  the  change  of  circumstances  or  technology  in  the  BTO 
model.  However,  a  Government  official  mentioned  that  the  private Byungwoo Gil     
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sector were only interested in making a profit, so they might be adapt 
the technology or innovative skill only when it could make an additional 
profit  in  the  BTO  model.  Even  though  the  private  sector  could  save 
operating cost or increase revenue, it might be included to the private 
sector  as  an  incentive  in  the  BTO  model,  so  there  would  be  little  to 
increase  the  VFM  in  the  view  of  the  Government.  Consequently,  he 
argued  that  the  BTL  model  seemed  to  have  more  benefit  in  the 
operational flexibility (○ H ).  
 
3.3  The Oksan-Ochang Expressway (BTO model) 
 
The  Oksan-Ochang  Expressway  is  the  BTO  without  the  MRG  project 
suggested  by  the  private  sector.  The  private  sector  requested  the 
construction  subsidy  of  the  Government  and  this  suggestion  was 
rejected  because  of  low  VFM  compared  with  the  PSC  option.  The 
Government  proposed  to  reduce  the  subsidy  and  profit,  and  the 
consortium  of  construction  companies  accepted  it  but  they  have 
difficulties in financing. 
 
< Serviceability > 
 
Most interviewees agreed that there would be little difference between 
the BTL and the BTO model in the serviceability (○ A ). They argued that 
the service in road seemed routine and it was decided not by the effort 
of  the  private  sector  but  by  the  geographic  route.  An  officer  of  BAI 
(Board of Audit and Inspection) also pointed out that the Oksan-Ochang 
Expressway  was  not  expected  to  be  congested  at  first  as  newly 
constructed road which was designed for decades later, so people would 
be more interested in toll price (○ B ). Others said that though there was 
little difference in the service quality, but the toll price could be lower in 
the BTL model, so the BTL model could be better in the wise of service 
quality.  
 
< Contract and management > 
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This  project  without  the  MRG  condition  is  having  much  difficulty  in 
financing  because  of  high  demand  risk  of  the  private  sector  beside 
general  financial  situation  wanting  avoid  long-term  risk.  Thus,  most 
interviewees consented that choosing the BTL model would be helpful to 
finance and make a contract (○ C ). Many of them also mentioned that the 
management of road in operation is about the maintenance, so there 
would be very little different in management in both PPP models.  
 
< Incentivising good risk management > 
 
All  interviewees  said  that  incentivising  good  risk  management  is 
available  to  both  PPP  models  through  the  conditions  of  contract. 
However,  the  most  important  difference  between  the  BTL  and  BTO 
model is who is in charge of traffic demand risk. Thus, this was about 
the good management in demand risk which is on the private sector in 
the BTO model and on the private sector in the BTL model. In this BTO 
project, the private sector has whole responsibility of demand risk, so 
there is no incentivising from the Government and the private sector is 
compensated for the traffic demand by the collected revenue from the 
end users. An interviewee argued that the BTL model seemed better to 
manage the demand risk in road, because the traffic demand in road 
was much affected not by the effort of an operator but by the road route 
which was decided by the Government (○ D ). He alleged that it was better 
to incentivise good risk management which could be controlled by the 
private sector through the performance assessment in the BTL model.  
 
< Operational flexibility > 
 
With regard to the operational flexibility, opinions of the private sector 
and  the  public  sector  were  quite  different  like  other  projects. 
Interviewees from the private sector said that the private sectors would 
be passive to the need of operational change in the BTL model (○ E ). They 
argued  that  considering  the  public  sector  tended  to  cope  with  these 
changes later compared with the private sector, the BTO model would 
be better. Like other projects, the public sector argued that the private 
sector would not be interested in the change with no profit and even Byungwoo Gil     
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though  they  would  change,  it  might  not  be  related  with  the  VFM 
measured in the view of public sector (○ F ). Thus, they said that the BTL 
model could be better in the operational flexibility.  
 
3.4  The Daegok-Sosa Railway (BTL model) 
 
The Daegok-Sosa Railway is the solicited BTL project. The VFM test has 
been done and now is in negotiation with the Government. This project 
is  the  part  of  arterial  railway  network,  and  it  can  not  be  operated 
separately with other trains. It is one of the most important reasons to 
choose the BTL model. 
 
< Serviceability > 
 
With respect to the serviceability, most interviewees thought the private 
sector could be difficult to improve the serviceability whatever the PPP 
model is, because this project was a part of national rail network. An 
interviewee  said  that  the  construction  and  operation  should  be 
separated  in  rail,  because  the  there  could  be  no  difference  in 
construction as a part of national rail network, but the private sector 
could  compete  with  other  rail  route  for  better  service  quality  in 
operation if the BTO model would be used. An interviewee from KORAIL 
said  that  the  creativity  of  the  private  sector  beyond  the  performance 
demand  from  the  public  sector  was  not  clear  to  improve  the  service 
quality timely (○ A ). He argued that the service quality might be affected 
by who operated it rather than by which PPP model was used. Especially, 
the Daegok-Sosa  line is  a  part of national rail network  and  it  can  be 
operated  with  other  public  operating  rail.  Thus,  he  said that the  BTL 
model can be advantageous in the service quality such as connecting or 
transferring  to  other  trains  and  lowering  the  tariff  through  sharing 
common facilities or equipments with the public operator. However, all 
of them agreed that the tariff could be lower in the BTL model, so the 
BTL model could be better in the perspective of VFM. 
 
< Contract and management > 
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Most interviewees agreed that the BTL model would be easy to finance, 
so it could make a contract easy  (○ B ). For this project, it would need 
subsidy  from  the  Government  in  case  of  using  the  BTO  model.  Even 
though  the  Government  could  provide  the  construction  or  operation 
subsidy, the BTO model would be difficult to make a contract because of 
the  recent  experience  of  much  lower  traffic  demand  in  rail  than 
anticipated if there were no MRG condition. 
 
With regard to the management, an experience is an important factor 
for the public sector to  manage the project.  The  BTL  model  is firstly 
used for rail, but an interviewee from the MLTM said that the private 
sector has already experiences in train operation, so it did not seem to 
have difficulty in operation even in the BTL model (○ C ). Interviewees from 
the  public  sector  pointed  out  that  there  might  be  little  difference  in 
construction stage in both PPP models, but agreed that the BTL model 
looks easier to be supervised in operation stage than the BTO model by 
the public sector (○ D ). 
 
< Incentivising good risk management > 
 
All  interviewees knew that the  BTL  model could  incentivise  good  risk 
management  through  the  performance  assessment  linked  to  the 
Government payment. However, a Government official in charge of this 
project said that the private sector did not make an effort to improve 
the  service  or  suggest  creative  idea  for  better  VFM  (○ E ).  They  just 
followed the guideline of the Government and were passive in the BTL 
model.  Most  interviewees  consented  that  this  project  is  a  part  of 
national  rail  network,  so  even  though  the  BTO  model  was  used, 
incentivising good risk management might be limited (○ F ).   
 
< Operational flexibility > 
 
Most interviewees from the public sector said that basically this project 
was  much  related  with other national rail network,  so the  BTL model 
could have benefit to the public sector to cope with the future change of Byungwoo Gil     
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circumstances  (○ G ).  Respondents  of the  public  sector  argued that  the 
need for an operational change such as train time and equipment by the 
public sector was expected to be high (○ H ). 
 
3.5  Seoul Metro 9 (BTO with MRG model) 
 
< Service quality >  
 
Most interviewees agreed that the private sector seems to be more 
sensitive to the end users in the BTO model (○ A ). However, several 
respondents pointed out that the advantage of the BTO model in service 
quality could be realised only when there was no MRG condition (○ B ). 
They argued that if a BTO project had a MRG condition, the revenue 
would be guaranteed to the private sector and efforts to improve service 
quality could be decreased. Also, an interviewee said that the service 
quality of the Seoul Metro 9 could be upgraded because there were 
enough competitions among subway operators (○ C ). The interviewee 
pointed out that there were more competitors in the Seoul Metro 9 than 
other railways (○ D ). 
 
< Contract and Management > 
 
Many interviewees said that financing was a key issue to make a 
contract and the BTL model looked easier to induce the private 
investment because there was no demand risk on the private sector (○ E ). 
An interviewee of the investment bank said that a financial investor 
could prefer the BTO with the MRG model than the BTL model (○ F ). 
 
With regard to the project management, many interviewees agreed that 
the difference between the BTL and the BTO in project management 
would be little (○ G ). Instead, some of them pointed out that the ability of 
the private and public sector was more important than a kind of PPP 
model (○ H ).  
 
< Risk management > Byungwoo Gil     
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Most Interviewees said that the appropriate risk management is variable 
by terms and conditions (○ I ). Several respondents said that the 
simplicity of risk management in the BTO model is a very strong 
advantage (○ J ). 
 
< Operational flexibility > 
 
Interviewees from the private sector alleged that they were more 
sensitive to the change of circumstances or technology in the BTO 
model (○ K ). A respondent from the public sector said that the private 
sector was only interested in making a profit, so the technology or 
innovative skill might be only adapted when it could make an additional 
profit in the BTO model. Respondents from the public sector argued that 
it was easy to request operational change in the BTL model through 
performance assessment. They argued that, even the in case of affecting 
the profit of the private sector, the public sector can have more options 
to be involved in the operation stage than in the BTO model (○ L ).  Byungwoo Gil     
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APPENDIX 5 Forecasted and actual traffic in rail of South Korea since 2000 
 
Project  Length 
(km) 
Open 
(year) 
 Forecasted 
passengers 
(passengers
/day, 2010*)  
 Actual 
passesngers 
(passengers
/day)  
Suseo-Ogum  3.0  2009            16,610            16,813  
Seoul subway 7(Jangam-
Onsu)  46.9  2000       2,596,000          926,000  
Seoul subway 6(Eongam-
Bonghwa)  35.1  2001       1,634,000          529,000  
Seoul subway 9(Gaehwa-
Nonhyun)  27.0  2009          312,438          260,452  
Incheon Gyulhyeon-
Dongmak  21.9  2000       1,890,000          218,551  
Incheon Dongmak-
Internatnional business 
centre 
6.5  2009            81,783            11,376  
Daejeon metro 1  22.6  2005          181,000            94,991  
Gwangju metro 1  20.1  2007          263,659            47,931  
Daegu metro 2  29.0  2005          152,000          143,705  
Busan metro 3(Suyoung-
Daejeo)  18.3  2005          322,678            75,000  
Uijeongbu-Dongan 
electrified double track rail  23.0  2007          191,984          139,513  
Suwon-cheonan 2 
electrified double track rail  55.6  2007          114,165          240,006  
Janhhang line renovation 
(1st stage)  75.6  2009            39,234            19,693  
Incheon airport railway  61.7  2010          421,592            47,791  
Ori-Suwon electrified 
double track rail  19.5  2007          108,518            28,041  
Cheongryangli-Deokso 
electrified double track rail  18.0  2010            96,916          155,921  
Deokso-Wonju electrified 
double track rail  90.4  2009            55,511            38,326  
Cheonan-Onyangoncheon 
electrified double track rail  16.5  2009            33,056            43,152  
KTX(1st stage)  238.6  2004          226,155          195,363  
* Traffic forecast in 2000 was calculated by the linear analysis based on past and 
future traffic forecast trend. Source: MLTM (2010) Byungwoo Gil     
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APPENDIX 6 Monte-Carlo Simulation by MS Excel 2003 
 
1. Basic Procedure 
 
1.1 Random number generation by using the formula =RAND( ) 
 
When the formula =RAND() is entered in a cell, a number, that is equally likely 
to assume any value between 0 and 1, can be get. Thus, around 25 percent of 
the time, a number less than or equal to 0.25 can be get; around 10 percent of 
the time a number that is at least 0.90 can be get, and so on. In the thesis, 
random numbers of 10,000 are generated by using this function of the MS 
Excel 2003. 
 
1.2 Simulation of values of a discrete random variable 
 
The key to the simulation is to use a random number to key a lookup from the 
probability of inaccuracy of traffic forecasting in road and rail in South Korea. 
In the case of road, random numbers greater than or equal to 0 and less than 
0.046 will yield an inaccuracy of -95%; random numbers greater than or equal 
to 0.046 and less than 0.207 will yield an inaccuracy of -80%; by the same 
method, the rest of random numbers yield to the probability of an inaccuracy 
of traffic forecasting in road. In the case of rail, the same method is used 
based on the probability of inaccuracy of traffic forecasting in rail in South 
Korea. In Figure A, 10,000 random numbers were generated by copying from 
C2 to C10001 the formula RAND(). 10,000 iterations of inaccuracy of traffic 
forecasting were undertaken by copying from B2 to B10001 the formula 
VLOOKUP(C2,lookup,2). Here, the lookup is the table range from F2:G13 
 
1.3 Calculation of the VFM 
 
The VFM for comparing the BTL with the BTO is calculated by the following 
formula in Chapter 4 based on the generated inaccuracy of traffic forecasting.  
 
VFMlo = BTO (Subsidy) – BTL (Lease + Operating cost – Revenue) 
 
In this formula, the inaccuracy of traffic forecasting affects the revenue. Byungwoo Gil     
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1.4 Probability of VFM based on the inaccuracy of traffic forecasting 
 
By using the Frequency function of the Excel, the values of VFM, which were 
calculated by randomly generated inaccuracy of traffic forecasting based on 
the discrete probability of the inaccuracy of traffic forecasting in road and rail 
in South Korea, can be counted. Total iteration is undertaken 10,000 times, so 
the frequency divided by 100 is the probability of VFM based on the inaccuracy 
of traffic forecasting. 
  
2.  Monte-Carlo Simulation for 5 cases 
 
2.1.  Incheon Airport Expressway 
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2.2.  Oksan-Ochang Expressway 
 
 
2.3.  Incheon Airport Railway 
 
D Di is sc cr re et te e   p pr ro ob ba ab bi il li it ty y   o of f   i in na ac cc cu ur ra ac cy y   o of f   t tr ra af ff fi ic c   
f fo or re ec ca as st ti in ng g   i in n   r ro oa ad d   
R Ra an nd do om m   
n nu um mb be er r   
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2.4.  Daegok-Sosa Railway 
 
 
2.5.  Seoul Metro 9 
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